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Insider Attacks are one of the most dangerous threats organizations face today. An insider
attack occurs when a person authorized to perform certain actions in an organization decides
to abuse the trust, and harm the organization by causing breaches in the confidentiality,
integrity or availability of the organization’s assets. These attacks may negatively impact
the reputation of the organization, its productivity, and may incur heavy losses in revenue and
clients. Preventing insider attacks is a daunting task. Employees need legitimate access to
effectively perform their jobs; however, at any point of time they may misuse their privileges
accidentally or intentionally. Hence, it is necessary to develop a system capable of finding a
middle ground where the necessary privileges are provided and insider threats are mitigated.
In this dissertation, we address this critical issue.
We propose three adaptive risk-and-trust aware access control frameworks that aim at
thwarting insider attacks by incorporating the behavior of users in the access control deci-
sion process. Our first framework is tailored towards general insider threat prevention in
role-based access control systems. As part of this framework, we propose methodologies to
specify risk-and-trust aware access control policies and a risk management approach that
minimizes the risk exposure for each access request. Our second framework is designed to
mitigate the risk of obligation-based systems which are difficult to manage and are partic-
ularly vulnerable to sabotage. As part of our obligation-based framework, we propose an
insider-threat-resistant trust computation methodology. We emphasize the use of monitoring
of obligation fulfillment patterns to determine some psychological precursors that have high
iii
predictive power with respect to potential insider threats. Our third framework is designed
to take advantage of geo-social information to deter insider threats. We uncover some in-
sider threats that arise when geo-social information is used to make access control decisions.
Based on this analysis, we define an insider threat resilient access control approach to man-
age privileges that considers geo-social context. The models and methodologies presented in
this dissertation can help a broad range of organizations in mitigating insider threats.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
“The year 2013 may be the year of the insider threat. Recent incidents of intellectual
property theft, exfiltration of sensitive intelligence, and international espionage concerns
have risen to the legal and regulatory forefront, quickly becoming a matter of political
debate and public speculation. These incidents highlight the need to improve the ability of
organizations to detect, deter, and respond to insider threats”.
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), January 2014 [52].
An insider attack is carried out by people who are legitimately authorized in the system to
perform certain tasks. Without a doubt, the data exfiltration performed by Edward Snowden
has been one of the most publicized insider incidents in recent history [64]. Snowden, while
working as a governmental contractor, leaked an estimate of 200,000 classified documents
from the US National Security Agency (NSA). This incident illustrates the significant damage
that can be inflicted by insiders and the urgent need for new solutions to mitigate this type
of threat.
Snowden’s insider attack is not an isolated incident. Insider threats have occurred across
all public and private sectors. According to the US State of Cybercrime Survey, insider
attacks accounted for 28% of the total incidents reported in 2014 [29]. Additionally, 32% of
the respondents reported that insider attacks were more damaging than attacks performed
by outsiders and 31% of the respondents in that survey reported incidents that could not
be attributed with certitude to insiders or outsiders. This indicates a lack of accountability
and possibly more incidents caused by insiders. The consequences of insider attacks may
be devastating, and may include financial losses, negative impact on the reputation, loss of
customers, among others. According to the CERT [81], the monetary losses due to insider
attacks ranged from five hundred dollars to tens of million of dollars, around 75% of the
organizations had an adverse impact on their business operations, and 28% experienced a
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negative impact on their reputation. Moreover, according to the same survey, 60 % of the
respondents reported monetary losses caused by non-malicious insiders. These statistics
show that it is not wise to trust insiders blindly. For this reason, dealing with insider threats
has become one of the most important issues in information security.
Deterring insider attacks and unintentional damage is a daunting task. In contrast to
external adversaries, insiders already have some access to the system and have preliminary
knowledge about existing defenses and about what data is valuable. Hence, these threats
cannot be adequately mitigated using defenses against outsiders. Additionally, while it
is necessary to provide privileges to employees so they can perform their jobs efficiently,
providing too many privileges may backfire when users accidentally or intentionally abuse
their privileges. Hence, finding a middle ground, where the necessary privileges are provided
and malicious usages are avoided, is necessary.
Some of the insider attacks could be prevented if users are monitored to identify suspi-
cious activities [81]. In particular, insider attack incidents could be prevented if the system
had a monitoring module to evaluate how trusted a user is with respect to technical and
psychological precursors used to predict insider attacks. Some of the technical precursors
include download and use of hacker tools, failure to create backups, unauthorized access
to customers’ or coworkers’ systems, system access after termination, inappropriate Internet
access at work, and the setup or use of backdoor accounts [81]. Among the psychological pre-
cursors, insider attackers have shown the following symptoms: disgruntlement, bad attitude
towards feedback, lack of dependability and absenteeism [58].
Despite the evidence of the predictive value of technical and psychological precursors,
they are often overlooked [81], only manually examined [27, 61] or analyzed only for forensic
purposes after the damage has already been done [36, 102, 88, 65, 109]. Some of the existing
solutions to deter insider attacks aim at specifying and enforcing least privilege by uniquely
providing the minimum set of required permissions to complete a task at a particular point of
time, and separation of duty to avoid conflicts of interests that may allow fraudulent activities
or personal gain [56]. Although it is crucial to enforce these security principles, they are not
enough by themselves. In fact, access control systems such as role-based access control
(RBAC) [50], Bell LaPadula [19], obligation-based systems [22], among others, typically
2
incorporate these principles, yet do not adapt to negative changes in users’ behavior. In
these systems, as long as users can prove they have the necessary set of credentials, the
access is granted – for instance, if a user can prove he works as an engineer, he can get all
associated privileges, even if his behavior suggests he is attacking the system! These access
control systems are appropriate in environments where users are well-behaved and can be
trusted to perform actions according to their credentials. Unfortunately, as the statistics
show, insiders do perform attacks. Furthermore, even if users could be trusted, malware can
be inadvertently installed and a user account compromised. Thus, it is necessary to include
the behavior of the users in the access control loop.
This suggests that having a more adaptive enforcement system that considers the behav-
ior of users to make access decisions would help prevent insider attacks. In such a dynamic
system, users’ behavior should dictate how trusted they are. When a user’s behavior falls
out of the expected pattern in a suspicious manner, the trust the system has on him should
be reduced. If a user is no longer trusted, the system should adapt by denying access to key
resources. A different trust value needs to be enforced for each resource depending on the
resource’s inherent criticality and the potential risk of the resource being misused.
1.1 LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES
Several researchers have recognized the advantages of having more dynamic access control
models, e.g., [30, 49, 46, 84]. We refer to these as adaptive access control systems. Adding
trust helps the system adapt to changes in the behavior of users. A trust threshold is typically
used to limit access to resources based on their importance to the organization. However,
existing approaches do not provide a comprehensive solution to address insider threats. We
identify the following shortcomings in existing approaches that we propose to address as part
of this research effort:
• It is not well understood how to adequately model the risk exposure during the access
control decision-making process. Often, risk management techniques such as Octave [7],
or the NIST risk management methodology [108] are used to determine which threats
3
need to be mitigated and which need to be accepted. As a result of risk management
analysis, the technical controls and procedures that need to be in place are identified.
However, it is not well understood how to integrate risk analysis results into an access
control framework, nor how to aggregate the risk exposure that occurs when an access to
a set of resources is granted. Current approaches do not provide a comprehensive analysis
to determine how risky an access is and simply assume this information is available in
the form of a trust threshold. There is a need to provide clear methodologies to model
the risk exposure of an access request.
• Current adaptive access control systems lack procedures to enforce automatically the
access control policy while minimizing the risk exposure associated with each access
request, limiting the power of the system to mitigate insider attacks. Salim et. al
[99] propose a system that relies on users to minimize the risk exposure by themselves.
However, in the context of insider threats, we believe that it is not wise to trust users in
this respect. Furthermore, humans are known to have bounded rationality [38]; therefore,
their solutions are most likely suboptimal. To close this gap, it is necessary to define
a system to minimize automatically the risk exposure every time an access request is
received.
• Access control policies are prone to errors and misconfigurations that result in a danger-
ous false sense of security. Research in this area has produced methodologies to analyze
policies and discover, detect and resolve policy misconfigurations, e.g., [107, 69, 54, 16,
44, 17, 104]. However, these works have focused on analyzing policies of non-adaptive
access control systems. For this reason, their methodologies are not fully applicable to
adaptive systems. In particular, they do not cover some of the caveats that arise when
policy constraints for insider threat mitigation are in place. More research in this area
is needed.
• The recent proliferation of mobile devices and social media has created newer opportuni-
ties to design an adaptive access control approach that is better suited for the mitigation
of insider threats. Despite the availability of geo-social information and techniques to
analyze it (e.g., [35, 78, 5, 40]), there have been few research efforts that focus on leverag-
ing geo-social information to mitigate insider threats. Nonetheless, valuable information
4
such as interaction or relationship between users and places they frequently visit has not
been considered by existing adaptive access control systems. We believe that geo-social
information can help capture the risk exposure added by users in the vicinity and can
also assist in analyzing patterns of misbehavior. These risk factors should influence the
access control decision process to prevent insider threats.
A few recent approaches incorporate geo-social context of users as part of the access
control policy [76, 63, 14]. However, they are not designed to take into consideration
suspicious user behavior and thus they fail to prevent some insider attacks. We need
to have a better understanding of how to use geo-social information in access control
policies and how including this information impacts the security of the system. Thus,
new approaches to fully leverage geo-social information for insider threat mitigation are
in need.
• Despite the great predictive value of psychological indicators for insider threat detection
[58], they are often overlooked because they require human input and hence are difficult
to acquire and maintain up to date. Furthermore, collecting such information may violate
employee’s privacy [58, 111, 73]. Hence, new ways to collect this type of indicators are
needed.
With these limitations in mind, in the following, we present the objectives of our research.
1.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RESEARCH
The hypothesis of this study is that some insider attacks and undesirable incidents can be
avoided by designing an access control system that is able to adapt to negative changes on
users’ behavior as well as contextual information. In particular, we hypothesize that enhanc-
ing access control systems by including factors such as the inference of critical unauthorized
information, obligation management, geo-social contextual information, collusion indicators,
among other technical and psychological precursors can help evaluate the risk exposure of
each access request and mitigate it accordingly. We believe that including risk management
techniques that incorporate the previously mentioned enhancement components into the ac-
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Figure 1: Conceptual view of the proposed frameworks.
cess control decision process is a natural way to model the problem as different assets need
different degrees of protection. We also argue that access control systems are an appropriate
place to perform risk management because they are the main component controlling who
can access different information, assets or resources of the system.
Towards proving our hypothesis, we develop the three frameworks depicted in Figure 1.
Each of the proposed frameworks is designed to mitigate a different set of insider threats. A
detailed description of these threats is presented in Chapter 3. We now briefly describe the
objectives and research questions of each of the proposed frameworks.
1. An Adaptive Risk Management RBAC Framework
This framework is designed for general insider threat mitigation in systems that use
RBAC. We focus on extending the RBAC model because it is widely adopted and has
been proven to be a promising approach for different types of organizations, as docu-
mented in [95, 85]. Our objective is to develop an adaptive risk management framework
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for RBAC systems to proactively incorporate the most recent behavior of users as a fac-
tor for making an authorization decision. This risk-and-trust aware framework should
provide a comprehensive risk aggregation methodology and manage risk automatically
for every access request.
The key research questions that we address while designing this framework are the fol-
lowing: How should an adaptive RBAC-based system be modeled to mitigate insider
attacks? How should we model and compute the risk of granting an access? Can we
define an optimization problem to minimize automatically the risk exposure while en-
forcing the access control policy? How can we help system administrators mitigate the
risk exposure caused by inference of unauthorized information?
2. An Obligation-based Framework to Reduce Risk Exposure and Deter Insider Attacks
The second proposed framework aims to mitigate insider threats in obligation-based
access control systems. Obligation-based access control systems have emerged as an
important approach to perform privilege management in multiple application domains
[91, 66], for example, in health care information systems [86], digital right management
[75] and privacy aware systems [18]. These systems are particularly risky because they
incorporate a posteriori obligations. Such an obligation is an action imposed on users
after an access is granted. Because the access is already granted, there is no guarantee
that users will fulfill a posteriori obligations assigned to them, opening the door to costly
threats of sabotage1.
Our objective is to reduce the risk exposure introduced by a posteriori obligations. Here,
we aim to answer the following research questions : Can we reduce the risk exposure
caused by a posteriori obligations during access control? How should we model a risk-
and-trust aware obligation-based system to adequately reduce this risk? Can we use a
posteriori obligations as a way to determine how trusted a user is and what would be an
appropriate methodology to do so? Are a posteriori obligations a good way to determine
whether a user is about to become an insider attacker? How can we use the logs of the
system to identify policy misconfigurations and misbehaving users?
1For example, violations of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which requires the
fulfillment of multiple obligations from part of the personnel of health care entities, may carry a maximum
penalty of $50,000 per violation, with an annual maximum of $1.5 million [2]
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This framework can be used independently with non-RBAC or RBAC based systems. It
can also be integrated with the Adaptive Risk Management RBAC Framework proposed
in this dissertation to achieve a more comprehensive insider threat prevention solution.
3. A Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control Framework (G-SIR)
We propose G-SIR to take advantage of the increasing availability of geo-social infor-
mation to deter insider threats. This framework is tailored towards organizations that
want to adapt to users’ geo-social contexts during the access control process. Examples
of organizations where geo-social controls may be useful to prevent insider threats are
hospitals, research laboratories, critical infrastructure, cloud providers and any other or-
ganizations where users may not wander to certain places and where social and location
information can provide indications of potential insider threats.
The research questions that we address to develop this framework are the following: How
can we use geo-social information to regulate access to critical privileges? What policy
constraints are useful when geo-social information is available? Does using geo-social
information to regulate accesses introduce new insider threats? Can we manage the risk
of colludig communities and proximity threats using geo-social information? Can we use
geo-social behavior to determine how trusted users are? If so, what mitigation techniques
are appropriate?
The first two proposed frameworks, the adaptive RBAC framework and the obligation-
based framework, provide orthogonal solutions that can be integrated or used separately.
The first framework assumes the existence of an RBAC system with features that may in-
clude separation of duty, cardinality constraints and hybrid hierarchy. Our focus in designing
this framework is to provide an approach that allows the automatic reduction of risk expo-
sure for each access request received. Our obligation framework is primarily focused on
mitigating the risk introduced by the presence of a posteriori obligations. The proposed
approach provides a way to identify suspicious users based on their patterns of violation and
fulfillment of obligations. Another differentiating factor between these frameworks is that
the obligation-based framework does not require the use of RBAC. Hence, any access control
model that includes a posteriori obligations can adopt the methodologies proposed as part
of the obligation-based framework. The two frameworks can be integrated whenever an or-
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ganization needs to perform insider threat mitigation by using both the RBAC mechanism
and obligations.
Our third framework, G-SIR, differs from the previous two in that it focuses on the new
opportunities and challenges that using geo-social information in the access control system
brings to the picture. We define and design several geo-social policy constraints that may
be useful to a variety of organizations with the capability of collecting geo-social informa-
tion. Neither of the first two frameworks incorporate geo-social information to make access
control decisions. In Figure 1, the proposed G-SIR is depicted on top of the adaptive and
obligation-based framework because it makes use of some of their methodologies and con-
structs. In particular, G-SIR makes partial use of the enforcement approaches designed for
the adaptive RBAC framework to minimize the risk of each access request. Thus, achieving
a full integration between these two frameworks is relatively simple. One of the six types of
policy constraints that we define as part of G-SIR are geo-social obligations. This kind of
policy constraint is different from a posteriori obligations; however, they can be managed
through the same trust methodology presented in the obligation-based framework. More-
over, the trust methodology proposed as part of the obligation-based framework can be used
to monitor the behavior of insiders concerning the compliance of the G-SIR policy. The
obligation-based framework and G-SIR can be integrated to control the risk of each access
request considering relevant geo-social aspects as well as the assignment of possible a posteri-
ori obligations. Next, we present the system architecture that integrates the three proposed
frameworks.
Integrated System Architecture: Figure 2 presents the system architecture that inte-
grates all three proposed frameworks. It consists of a Risk-and-Trust Aware Access Control
Module, a Monitoring, Context and Trust Module, and an Administration Module. The Risk-
and-Trust Aware Access Control Module is responsible for making access control decisions
that manage the risk exposure. To perform this task effectively, this module considers the
current context of users in the system as well as how trusted they are. This information
comes from the Monitoring, Context and Trust Module. The latter consists of a Monitoring
Module that collects data about the user’s activities in the system, which are later analyzed
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and correlated by the Context Module to identify the context of a user at a particular time.
In this dissertation, we assume that these two modules are in place and work adequately. The
Trust Module uses the monitored information to compute a value that reflects how trusted a
user is given his behavior. All data produced by the Monitoring, Context and Trust Module
is stored in the trust and monitored data and context repositories, respectively.
The Risk-and-Trust Aware Access Control Module works as follows. The policy enforce-
ment point (PEP) intercepts all access requests, all requests are evaluated at the policy
decision point (PDP) which grants or denies accesses according to the policy stored in the
policy information point (PIP). For this purpose, all the information related to how trusted a
user is, the current context and the risk exposure is used to make an authorization decision.
The latter value is computed by Risk Module, which determines how risky an access request
is. With all the relevant information, the access control system determines whether an au-
thorization request should be granted. The decision is made to ensure that the risk exposure
is under control. Thus, the Risk-and-Trust-aware module is in charge of minimizing the
risk exposure. The last component of the architecture is the Administration Module. This
component is designed to specify access policies as well as help administrators find policy
problems and misconfigurations.
1.3 SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION
In this dissertation, we make the following assumptions. We assume that all accesses are
mediated by a reference monitor, the PEP in Figure 2. Attacks that bypass the PEP or that
manage to subvert it, for example, by taking advantage of software vulnerabilities, are out
of the scope of this dissertation. We focus on the mitigation of threats where the behavior
of insiders change before committing an attack. With respect to the collection of geo-social
information, we assume that it is possible to obtain accurate geo-social information from
users when they are in their working spaces.
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1.4 CONTRIBUTIONS
As part of this dissertation, we propose three frameworks. Their detailed contributions are
presented in Chapter 3. In the following, we overview the key contributions of our work:
• We develop a risk-and-trust RBAC framework that utilizes a novel risk aggregation
methodology, which includes the risk exposure caused by inference of unauthorized infor-
mation. We also define an optimization problem to automatically and optimally minimize
the risk exposure of an organization every time the system receives an access request,
and propose an algorithm to solve it. Additionally, we provide a methodology to identify
user-to-role assignments in the policy that lead to undesirable inference risks.
• We propose an obligation-based access control model that manages risk exposure caused
by unfulfilled obligations. To the best of our knowledge, such an obligation-based ap-
proach is the first of its kind. We propose to use obligations as a way to determine the
mood of employees –a psychological indicator– without introducing subjective informa-
tion or violating users’ privacy. We further develop a trust methodology to determine
when it is too risky to allow an access that has obligations associated with it. We also
provide a methodology that helps identify obligation-based policy misconfiguration and
misbehaving users.
• Little work exists in geo-social access control and existing ones do not consider the in-
tricacies of incorporating geo-social information as part of the access control system for
insider threat prevention. We uncover threats that are enabled by existing geo-social
access control systems. Then, we propose insider threat mitigation techniques using
geo-social access control policies. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research
effort to analyze geo-social access control systems with the objective of protecting a sys-
tem against insider threats. Based on this analysis, we propose our Geo-Social Insider
Threat Resilient Access Control Framework (G-SIR) which is the first to capture ac-
ceptable and unacceptable geo-social behavior and incorporate it into the access control
decision process. G-SIR includes new types of geo-social constraints and protects against
proximity attacks, collusion attacks and some attacks that can be launched by the access
requester.
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1.5 DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we present the
background and related work. In Chapter 3, we present the detailed motivation and require-
ments that have led to the design of the three frameworks that are part of this dissertation.
We also highlight the detailed contributions of each of the three proposed frameworks. In
Chapter 4, we present the proposed adaptive risk management RBAC framework. Then, in
Chapter 5 we present the proposed obligation-based framework. In Chapter 6 we present our
geo-social insider threat resilient access control framework. Finally, in Chapter 7, we present
the conclusions and future work.
The work presented in Chapter 4 has been previously published in [11, 12]. The material
in Chapter 5 was previously published in [13]. Some of the content used in our geo-social
framework was previously published in [14].
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2.0 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this Chapter, we present the background information and the related work of our research.
We begin by presenting background on insider attacks (section 2.1). Then, we present risk
and trust definitions and related work in these areas (sections 2.2 and 2.3). After that, we
present RBAC basics and related work that include risk and trust (section 2.4). Then, we
present the state of the art of obligation-based access control systems (section 2.5). Finally,
we introduce some background information on geo-social access control approaches (section
2.6).
2.1 INSIDER ATTACKS
Insider threats have been broadly classified as intentional and unintentional threats [112]
which are defined as follows.
1. Intentional insider threats: We define intentional insider attackers as individuals who
have legitimate access to the resources of an organization and decide to attack the organi-
zation by disrupting its availability and compromising confidentiality or integrity of assets
owned by the organization. The motives of insider attackers vary from highly calculating
individuals motivated by personal gain (e.g., steal intellectual property) to disgruntled em-
ployees aiming to hurt the organization (e.g., sabotage the operations). In [56, 58], several
incidents have been documented.
Modeling insider attacks successfully requires the identification of important indicators
that may be used to determine if a user is misbehaving. If an employee is accused unfairly, he
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may worsen his performance, increase his level of disgruntlement, reduce his trust towards the
organization and in the worst case, become an actual attacker. Technical and psychological
precursors discussed in [81] are often used to identify misbehaving users. The set of technical
precursors utilized is highly dependent on the type of system that is modeled. In particular,
depending on which access control model is used, different indicators may be available.
For instance, in a role based system, it is possible to profile users based on their behavior
with respect to the behavior of all other users that share the same role [21, 37]. Several
methodologies have been proposed to monitor different aspects of users’ behavior that include
monitoring their search behavior for files [98], the content of emails [111], among others,
e.g., ([47, 115, 25]). A survey on insider threat detection can be found in [97]. To integrate
all available anomaly detection data, situation-aware systems such as the one proposed in
[27, 73] can be used.
Situation-aware systems should also include psychological precursors to boost their pre-
diction value. However, including these indicators is a challenging task. Among the psy-
chological precursors, insider attackers generally show the following symptoms: disgruntle-
ment, bad attitude towards feedback, anger management issues, disengagement, disregard
for authority, performance decrease, stress, confrontational behavior, personal issues, self-
contentedness, lack of dependability and absenteeism [58]. Although psychological indicators
may allow early detection of insider threats, monitoring users can be challenging because
of privacy and legal concerns. Several of the indicators proposed in [58] are related to psy-
chological and physical characteristics that are usually seen as private information. For
instance, monitoring the health of an individual is not well regarded; indeed, the Health In-
surance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA) protects individuals’ right to medical
privacy [86]. Hence, including psychological and physical monitoring of a user would breach
the HIPPA legislation and other privacy related legislation. Therefore, new techniques to
measure these indicators without violating the privacy of the employees are needed.
Greitzer et. al [61] propose to find these indicators using human input, which is subjec-
tive in nature and may be biased due to interpersonal relationships. For instance, asking
an insider to evaluate these indicators will inevitably lead to a subjective evaluation based
on how he sees his co-workers. Another approach is to ask employees to report suspicious
15
behavior. This is not usually a successful practice as people tend not to report such in-
formation for fear of incriminating a co-worker who is possibly innocent or because they
think someone else is going to report the suspicious behavior [92]. Existing practices to mea-
sure the employee’s psychosocial state usually result in outdated information. For example,
360-performance evaluation methodology is typically completed once a year [58].
Ideally, a system should identify the psychological state of users without including sub-
jective opinions or compromising their privacy and at the same time, it should include this
information as quickly as possible. By doing so, it is possible to take advantage of the high
predictability factor of psychological indicators [9, 60].
2. Unintentional insider threats: Recently, unintentional insider threats have been
defined as threats that occur “through action or inaction without malicious intent that causes
harm or substantially increases the probability of future serious harm to the confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information systems” [112].
Social engineering attacks, phishing, fatigue-related incidents, among others are classified as
part of unintentional insider threats.
In this dissertation, our primary focus is to mitigate intentional insider threats. However,
for our obligation-based and geo-social framework, we also include some design elements that
aim at preventing unintentional insider attacks.
2.2 RISK
Risk is the cornerstone of the proposed research. Risk is defined by the likelihood of a
hazardous situation and its consequences if it occurs [83]. To identify the impact of an event
we use a probabilistic risk analysis as defined by Kaplan et. al in [74], where risk can be
calculated using the expected value formula. First, all possible outcomes are found and
quantified and then each outcome is weighted by its probability.
In information security, risk assessment methodologies such as the NIST risk management
methodology [108], Octave [7], [4], among others, allow organizations to identify threats and
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evaluate their risks to determine an appropriate course of actions. The ultimate objective
is to determine if it is appropriate to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of a particular
threat through the implementation of policies, controls and mechanisms in the system. When
controls are implemented the risk is said to be mitigated. Otherwise, it is said to be accepted.
The risk exposure after all the controls and mechanisms are in place is called residual risk,
and ideally, it is the risk that the organization is willing to accept. These methodologies
usually focus on high level assets and are often performed once a year. Complementary
risk mitigation techniques are needed to allow a more frequent and automatic prevention of
insider attacks.
2.3 TRUST
Trust is another key concept in our research. Several definitions of trust have been provided
in the literature [71, 82, 57, 87]. We adopt the following trust definition: “Trust is a sub-
jective expectation an agent has about another’s future behavior based on the history of their
encounters” [82]. Trust may depend on the context in which the interaction between entities
takes place. For instance, the type of service and the network connection used by the user
may define a context. Our framework requires the use of methodologies to find trust values
for users given their current and historic behavior. Several approaches for calculating trust
in different domains have been proposed. A comprehensive survey of trust methodologies
can be found in [34]. In Chapter 5.3 we show that existing trust methodologies are not
directly applicable for obligation-based risk management.
2.4 ADAPTIVE ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL APPROACHES
Because all access control models studied as part of this research corpus extend the Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) model, we begin by presenting an overview of RBAC model.
Then, we present the related work on RBAC, risk and trust and we point out the limitations
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of existing work that we propose to address as part of this dissertation.
2.4.1 Background on RBAC, Constraints and Hybrid Hierarchy
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model [50] has multiple benefits. It encompasses dis-
cretionary and mandatory access control models and supports organization or user-specific
requirements. In addition, RBAC uses roles, which are a natural abstraction for most orga-
nizations, and it provides organizations with economic benefits due to the reduction of the
administration cost [95].
In RBAC, permissions are assigned to roles, and roles are assigned to users. In order
to obtain the permissions authorized for a role, users need to activate the role in a session.
Sets U , R, and P represent the set of users, roles and permissions in the system, respec-
tively. Separation of duty constraints (SoD) are used to avoid fraudulent activities within
an organization by preventing a unique user from assuming two or more conflicting roles.
There are two types of SoD constraints: Static (SSoD) and the Dynamic (DSoD). SSoD
restricts the authorization of users to conflicting roles [6]. Each constraint is denoted as
ssod(RS, k) ∈ SSoD, where RS ⊆ R with 2 ≤ k ≤ n. This constraint states that a user can
be authorized to at most k−1 roles in RS. Similarly, a DSoD constraint dsod(RS, k) ∈ DSoD
states that a user can activate at most k − 1 roles in RS simultaneously.
There are two types of cardinality constraints. An activation cardinality constraint re-
stricts the number of users that can activate a particular role in a system simultaneously.
To denote that a role r can be activated at the same time by at most k− 1 users, we use the
notation card(r, k). An assignment cardinality constraint restricts the number of users that
can be assigned to a role. This is denoted as cardA(r, k).
Roles can be hierarchically organized using hybrid hierarchy [101]. Roles r1 and r2 can
be hierarchically related in one of the following ways. (1) I-hierarchy (r1 ≥I r2) where r1
inherits the permissions of r2. (2) A-hierarchy (r1 ≥A r2) where users assigned to r1 can
activate r2. (3) IA-hierarchy (r1 ≥IA r2), in this case, r1 is I-senior and A-senior of r2. The
hybrid hierarchy allows the enforcement of different types of policies such as DSoD when
roles are hierarchically related [101].
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2.4.2 Related Work on RBAC Extended with Risk and Trust
Although RBAC has several benefits, it cannot automatically revoke access to users that
are not behaving properly. For this reason, several approaches have incorporated trust [30,
49, 46]. However, existing approaches do not present a comprehensive analysis of the way
in which trust thresholds should be assigned, do not include separation of duty constraints
nor specify how to enforce such policies or reduce the risk exposure automatically. In [30],
roles are associated with trust intervals, and trust intervals are assigned to users. Users are
assigned to roles according to their trust levels. This model does not capture the intuitive
nature of RBAC systems in which users are assigned to roles according to their organization’s
functions, not trust levels. In [49], users are assigned to roles based on trustworthiness and
context information. A similar approach was proposed in [46], where role thresholds are a
function of the risk of the operations. If the trust of the user offsets the risk of the action,
the access is granted. However, none of these works provide a clear framework to compute
trust thresholds and do not reduce the risk the organization faces at runtime by selecting
roles with minimum risk exposure.
In [80], each role is assigned a minimum level of confidence and each user a clearance level.
Based on these values, the risk associated with a user activating a role is calculated. Objects
and actions are assigned a value according to their importance and criticality. However, this
work does not mitigate insider threats as the trust levels of users is a static value that does
not depend on users’ behavior. In addition, Ma et. al [80] do not consider role hierarchy in
their work and do not present experimental results.
In [84, 8, 32], the main focus is also to reduce the risk exposure. In [84], a risk based
analysis is proposed to ensure that system administrators assign permissions to the roles
considering the risk inherent to those permissions. Each permission is assigned a risk value,
and the role hierarchy is organized based on these risk values. This may not be appropriate,
as it is more intuitive to organize the role hierarchy according to the employee’s structure.
We argue that maintaining a role hierarchy that matches the organization’s hierarchy is
more intuitive for security administrators. Additionally, this work does not reduce the risk
exposure of the organization during the role activation process. In [8], a model that modifies
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the policy to minimize the risk exposure as systems evolve is proposed. This model results in
a difficult to manage policy in which the administrator does not know the current status of
the policy; making it cumbersome to modify it and prone to errors. Chen et. al [32] propose
a model in which the risk associated with a role is calculated using the trustworthiness of the
user, the degree of competence he has to activate a role, and the degree of appropriateness
of the permission-role assignments. Each permission is assigned a mitigation strategy, which
is a list of risk thresholds and an associated obligation pair. When a user wants to obtain
a set of permissions, the role with minimum risk is selected. Then, the system consults
the mitigation strategy to see which action is more appropriate: to deny the access or to
allow the access imposing an obligation. Chen et. al do not consider SoD constraints,
which is crucial for addressing insider attacks. Additionally, they do not account for the
context as an important component to define the risk threshold that should be enforced.
Chen et. al use the appropriateness of permission to role assignment as part of the risk
computation. We believe this makes the semantics of permission to role assignment complex,
as the appropriateness value becomes a functional input for such assignments. This may
result in too many inappropriate assignments -although they will likely be captured through
risk computation. Hence, this causes unnecessary complexity in the administration of the
policy. Additionally, Chen et. al do not provide an algorithm to enforce the policy to reduce
the risk exposure during the role activation process.
Salim et. al propose to assign costs of access to permissions depending on the risk of
their operations, and to assign to each user a budget in [99]. Users are assigned to roles, but
being assigned or not does not necessarily determine whether or not a user should be allowed
to activate a role. If the user accesses permissions that he can obtain through an authorized
role, the cost is reduced. In case a user is not authorized to a role, the cost of activating the
role is taxed. Nonetheless, if the user has enough budget to make the operation, he can access
the permissions. Salim et. al [99] claim that this mechanism incentivizes users to spend their
budget cautiously, activating low cost (low risk) roles. However, this scheme exacerbates the
risk of insider threats. Users can use their budget to perform unauthorized accesses without
being detected; e.g., if a disgruntled employee wants to quit the organization, he would not
mind expending all his budget performing a malicious action.
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Many commercial products also incorporate risk in their solutions; e.g., SAP [102], Oracle
[88], IBM [65] and Beta Systems [109]. These products mitigate risk by closely monitoring
and auditing the usage of risky permissions. The risk values, however, are not used to make
access control decisions, missing the opportunity to incorporate the overall known behavior
of the users to prevent insider threats.
The threat of inference of unauthorized information is particularly relevant in the insider
threat context. This threat occurs when through what seems to be innocuous informa-
tion, a user is capable of inferring information that he should not have access to. In existing
approaches to deal with inference threat [26, 45, 23], when a user is about to infer some unau-
thorized information, the system prevents it by either denying access or providing scrambled
data. This is not adequate for all types of organizations. We believe that real organizations
may need to provide access to multiple pieces of information to a single employee even if
they result in undesirable inference. Existing RBAC extensions do not consider the risk of
inferred information. New ways to mitigate the inference risk in RBAC-based systems are
needed.
In summary, to the best of our knowledge, none of the related work has provided an
analysis of the way the roles should be activated to mitigate risk of insider threats. For
this purpose, there is need to have a comprehensive methodology to identify how risky an
access is. In addition, current literature often does not include hybrid hierarchy, SoD and
cardinality constraints or enforce least privilege. These constructs are crucial to provide
flexibility during policy specification as well as reducing the risk exposure caused by insider
threats. Another limitation of existing approaches is that they do not mitigate the risk
of inference of unauthorized information. Finally, none of these works provides tools for
administrators to validate policy correctness. This research avenue has been explored in
non-adaptive access control systems e.g., [107, 69, 54], however it has been neglected in risk
and trust-aware access control systems despite their increased policy specification complexity.
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2.5 OBLIGATION-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Many application domains, including healthcare information systems, require the inclusion of
obligations as part of their access control policies [86, 91, 66]. An obligation is an action that
needs to be performed before a deadline passes [67]. The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) provides some examples of obligations, e.g., “when a patient
sends a request to access her protected health information, the doctor must respond to that
request within 30 days”. Here the deadline is 30 days and the action is to respond to the
patient’s request. When an obligation is completed before the stipulated deadline, it is said
to be fulfilled. Otherwise it falls into a violated state. We distinguish between user-based and
system-based obligations. In system-based obligations, the system is in charge of performing
the obligations while in user-based obligations the user is in charge of fulfilling the obligation.
We further classify obligations in three categories based on when they need to be performed,
these are: a priori obligations and a posteri obligations. A priori obligations need to be
performed before an access to a resource takes places while a posteriori obligations need to
be performed after an access takes place.
In this dissertation, we focus on user-based a posteriori obligations because they are very
challenging to enforce as there is no guarantee that users will fulfill them. Additionally, they
are particularly prone to sabotage threats. In what follows, we present the related work to
obligations.
2.5.1 Related Work on Obligations
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing work has recognized that not fulfilling an
obligation has an inherent risk for organizations. Most existing work related to obligations
focus on providing accountability in the system [36, 67]. The idea is to assign a posteriori
obligations to the users in such a way that the only reason for the obligation to fall into
a violated state is user’s incompetence. Li et. al [79] propose an XACML extension to
specify obligations as state machines. In [120], an RBAC policy augmented with obligations
is presented. None of these works include risk management as part of the decision making
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process to assign an a posteriori obligation to a user.
Bettini et. al propose calculating a reliability value based on the history of fulfillment
of obligations in [22]. However, the work limits itself to providing a syntax to include this
value into the obligation policy and does not provide a methodology to calculate it. Their
approach assumes a trust methodology is available to identify users’ intentions. Additionally,
no methodology to find policy misconfigurations, colluding and suspicious users is provided.
Other approaches have tried to reduce the risk exposure through the use of system obligations
(e.g., [32]), which are obligations performed by the system itself. These obligations are meant
to mitigate the risk, e.g., an obligation may consist of having the system close a file after a
low trusted user has accessed it. System obligation are a valuable approach to deter insider
threats, but they do not mitigate the risk associated with a posteriori obligations.
Although several approaches combine access control with risk and trust [72, 103, 11,
100], to the best of our knowledge none of them considers risk when assigning a posteriori
obligations to users nor provides a trust based methodology to do so. In [72], an abstract
model for incorporating the concept of risk in Usage Control (UCON) [90] is presented.
They consider risk coming from components such as the user, object, operations, connection
used as well as the provenance of attribute certificates. However, they do not include the
obligations as part of the risk components. We believe that it is relevant to incorporate a
posteriori obligations in the risk assessment as obligations are inherently risky.
2.6 GEO-SOCIAL ACCESS CONTROL
Several works have extended RBAC to include the context of the user such as the location
and temporal constraints as part of the access control decision [20, 31, 114, 41, 94]. We
broadly classify the existing RBAC literature into two categories namely RBAC extensions
that support location-based decisions [20, 31, 114, 94] such as Geo-RBAC [20] and LoT-
RBAC [31] and models that extend RBAC with proximity constraints that include other
user’s proximity as part of the access control policies such as Prox-RBAC [76, 63]. In Table
1, we compare existing approaches with our previously proposed Geo-Social RBAC [14] based
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on the following types of constraints:
1. Pure location constraints: these constraints only take the location of users into ac-
count, e.g., to access a confidential file, a user may need to be in a particular room.
2. Geo-social constraints: these constraints consider both the location and the social
dimensions of the users in the policies. These are further classified as follows. (i)Geo-
social graph-based constraints which are based on the social graph structure, e.g., to enter
into a room a person needs to be in company of at least two friends that work there and
are present. (ii)Geo-social tag-based constraints which capture the types of relationships
between the users in the social graphs in addition to the location and social constraints.
For example, a child can only access a pay-per-view movie if he is in the presence of his
parent or a nanny.
3. Trace-based constraints: These constraints are based on user’s trajectory and whether
the user has been physically co-located with a particular set of individuals. These include:
• Location trace-based constraints: which capture the past location traces of a user as
part of the access control policies. For instance, consider a silicon chip manufacturer
company where even a minimum amount of dust may ruin an entire production
batch. If an operator has been in known dusty rooms of the factory, he cannot
enter the sterile chip production room unless he has previously passed through the
cleaning room. This is a location trace policy as the previous whereabouts of the
user determine whether or not he would be able to obtain the requested access.
• Geo-social trace-based constraints: which capture both the location history and the
social dimensions of the users. For example, in a company, if a visitor has entered into
the rooms used for induction of new employees accompanied by an administrator,
he can also access the welcome package files and the internal directory web pages.
As shown in Table 1, existing models do not support many geo-social constraints that
our previously proposed Geo-Social-RBAC incorporates. For this reason, in the remaining
of this dissertation, we focus on this model. In the remainder of this subsection, we examine
more closely approaches that have included the geo-social context as part of access control
systems [76, 63]. Prox-RBAC model [76] extends the Geo-RBAC model to include proximity
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Table 1: Comparison of types of geo-social policies supported by existing RBAC based
models.
Policy RBAC extended
with location
[20, 31, 114, 94]
RBAC extended
with proximity
[76, 63]
Our Approach:
Geo-Social-RBAC
[14]
Pure location constraints Yes Yes Yes
Geo-social graph-based constraints No Yes Yes
Geo-social tag-based constraints No No Yes
Location-trace-based constraints No No Yes
Geo-social-trace-based constraints No No Yes
of other individuals as part of the policy in indoor environments. In Prox-RBAC valid
proximity constraints are based on the role of the access requester and the roles of other
individuals in proximity of the requester. This model does not allow the specification of
geo-social constraints based on social graphs. Gupta et. al [63] extended Prox-RBAC by
providing formal definitions to determine the proximity between locations, users, attributes
and time, each of which is referred to as a realm. The access control model does not include
hybrid realm policies. Additionally, their work does not allow the specification of some of
the policies presented in Table 1.
Other non-RBAC based models have been proposed in the literature [113, 53, 28, 110].
Besides not being RBAC-based, none of them are designed to protect against insider threats.
TMAC [113] is a model to establish policies that require team cooperation. Fong present
ReRAC [53] where decisions are based on the relationship between the resource owner and
the access requester. Carminati et al. [28] propose an access control model where policies
are expressed based on user-user and user-resource relationships. In [110], access control
decisions are made based on the location of the resource owner, the resource requester and
possibly other co-located individuals. Their model assumes that individuals own the re-
sources and it is not based on RBAC, making it less suitable for company settings. Also, it
does not consider trace-based constraints.
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing approaches have been designed to
25
capture the intricacies of creating a geo-social access control model capable of mitigating
insider threats. In particular, they do not include risk and trust as part of the access control
decision making process. As part of this dissertation, we present some insider threats that
arise when existing geo-social models are used. We also provide policy constraints and
enforcement mechanisms to mitigate these threats.
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3.0 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this chapter, we present the requirements and contributions of each of the three frameworks
proposed as part of this dissertation. We begin by our RBAC-based framework in Section
3.1, followed by our obligation-based framework in Section 3.2 and conclude the chapter with
our G-SIR framework in Section 3.3.
3.1 AN ADAPTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT RBAC FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework aims to reduce the attacks and misuses performed by insiders when
using an RBAC-based access control system. We envision a model simple enough to abstract
the fact that information to assess how trusted a user is may be coming from multiple sources.
Failing to hide this complexity or to avoid having multiple sources of information to determine
how trusted a user is would render the model unusable. No previous assumptions on trust
levels of the users should be made based on their rank or on fixed security clearances such
as top secret, secret, non-confidential, etc., to allow flexibility and applicability to multiple
types of organizations.
This framework needs a risk a methodology to assess the risk exposure of each access
request. Recall that in RBAC, to acquire a permission, it is necessary to activate a role that
has the permission assigned to it in a session. Each permission may have a different risk
value associated with it; hence, we need to design a suitable risk aggregation methodology
to determine the risk exposure of an organization if a particular access request that requires
the activation of a set of roles is to be granted. The risk aggregation methodology should be
designed to account for different ways in which acquiring multiple privileges simultaneously
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may be used to attack the system. We consider two factors. The first factor is the risks
associated with the permissions acquired through the roles. The second factor is the risk due
to inference of unauthorized objects, which we call inference risk and is caused by multiple
accesses. The inference risk arises when providing a set of permissions to a user allows
him to infer information that, in principle, he should not have access to. Although ideally,
this should never be the case, given the limited number of users in organizations, security
administrators may specify access control policies that often enable undesirable inference
of information [15, 43]. For this reason, the aggregation methodology should account for
inference risk to manage it appropriately.
3.1.1 Requirements
We identify the following requirements.
1. The access control model should allow the specification and enforcement of separation
of duty, cardinality constraints as well as the hybrid hierarchy to support fine-grained
access control policies. The importance of these components for insider threat prevention
was outlined in Chapter 2.
2. The system should detect suspicious activities. This process should be automatic and
should be able to establish to which level each user is to be trusted by the system.
3. It should be possible to associate different trust values for a user depending on the user’s
and system’s context. We stress the importance of including the context in which the
access is taking place. For example, the risk of a user accessing a confidential file from a
machine without connection to the Internet is less compared to the risk associated with
the same access using a personal device from a remote location.
4. Since different permissions may have different risks associated with them, the system
should be able to react to suspicious changes in the behavior of users by removing access
to riskier permissions quickly, and if the misuse continues, to other permissions as well.
5. The framework should include a risk aggregation methodology to determine the risk as-
sociated with the activation of a set of roles by a particular user. The risk associated
should include the imminent risk associated with the permissions acquired through the
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roles, and the risk due to inference of unauthorized objects. The risk exposure should be
automatically reduced, minimizing the impact of possible attacks.
6. The system should provide the security administrator the ability to identify the active
inference threats associated with a particular policy, so he can decide whether the pol-
icy needs to be modified to reduce the risk exposure due to inference of unauthorized
information.
In this dissertation, we focus on requirements 1, 3, 4 and 5. For requirement 2, anomaly
detection solutions, such as those presented in Chapter 2, can be used to monitor the behavior
of users and calculate how trusted they are.
3.1.2 Contributions
The details of our proposed risk-and-trust aware RBAC framework are presented in Chap-
ter 4. The following are the contributions associated with the proposed Adaptive Risk
Management RBAC Framework.
• We propose a model that includes risk and trust in RBAC systems that adapts to anoma-
lous and suspicious changes in users’ behavior.
• We propose a comprehensive approach to calculate the risk values associated with per-
missions and roles. In particular, we introduce the notion of inference of unauthorized
permissions when calculating the risk of activation of a set of roles. For this purpose, we
present a formulation of a Coloured Petri-net (CP-net) [70] to identify when a particular
user may infer unauthorized permissions, and subsequently adjust the trust threshold
required to activate needed roles.
• We propose a refinement methodology to reduce the amount of information stored and
the performance of the CP-net used to identify the risk exposure due to inference of
unauthorized information.
• We formulate an optimization problem to enforce the policy and reduce the risk exposure.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that attempts to reduce the risk
exposure in this way.
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• We present a role activation algorithm to solve the optimization problem, and evaluate
its performance using well-formed policies and prove its correctness.
• In order to improve the risk management process related to inference threats, we propose
a simulation strategy that allows administrators to identify active inference threats before
a policy is deployed. In addition, an administrator can determine the effects of adding
a user-to-role assignment before he modifies the access control policy in the production
system. This methodology helps reduce undesirable inference threats.
3.2 OBLIGATION-BASED FRAMEWORK TO REDUCE RISK
EXPOSURE AND DETER INSIDER ATTACKS
At the core of this framework is a methodology to find users’ trust values based on patterns of
violation and fulfillment of their assigned obligations. Such a methodology should withstand
powerful adversaries. We propose the following threat model with two types of adversaries
that are representative of possible insider attackers:
1. Na¨ıve users: These are insiders who know the system is monitoring if they have fulfilled
or violated a particular obligation. However, they do not know the details of how their
trust values and trust thresholds to access resources are computed by the system.
2. Strategic users: These are insiders who have knowledge about the system’s mechanism
to compute trust values. This information gives them the power to try to maintain
their trust levels within the expected thresholds to avoid being flagged as suspicious by
controlling their behavior in a smart way.
In chapter 5.3, we show that the existing approaches do not withstand this adversarial model.
Having defined our adversarial model, we now present the requirements of this framework.
3.2.1 Requirements
The proposed obligation-based framework should address the following requirements for
detecting and mitigating the risk exposure of unfulfilled a posteriori obligations.
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1. The associated access control model should capture the criticality of obligations. A
criticality value represents the severity of the impact of not fulfilling an obligation for
the organization.
2. Reduce risk of users not fulfilling obligations by considering their trust values and the
criticality of a posteriori obligations associated with the permissions being requested.
The system should deny access requests to users whose trust values are below a pre-
specified threshold associated with a posteriori obligations that would be triggered by
the requested accesses.
3. Develop a methodology to compute the obligation related trust value of a user based on
the history of fulfilling or defaulting on a posteriori obligations as well as his performance
with respect to his peers. The trust value should detect when a user is an outlier;
e.g., when the user is the only one defaulting on a particular obligation. The proposed
methodology should be reliable against both strategic and na¨ıve adversaries.
4. Provide a methodology that allows an administrator to detect policy misconfigurations
related to a posteriori obligations by identifying patterns of violation of a posteriori
obligations. The patterns can serve to identify when a particular obligation is not being
fulfilled by a large number of users. This may be due to different factors. It is possible
that the policy is not updated, but there is a verbal or implicit agreement to ignore it
or the users that are assigned those obligations are too busy or lazy. The system should
also detect when a user is the only one continuously violating an obligation, which may
imply he is sabotaging the operation. The knowledge of these patterns can be used to
reduce the risk and identify policy misconfigurations.
5. Identify when a user is misbehaving, which in turn indicates that he poses a high risk of
becoming an insider attacker, without invading users’ privacy.
3.2.2 Contributions
The proposed Obligation-based Framework to Reduce Risk Exposure and Deter Insider At-
tacks is presented in Chapter 5. The contributions of this framework are as follows:
• We emphasize and show that a posteriori obligations have an inherent criticality level and
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propose a comprehensive framework to reduce the risk exposure faced by organizations
every time a user is assigned critical obligations. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first work that has integrated the inherent criticality of a posteriori obligations and
the obligation-based trust values in the authorization decision-making process.
• We propose and evaluate a methodology to calculate the obligation-based trust values
for each user. The methodology is resilient against users who know how the system
computes the trust values and try to exploit this knowledge. Our methodology is also
able to discern among users who accidentally do not fulfill an obligation, maliciously
avoid the fulfillment of obligations and those who strategically oscillate their behavior to
maintain their trust values within an acceptable threshold to later launch an attack.
• We propose the use of a clustering-based methodology to identify policy misconfigura-
tions, users colluding to avoid performing particular obligations and users whose behavior
is worse than their peers (e.g., users that systematically avoid fulfilling an a posteriori
obligation). This information can be used by the system administrator to take necessary
actions, such as updating the policy or monitoring more closely certain users.
• Finally, the proposed framework provides a technique to detect insider threats by moni-
toring users without invading their privacy (e.g., other methodologies used for this pur-
pose scan users’ personal emails) or including subjective measures.
3.3 GEO-SOCIAL INSIDER THREAT RESILIENT ACCESS CONTROL
FRAMEWORK
Geo-social information can significantly help to deter insider threats. When an organization
establishes a geo-social access control system, it creates a unique opportunity to use the
information collected by the infrastructure to account for users’ behavior and make ade-
quate access control decisions. These types of controls help prevent some insider attacks.
For example, a user who is often at places that he is not supposed to frequent should be
flagged as suspicious and actions to restrict his access to highly critical information should
be automatically performed. This behavioral information should be considered at the time
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access control decisions are evaluated.
However, designing a system that uses this information without increasing the risk ex-
posure is a challenging task. Before outlining the concrete challenges and showing where
existing techniques fall short, we introduce the relevant actors and components of the pro-
posed system.
3.3.1 System Actors
A geo-social access control system has a social network graph, where nodes represent users
and edges represent relationships among them. These relationships are annotated with labels
that represent the types of social relationships, e.g., boss. Additionally, a geo-social system
has access to the location where users are at any particular time. Users may issue access
requests and a policy can be defined to determine if an access request should be granted or
denied. Geo-social access control systems also consider where the requester is located and
who the users in the vicinity are. This information is very useful because it helps determine
when the access request context is not adequate to grant a requested access.
We classify users in the vicinity in three classes: enablers, inhibitors or neutral users
according to the way in which they impact the risk exposure associated with granting an
access request. Enablers are users that may actually bootstrap and/or enhance the trust of
an access request by vouching for the requester due to their social relationship. Inhibitors
on the other hand, are users whose presence increases the risk of granting an access and
neutral users are those whose presence does not increase or reduce the risk of a request. For
example, consider a policy that requires a parent or a nanny to be in the same room with a
child requesting an access to a pay-per-view movie. Here, the parent or nanny are enablers
and the child is the requester. In contrast, inhibitors increase the risk of granting access to
a request. An example of an inhibitor is a consultant trying to access sensitive information
in presence of another consultant working for a competing company.
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3.3.2 Insider Threats
A geo-social adaptive system to deter insider attacks should be able to determine the risks
associated with these actors whenever an access request is evaluated. The risk exposure
increases with respect to adaptive access control systems because enablers can influence the
access control decisions as indicated by the following threats.
1. Collusion: The requester and enablers may decide to collude and probe the system to
try to access information that they would not ordinarily have access to. Ways to collude to
probe the system include changing the current location or trying to modify the social graph
to gain more accesses.
These types of collusion attacks are new and have not been considered by existing adap-
tive access control models. Although existing geo-social access control models make use of
statically defined and enforced geo-social cardinality constraints to reduce the risk of col-
lusion, these constraints are not enough. A geo-social cardinality constraint is a rule that
helps establish how many people need to be at a particular location for a user to be able
to exercise a privilege [76, 63, 14]. Even if there is evidence that suggests a group of peo-
ple is colluding, existing geo-social cardinality constraints disregard this information. As a
consequence, colluding users may gain access to critical information despite availability of
evidence of their malicious efforts.
2. Social engineering attacks: Social engineering attackers convince other users to
perform an action that they should not perform under normal circumstances. For instance,
an enabler may be tricked by a malicious requester through a social engineering attack to
move to a location to allow his request to be granted. Similarly, the requester may be tricked
to enter into a particular place and access some information.
3. Proximity threats: Users in the vicinity create multiple risks based on the groups to
which they belong (e.g., conflicting projects, or being part of social communities that are
undesirable for a particular access). When a user in the vicinity poses too much risk, she
is classified as an inhibitor. A framework for insider mitigation needs to be able to specify
that whenever there are one or more inhibitors, the access control system should deny the
access.
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4. Inadequate policy enforcement: Although existing geo-social access control systems
specify policies that control access to some privileges based on the geo-social context of a
user, they do not account for negative geo-social behavior. Undesirable behavior may not
be prevented by an access control policy for reasons that include high costs of enforcement,
inconvenience, and people working around enforcement mechanisms in place, as the following
example illustrates. A user may enter a restricted area (e.g., by door piggybacking), where he
should not be; however, he does not request any access while in the forbidden place. In this
scenario, current geo-social access control systems are blind to the fact that the user entered
into a forbidden place. Although it is understood that the user’s behavior is inappropriate,
no enforced access control policy is impacted by her behavior. Thus, current geo-social access
control policies are not enough to detect negative geo-social behavior when it is not linked
to an access request. As a result, dangerous behavior may not be captured.
Given this inability to enforce desired policies, often users are informed of the geo-social
behavior they are expected to fulfill and are blindly trusted to do so. Such desirable behav-
ior can be enforced through social contracts [24], which are a tacit or verbal understanding
between interested parties about each other’s expected behavior. We are interested in social
contracts that specify the whereabouts and relationships that are appropriate or inappropri-
ate for the role that users play within an organization.
Preventing inappropriate geo-social behavior is a daunting task, and new techniques need
to be devised to capture violations of social contracts. Although it is difficult to enforce,
through proper monitoring, it is possible to identify inappropriate behavior and raise an
alert.
5. Privilege misuse threats: These threats occur when a requester decides to abuse his
privileges. Our framework should also mitigate them by using historical behavior.
3.3.3 Requirements
Towards addressing these insider threats, we now discuss the requirements for the proposed
Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control Framework :
1. Provide policy constructions to classify users in the vicinity according to the risk they
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impose given an access request into enablers, inhibitor or neutral users.
2. Define policy constraints to capture geo-social behavior relevant to access control deci-
sions. In particular, the system should allow the specification of the following types of
policy constraints.
i) geo-social contracts, which specify places and people that a user cannot visit by
virtue of being assigned to a role in an organization,
ii) geo-social obligations, which are geo-social actions that a user needs to perform after
an access has been granted. Geo-social actions include visiting or refraining from
visiting a particular place or person, and
iii) trace-based constraints, which reflect expected paths that users need to complete
before being granted an access.
3. Restrict accesses where the requester or any of the enablers are violating any of his social
contracts.
4. Monitor and analyze the behavior of users with respect to the fulfillment of geo-social
policy constraints. Users violating policy constraints more often than their peers are
suspected of disregard of authority and, hence, should be trusted less. Therefore, the
estimated probability of the requester being an attacker should include geo-social policy
violations.
5. Mitigate the risk of colluding users by identifying communities of colluding users and
restricting accesses where there is a strong indication that the enablers and the requester
are colluding.
6. Ensure that the access control system can adapt to negative changes in behavior of users
by restricting critical privileges to users who do not behave properly. The decision to
grant or deny an access should consider the risk exposure. G-SIR should minimize the
risk exposure caused by the requester, users in the vicinity and potential collusion among
enablers and the requester.
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3.3.4 Contributions
We propose a Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control Framework (G-SIR). G-
SIR is capable of deterring insider attacks by considering users’ geo-social context, their
behavior and the risks associated with granting access to a set of permissions. In Chapter 6
we present in detail G-SIR. The contributions related to this framework are summarized
as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first research effort to analyze geo-social access
control systems with the objective of protecting a system against insider threats. We
present threats that are enabled by current geo-social access control systems.
• To mitigate these threats, we propose an access control model that includes a set of
geo-social constraints to capture acceptable and unacceptable geo-social behavior. The
proposed constraints include geo-social contracts, geo-social obligations, traces and vicin-
ity constraints.
• We propose a risk management framework that incorporates geo-social behavior of the
users and adaptably tunes the access control decision to minimize the risk. As part
of this process, G-SIR monitors users who violate geo-social constraints to improve ac-
countability and determine how trustworthy users are. The risk management procedure
considers: i) how trustworthy the system considers the user is with respect to his geo-
social behavior, ii) the user’s current geo-social context, iii) the context of relevant social
relationships, iv) existing indications of collusion among individuals in the vicinity, and
v) other users in the vicinity who may compromise the security of accessed information.
• Finally, we evaluate G-SIR through simulations to demonstrate its effectiveness and
feasibility.
In the following chapter, we present first and most general framework to deter insider
threats.
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4.0 AN ADAPTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT RBAC FRAMEWORK
In this chapter, we present the proposed Adaptive Risk Management RBAC Framework.
We begin by presenting some preliminaries in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we present the
requirements of the system and an overview of the proposed framework. The details of the
risk calculations are presented in Section 4.3. The formal definition of the role activation
problem and the proposed algorithm is presented in Sections 4.4. In section 4.5, we present
a CP-net based technique to find and manage the inference risk. Finally, we show the
experimental results in Section 4.6.
4.1 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present the notation and concepts used through this chapter. In our
risk-and-trust aware RBAC model, we incorporate hybrid hierarchy introduced in Chapter
2. We use function Pau(r ∈ R) to denote the set of permissions that can be acquired through
r; this includes the permissions directly assigned to r and those inherited through I and IA
hierarchical relations. Similarly, Pau(Rc ⊆ R) returns the authorized permissions of all the
roles in Rc. Function authorized(u ∈ U) returns the roles in R that are authorized for u (if
u is authorized for role r, it means he can activate r). Function activated(r ∈ R) returns
the number of sessions that contain role r. Finally, we denote the set of contexts as C.
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4.1.1 Coloured Petri-net (CP-net)
We model the history of accesses as a Coloured Petri-net (CP-net) [70]. Here, we provide
the basic concepts of CP-nets, and in Section 4.3.2.1, we present the proposed CP-net. A
CP-net is a bipartite graph that contains two types of nodes: places (W ) and transitions
(T ). Places and transitions are connected through arcs (F ⊆ (W × T ) ∪ (T ×W )). No arc
can exist between two nodes of the same type. Tokens (V ) live in places, and move around
in the CP-net when transitions fire. Usually, tokens represent objects and their attributes,
which are called colors or types. Not all types of tokens are accepted in all the places.
Υ(w ∈ W ) denotes the type of accepted tokens in place w. Each transition t ∈ T has a
boolean guard that evaluates a condition based on tokens V ′ ⊆ V located in the input place;
a guard is represented by G(t ∈ T, V ′ ⊆ V ). If the guard evaluates to true, the transition
fires. Otherwise, the transition does not fire. If a transition fires, it consumes the tokens that
made the guard evaluate to true and collocates a new token in the output place(s). This is
represented by the function λ : t ∈ T × V ′ ⊆ V → vo ∈ V , where G(t, V ′) = true and vo is
the token produced by the transition. We use mo to denote the initial placing of tokens in
the CP-net. Finally, a CP-net in its initial state is defined by tuple 〈W,T, F, V,Υ, λ,mo〉.
4.2 THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
4.2.1 Overview of the Framework
We consider RBAC systems with hybrid hierarchy, cardinality and SoD constraints. We
extend this model by adding the following components (a detailed explanation of each of
them is provided in Section 4.3).
• Each user is associated with a trust value that is a function of his behavior under a
particular context. We denote this as trust(u ∈ U, c ∈ C).
• Each permission is assigned a risk value within a particular context. We denote this as
rs(p ∈ P, c ∈ C).
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• The policy contains a set of inference tuples I, which allows the calculation of the risk
exposure due to inference of unauthorized information.
• When a set of roles RS is to be activated, first its combined risk value is computed
(rs(RS ⊆ R, c ∈ C, u ∈ U)) based on (i) the permissions it is authorized for, (ii) the
inference risk associated with those permissions, (iii) the context, and (iv) the trust
value of the user trying to activate the roles.
• Similarly, when a set of roles RS is to be activated simultaneously by a user, a trust
threshold is computed based on the risk of RS. This threshold is denoted as τ(RS ⊆
R, c ∈ C, u ∈ U).
A user can activate a set of roles in a session if and only if (i) he is assigned to all the
roles in the set, (ii) their activation does not violate any constraint, and (iii) he possesses a
trust value greater than or equal to the trust threshold required for those roles. We formalize
this notion in Section 4.4. In RBAC, only the first two conditions need to be fulfilled for a
user to be able to activate a role. In our model, we also consider the trust value of the user,
which allows the system to adapt to misbehaving users.
The proposed system architecture is shown in Figure 3. The Monitoring Module monitors
the users in the system. The Trust and Context Module (TCM) uses the monitored infor-
mation to identify the context, and calculate the trust value of each of the users accordingly.
These trust values are stored in the Trust Repository.
The Access Control Module is composed of the Enforcement Module the Administration
Module and the Policy Information Point (PIP). The policy of the system is stored in the
PIP. The Enforcement Module is in charge of evaluating access requests and has several
components, the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP), the
Risk Module and the Inference Module. An access request consists of the set of permissions a
user wants to acquire. The PEP intercepts all these requests, and ensures that the resources
of the system can be accessed only if the policy authorizes it. The access requests are
intercepted by the PEP, which sends them to the PDP. The PDP evaluates the policy
according to the trust the system has on the user, the context, and the inference risk. The
inference risk is computed by the Inference Module and the computations related to trust
thresholds are performed in the Risk Module. In case the trust value of a user decreases
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Figure 3: Risk-and-trust RBAC architecture.
while a user has a session open, the TCM sends a notification to the PDP, which re-evaluates
whether the privileges the user is exercising should be revoked. In this way, the system is
able to deny access to misbehaving users before they can perform extensive damage to the
system.
The Administration Module enables the administrator to define, refine and analyze the
policy. It is composed of two modules. The Policy Editor allows the specification of the
policy and the Inference Threat Risk Management Module produces informs that identify
the active inference threats of a particular policy configuration. Using this information, an
administrator may iteratively modify the policy to reach the desired risk exposure. In this
way, the administrator can identify the ideal policy, with respect to inference risk, before he
realizes the policy in the production system. We discuss in detail this procedure in Section
4.5.
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4.3 RISK AND TRUST THRESHOLDS
In this section, we present the proposed methodology to calculate the risk exposure of an
organization. We show how the risk is calculated for different roles that a user wants to
activate based on the risk of the permissions they can acquire. Finally, we show how to
compute the trust threshold.
4.3.1 Risk Associated with Permissions
A permission is a tuple 〈obj, act〉 where the obj is an asset in the organization such as a file or
other resource, and the act corresponds to the action that a user can perform on the object.
Objects are susceptible to different threats. Among these are object’s loss of integrity,
loss of confidentiality, and loss of availability. Intuitively, different objects have different
security requirements that depend on the business functions of a particular organization.
For instance, some objects require that their integrity be well guarded, other objects are
sensitive (their leakage would result in a lot of damage to the business), while others may be
critical and sensitive simultaneously. Hence, the risk exposure of the organization depends
on the action that is performed on the object and the relevance of the object.
The risk value of a permission p is the likelihood that p is misused multiplied by the
corresponding damage cost. We are interested in the residual risk which means that the
likelihood of a particular misuse depends on the mitigation mechanisms and controls that
the organization has in place to reduce the vulnerabilities that can lead to the misuse.
Definition 1. The risk of permission p = 〈obj, act〉 ∈ P in context c ∈ C, written as rs(p, c),
is defined as follows:
rs(p, c) =
∑
xp∈MaliciousUsagec
Pr[xp| c ] ∗ cost(xp)
Where MaliciousUsagec is a set of possible events in context c that can lead to a misuse
of object obj through the action act, Pr[xp| c ] is the probability of occurrence of a particular
malicious usage of object obj through action act given c, and cost(xp) is its associated cost.
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Example 1. For simplicity, in this example, we only consider one context: users are ac-
cessing the system through the intranet. Consider an organization that produces soaps. To
calculate the risk associated with permission p1 = 〈listOfProviders, read〉, the organization
performs the following analysis. The provider’s list is considered to be sensitive, as its infor-
mation provides the organization a competitive advantage. The organization calculates that
its leakage would cost around $30,000. According to their system’s configuration, the proba-
bility of occurrence of this event is 0.1. This results in a total risk of $3,000. Permission p2,
corresponds to writing the number of orders to be placed. The concern related to this object
is its integrity. In case this number is overwritten maliciously, the organization would face
problems. They may either run out of materials before planned or they would be paying for
a large unnecessary inventory. The company estimates that having a large inventory would
cost them around $500 and an insufficient inventory $2,000, for a total cost of $2,500. The
probability of those events is 0.1. Therefore, the total risk of p2 is $250. Permission p3
allows halting the machines that produce soaps. If this permission is maliciously used, the
entire factory would be stopped and serious consequences may occur. The organization may
not be able to fulfill its contracts, may lose money, and in the worst case, clients. The cost
of this event is estimated to be $20,000. However, in order to use it, three administrators
need to authorize the operation. Hence, the probability of this misuse is estimated to be very
low: 0.005, for a total risk of $100.
4.3.2 Risk Associated with Role Sets
Intuitively, the risk associated with a set of roles is a function of the risk of the permissions
that can be accessed through those roles. When calculating such risk values, we include the
risk of the permissions that can be explicitly acquired through those roles, as well as those
that can be inferred from them. We first show how we model the inference problem, and
then we present how to calculate the risk of activating a set of roles.
4.3.2.1 Inference Threat and Activation History An Inference threat exists when a
user is able to infer unauthorized sensitive information through what seems to be innocuous
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data he is authorized for.
Definition 2. An Inference Tuple 〈PS, px〉 consists of a set of permissions PS ⊂ P , and
an inferred permission px = 〈x, read〉 ∈ P , for which the following conditions hold:
1. PS does not contain the inferred permission: px /∈ PS.
2. Once a user has acquired all the permissions in PS, he has all the information required
to infer object x.
3. The set PS is a minimal set of permissions that allows the inference of object x.
We denote the set of all inference tuples by I.
Note that in the above definition, an object may be inferred through more than one set
of permissions. For instance, it may be possible to infer object x through two different sets
of permissions PS1 and PS2; which results in two inference tuples: 〈PS1, px〉 and 〈PS2, px〉.
It is also possible that the same set of permissions can be used to infer different objects, e.g,.
〈PS3, pi〉 and 〈PS3, pj〉. These inference tuples can be found automatically using techniques
such as those described in [33, 118].
To determine when a user has acquired all the permissions necessary to be able to infer
unauthorized information, we need to keep track of his access history because the user
may accumulate over time information to perform the inference. We denote the history
of access of user u as Hu and use two functions. Function permInferred(Hu) returns the
set of permissions the user would be able to infer given his previous accesses, and function
permExercised(Hu) returns the set of permissions the user has exercised.
Definition 3. Given a user u, his history of access Hu and a set of roles R′ that he is
authorized for, function inferred(Hu, u, R′) returns the set of unauthorized permissions that
u can infer uniquely after activating R′:
inferred(Hu, u,R′) = {px | 〈PS, px〉 ∈ I ∧ px /∈ authorized(u)
∧ permExercised(Hu) ∪ Pau(R′) ⊇ PS
∧ px /∈ permInferred(Hu) }
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Note that in the above definition, because of the last condition, only permissions that
the user would not be able to infer without activating R′ are included. In section 4.5, we
present in detail a methodology to find inferred(Hu, u, R′) using a CP-net.
4.3.2.2 Calculating The Role Set Risk The risk exposure of providing access to a
set of roles R′ ⊆ R to a user u depends on the state of the CP-net. The following formula
provides the risk exposure.
Definition 4. The risk exposure of the system if user u activates a set of roles R′ ⊆ R in
context c is given by
rs(R′, c, u) =
∑
p∈℘
rs(p, c)
where ℘ = Pau(R
′) ∪ inferred(Hu, u, R′).
When no inference occurs due to the activation of R′, inferred(Hu, u, R′) = ∅; and the
risk exposure is given by the risk of the authorized permissions Pau(R
′). On the contrary,
when one or more roles in R′ allow the user to infer unauthorized information, the risk
includes the risk of directly acquired permissions and the risk of the inferred permissions
in inferred(Hu, u, R′). In Example 3, Section 4.5.1, we show how inferred(Hu, u, R′) is
computed and used.
4.3.3 Trust Thresholds Associated with Role Sets
The trust threshold associated with a set of roles represents how trusted a user needs to be
in order to use those roles. Intuitively, this threshold needs to reflect the risk exposure of
the organization when the roles are activated by a user. We define the trust threshold as
follows.
Definition 5. The trust threshold of the set of roles R′ ⊆ R, in context c for user u is
defined as follows:
τ(R′, c, u) =
rs(R′, c, u)∑
p∈P
(rs(p, c))
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p5
p6
r7 p7
Conventions
Roles
Permissions	
A-hierarchy	
I-hierarchy	
IA-hierarchy
Permission
(pi)
Risk of	permissions	
rs(pi,c)
Role	
(ri) Pau(ri)
p1 $3,000	 r1 {p1,p2,p4}
p2 $250	 r2 {p1}
p3 $100	 r3 {p3}
p4 $50	 r4 {p4}
p5 $1,500	 r5 {p1,p5,p6}
p6 $500	 r6 {p6}
p7 $500	 r7 {p7}
Figure 4: Policy for example 2.
Where 0 ≤ τ(R′, c, u) ≤ 1. When τ(R′, c, u) = 0, it means that user u does not need to
be trusted to activate R′ in context c; when τ(R′, c, u) = 1, it means that user u needs to be
completely trusted in order to activate R′ in context c.
Example 2. Consider the policy presented in Figure 4 where roles are represented by cir-
cles and permissions by rectangles. Roles are organized hierarchically as shown in the fig-
ure. In the table, the risk of each permission and the set of authorized permissions per
role are listed. Let inferred(Hu, u, R′) = ∅ and assume that user u is assigned to roles
r1, r5 and r6. (a) Suppose that u wants to activate role set {r1, r6} under context c. Given
that Pau({r1, r6}) = {p1, p2, p4, p6} and according to Definition 4, the risk exposure is equal to
rs({r1, r6}, c, u) = rs(p1, c)+rs(p2, c)+rs(p4, c)+rs(p6, c). Hence, rs({r1, r6}), c, u) = $3, 800
and τ({r1, r6}, c, u) = $3,800/$5,900 = 0.64, where $5,900 corresponds to the sum of the risk
of all the permissions. (b) Now suppose that u requests the activation of r5 under context c.
Here Pau(r5) = {p1, p5, p6}, rs({r5}), c, u) = {rs(p1, c) + rs(p5, c) + rs(p6, c)} = $5,000 and
τ({r5}, c, u)=0.85. Role {r5} grants access to permissions that are very critical, more than
the ones granted by {r1, r6}; therefore its trust threshold is higher.
4.3.4 Trust of Users
We assign each user in the system a trust level. The trust for a user u in context c is denoted
by trust(u, c) and is defined in the interval [0, 1], where 1 means the user is fully trusted and
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0 means the user is totally untrusted. The Trust and Contexts Module in Figure 3 considers
the behavior of users over time and the context to calculate the trust value for each user;
e.g., if the user is using an untrusted connection, the trust in the user may be reduced. The
details of this process are out of the scope of this dissertation. Solutions such as [21, 37] can
be used to construct profiles and latter calculate a trust value based on the behavior of a
user.
4.4 MINIMIZING THE RISK EXPOSURE
To make sure that our system enforces a policy correctly, we provide the definition of a
well-formed policy that establishes a baseline of the types of accepted policies.
Definition 6. A well-formed policy is defined as follows:
1. No roles in a DSoD constraint are allowed to have any I or IA-seniors:
∀ r ∈ R, dsod(RS, k) ∈ DSoD @r′ ∈ R : (r′ ≥I r) ∨ (r′ ≥IA r)
2. User to role assignments should respect SSoD:
∀u ∈ U, ssod(RS, k) ∈ SSoD : |authorized(u) ∩RS| < k
3. User to role assignments should respect the cardinality constraints:
∀u ∈ U, cardA(r, k) ∈ CARDA : |authorized(u) ∩RS| < k
Condition 1 states that the roles involved in a DSoD constraint may only have A-senior
roles. As explained in [101], this condition allows the system to enforce DSoD constraints.
Condition 2 establishes that all SSoD constraints are enforced in presence of hybrid hierarchy.
Finally, condition 3 ensures that the user assignment fulfills the cardinality constraints.
When a policy fulfills all these conditions, it is possible to enforce it during runtime.
4.4.1 Trust-and-Risk Aware Role Activation
The role activation process is instrumental in our framework. It is in charge of identifying
when a user should be denied to activate roles due to lack of trust or other policy constraints.
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It also allows us to minimize the risk exposure by selecting the roles that have less risk in
the system. First, we present the problem statement.
Problem Statement: A user u in context c with a trust value trust(u, c) requests the
system to activate a permissions set PS ⊆ P in a single session. The system responds to
the user’s request by either accepting it and determining the proper roles to be activated or
rejecting it. If the access is granted, the roles selected to be activated should minimize the
risk exposure of the organization.
A request of a user u ∈ U in context c for permissions PS ⊆ P is granted if a set of
roles Rq ⊆ R can provide the permissions in PS, and the following conditions hold: (1) The
user is authorized for all the roles in Rq. (2) The user’s trust level (trust(u, c)) is greater or
equal to the trust threshold of the set of roles Rq. (3) The DSoD and cardinality constraints
are not violated when roles in Rq are activated simultaneously. The following optimization
problem captures the Trust-and-Risk Role Activation problem.
Definition 7. The Trust-and-Risk Aware Role Activation Optimization Problem for a query
q = 〈u, PS, c〉, consists of finding a solution, Rq, such that:
min
Rq⊆authorized(u)
rs(Rq, c, u)
s.t.
∀ dsod(RSi, ki) ∈ DSoD : |Rq ∩RSi| < ki (a)
∀ card(rc, k) ∈ CARD ∧ rc ∈ Rq : activated(rc) + 1 ≤ k − 1 (b)
trust(u, c) ≥ τ(Rq, c, u) (c)
Pau(Rq) ⊇ PS (d)
The system grants a request only if the entire set of requested permissions can be autho-
rized to the user, as we assume that the permissions in PS need to be used simultaneously.
In addition, we only require that Pau(Rq) ⊇ PS. This means that the selected roles may
provide additional permissions than those requested by the user. We argue that selecting
the roles that minimize the risk is better than providing the roles that minimize the number
of extra permissions. To see why, let us consider two possible solutions. The first solution
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contains one role that provides one additional permission, with a risk of $10, whereas the
second solution contains a role that provides two extra permissions with a risk of $1. In this
case, the algorithm selects the second solution because, even though the number of additional
permissions is higher, the total risk exposure is reduced.
4.4.2 Role Activation Algorithm
We propose Algorithm 1 to find a solution for the Trust-and-Risk Aware Role Activation
Problem. Our algorithm assumes that the policy is well formed, as per Definition 6. The
algorithm first removes from the search space the roles that cannot be activated due to trust
issues (line 4). The current best solution is stored in the set Rq, which initially is empty.
The function selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem, Ravail, Rsel, u, c) finds candidate solutions,
and compares them to select the best one. This function is recursive and it starts by checking
the base case. This occurs when a candidate solution provides all the permissions requested
(line 16). If the candidate solution is less risky than the current best solution, it becomes the
new best solution. If both solutions have the same risk, the algorithm selects the one that has
lesser number of roles. Otherwise, it keeps the original solution. Before the algorithm reaches
the base case, it prunes the search space by removing the roles that cannot be activated due
to DSoD and cardinality constraints (lines 25 and 28). Roles that do not provide the missing
permissions in the candidate solution are also removed (line 32). These pruning steps take
place before any role is added to a candidate solution, ensuring that candidate solutions do
not contain roles that violate the constraints of the policy. In case no candidate roles are left
after the pruning (line 34), the algorithm backtracks as that search path did not lead to a
valid solution. Otherwise, the next role to be added to the candidate set is chosen in line 36;
this function only selects a role r if adding it to Rsel fulfills τ(Rsel ∪ {r}, c, u) ≤ trust(u, c)
(line 44). We evaluate two heuristics to perform this step in Section 4.6. The selected role
is denoted as rbest. The algorithm evaluates the two possible paths i) a candidate solution
where rbest is added (line 40) and ii) a candidate solution that does not contain rbest (line
41).
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Algorithm 1 Trust-and-Risk Aware Role Activation
Precondition: The policy is well-formed (Definition 6).
Postcondition: Rq contains the solution of the problem specified in Definition 7.
1: findTrustAndRiskAwareActivationSet(u, PS, c)
2: Ravail ← authorized(u) {Candidate roles}
3: for all r ∈ Ravail do
4: if τ(r, c, u) > trust(u, c) then
5: Ravail ← Ravail \ r {Pruning based on user’s trust}
6: Rsel ← ∅ {Selected roles so far}
7: Prem ← PS {Set of permissions that haven’t been found}
8: Rq ← ∅ {Global variable, stores the best found solution}
9: selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem, Ravail, Rsel, u, c)
10: if Rq 6= ∅ then
11: return Rq {Request accepted, activate Rq}
12: else
13: return ∅ {Request denied}
14: —————————————————————————————————————————
15: selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem, Ravail, Rsel, u, c)
16: if Prem = ∅ then
17: if Rq = ∅ then
18: Rq ← Rsel
19: else
20: if rs(Rq, c, u) > rs(Rsel,c,u) then
21: Rq ← Rsel
22: else if (rs(Rq, c, u) = rs(Rsel, c, u))∧ | Rq |>| Rsel | then
23: Rq ← Rsel
24: return {Found candidate solution}
25: for all dsod(RS, k) ∈ DSoD do
26: if | Rsel ∩RS |= (k − 1) then
27: Ravail ← Ravail \ [RS \ (Rsel ∩RS)]
28: for all card(rc, k) ∈ CARD ∧ rc ∈ Ravail do
29: if activated(rc) + 1 = k − 1 then
30: Ravail ← Ravail \ rc
31: for all ri ∈ Ravail do
32: if Prem ∩ Pau(ri) = ∅ then
33: Ravail ← Ravail \ ri
34: if Ravail = ∅ then
35: return
36: rbest ← nextRole(Prem, Ravail,H, u,Rsel)
37: if rbest =⊥ then
38: return
39: Ravail ← Ravail \ rbest
40: selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem \ Pau(rbest), Ravail, (Rsel ∪ {rbest}) , u, c)
41: selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem, Ravail, Rsel, u, c)
42: —————————————————————————————————————————
43: nextRole(Prem, Ravail,H, u,Rsel)
44: select r ∈ Ravail such that τ(Rsel ∪ {r}, c, u) ≤ trust(u, c){We evaluate selection heuristics in
Section 4.6}
45: return if found r otherwise return ⊥
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4.4.2.1 Proof of Correctness of the Algorithm We now prove that Algorithm 1 is
correct with respect to Definition 7. Algorithm 1 has the following pre and post conditions.
Precondition: The policy is well-formed as per Definition 6. Postcondition: If Rq = ∅, no
solution was found otherwise, Rq solves the problem specified in Definition 7.
Theorem 1. (Correctness of Algorithm 1) Given an authorization query q = 〈u, PS, c〉 and
a well-formed policy PL, as per Definition 6, Algorithm 1 finds Rq with the minimum risk
value, rs(Rq, c, u) that satisfies the problem specified in Definition 7.
Proof. Note that the postcondition of the algorithm is fulfilled if the set of roles Rq returned
by function selectRolesMinimumRisk constructs the set appropriately. Hence, we focus on
that function. Let us begin by presenting the invariants of Algorithm 1.
• Invariant 1: At any time during the execution of the algorithm, Rq satisfies all the
constraints (a), (b), (c) and (d) specified by Definition 7.
• Invariant 2: At any time during the execution of the algorithm, Rq contains the best
solution explored so far (less risky), as specified by Definition 7.
We divide the proof into three parts for clarity. We first show that the solution found
respects the constraints of the policy, that is, invariant 1 is fulfilled. Then, we prove invariant
2 and show that the algorithm terminates. Finally, we prove that the algorithm always finds
the best solution.
1) Invariant 1 is fulfilled: Rq is only updated in lines 18, 21 and 23, and in each case,
Rq is assigned roles that are in Rsel. Thus, for Rq to fulfill the invariant, Rsel also needs to
fulfill the constraints of Definition 7. We prove that this is the case by induction.
Base case: The first time the function is called in line 9, Rsel = ∅. It is clear that
constraints (a), (b) and (d) are respected. Since τ(∅, c, u) = 0, constraint (c) is also respected.
Induction case: Assume that Rsel received as parameter by the function respects invariant
1. Let R′sel be the parameter used by the function when it invokes itself recursively in lines
40 and 41; we now show that R′sel also fulfills the invariant. The invocation in line 41
trivially fulfills the invariant as R′sel = Rsel. The invocation in line 40 contains R
′
sel = Rsel ∪
rbest. Constraint (c) is trivially fulfilled as in line 44, rbest is selected explicitly to fulfill this
condition. Note that the roles from which rbest has been selected have been pruned to avoid
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violating constraints (a), (b) and (d). After line 27, ∀ dsod(RS, t) ∈ DSoDRsel, r ∈ Ravail :
@ Rsel : |Rsel∪{r}∩RS| = k− 1. Therefore, Rsel∪ rbest respects constraint (a). Similarly, in
line 30 the roles of Ravail are pruned so that adding one to Rsel does not violate constraint
(b). After this pruning ∀card(rc, k) ∈ CARD ∧ rc ∈ Ravail : activated(rc) + 1 ≥ k − 1.
Finally, in line 33 the roles that do not contribute to the coverage of permissions are pruned
so that ∀r ∈ Ravail : Pau(r) ∩ Prem 6= ∅. Hence, in line 36 no matter what role is selected to
be added to Rsel, it is sure that it will not violate invariant 1.
2)Invariant 2 is fulfilled: Rq is only updated when: (i) no solution has been found
up to that point (line 18), in this case, a solution is better than no solution and hence the
invariant is fulfilled, (ii) the risk of the candidate solution is smaller (line 21) or (iii) a solution
with the same risk, but less number of roles is found (line 23). It is clear that invariant 2 is
always fulfilled in these three cases.
3) The algorithm always terminates:
Algorithm 1 terminates if the recursive function selectRolesMinimumRisk terminates.
The function selectRolesMinimumRisk returns when (i) a solution has been found (line 24),
(ii) the algorithm backtracks because there are no roles in Ravail (line 35) or because the
inference risk is too high (line 38).
In the worst case, no solution is found and hence, the algorithm terminates when Ravail =
∅. The first time the function selectRolesMinimumRisk is invoked, Ravail contains the roles
user u is authorized for (line 2) minus the ones he cannot activate because they require a
larger trust value (line 4). In the worst case, Ravail contains all the roles authorized for u
when the recursive function selectRolesMinimumRisk is called.
The algorithm terminates because:
• The set Ravail is bounded by the total amount of roles existing in the policy R.
• No element is ever added to Ravail.
• Every time the function is invoked recursively, at least one role is removed from Ravail
with which it was invoked.
Ravail is reduced in function selectRolesMinimumRisk in lines 25, 32 and 39. In the worst
case, no role is removed from Ravail due to policy constraints or already covered permissions
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(lines 25, 28 and 32). However, in line 39 there is always a deterministic reduction of the
set Ravail in which a role is always removed from Ravail and added to the solution. For this
reason, the next time the function is called in lines 40 and 41, Ravail always contains one less
role. Therefore, the algorithm terminates.
4) The algorithm always finds the set of roles with minimum risk exposure:
Since invariants 1 and 2 hold, it suffices to prove that the algorithm explores all the possible
valid solutions. In line 40), rbest is selected. The algorithm follows a depth-first strategy: it
first explores the solution where rbest is added and later where it is not (41). Thus, all valid
solutions are explored, and hence, the algorithm always finds the best solution.
The previous proof demonstrates the correctness of Algorithm 1. In Section 4.6, we
experimentally evaluate its performance. Before doing so, in the following section, we present
in detail the inference threat analysis and administration module.
4.5 INFERENCE THREAT ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATION
In this section, we present a CP-net based methodology to find the information a user may
infer after a particular access, and a technique to manage inference threats associated with
a particular policy. We begin by presenting the CP-net we propose to find an access inferred
permissions as specified in Definition 3. Then we present a simulation methodology to find
active inference threats. We show how the simulation results can be used to refine the CP-net
reducing its complexity. Finally, we present a methodology that allows an administrator to
manage the risk of active inference threats.
4.5.1 Finding Inferred Permissions
In Definition 2, the set of inference tuples, I, that are applicable to an organization were
defined. We begin by specifying the terminology we use to refer to the components of I.
Definition 8. Given a set of inference tuples I, we define the set of risk inference objects
OI, and the set of inference permissions PI as follows:
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(a) General structure of the CP-net, as per Def-
inition 9.
ws 
 
BelongTo 
<{p1,p2,p3}, p10> 
 
BelongTo 
<{p1,p5,p6}, p11> 
wf 
1 2 
Completed 
tuple1 
Completed 
tuple2 
wend 
InitialSetup 
(b) Example 3.
Figure 5: CP-net graphical representation.
OI = {o | 〈PS, 〈o, r〉〉 ∈ I} and PI =
⋃
〈PS,p〉∈I
PS
To identify if a user has obtained all information needed to infer a particular object, we
model the role activation history using a CP-net. The inference tuples in I determine the
specific structure of the CP-net. The general structure of the proposed CP-net is presented
in Figure 5a.
In the following discussion, we assume that each inference tuple in I has been enumerated
from 1 to k. That is, there are k inference tuples in the system, and 〈PSi, pxi〉i refers to the
ith inference tuple. For each inference tuple 〈PSi, pxi〉i, two transitions BelongToTuple i and
CompletedTuple i, and a place βi are created. Each user has tokens positioned in different
places of the CP-net; the placement of tokens reflects the access history of each user. We use
function tokensAt(u ∈ U,w ∈ W ) to retrieve the set of tokens of user u at place w. In what
follows, we formally define the CP-net and then explain how it works and show an example.
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Definition 9. Given a policy a PL = 〈R,U, P, I, C,DSoD, SSoD〉, we define an Inference
CP-net as a tuple H = 〈PL,W, T, F, V,Υ, λ,mo〉 where:
1. Places (W): For each 〈PSi, xi〉i ∈ I, a place βi is created. Let B = {β1, ..., βk}, then:
W = {ws, wf , wend} ∪B.
2. Transitions (T): For each 〈PSi, xpi〉i ∈ I, a pair of transitions BelongToTuplei and
CompletedTuplei are created. Let
D1 = {BelongToTuple1, ..., BelongToTuplek},
D2 = {CompletedTuple1, ..., CompletedTuplek}. Then:
T = {InitialSetup} ∪D1,∪D2
3. Arcs (F): Let E = {〈BelongToTuplei, βi〉 : ∀i 1 ≤ i ≤ k} ∪{〈βi, CompletedTuplei〉 : ∀i 1 ≤
i ≤ k}. Then,
F = {< ws, InitialSetup>}, <InitialSetup, wf > ∪ {wf} ×D1∪ E ∪ D2 × {wend}
4. Token Types (V ): Let u ∈ U , R′ ⊆ R, PR′,I ⊆ PI , and px ∈ PI , we have:
V = {〈R′, u〉, 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉, 〈u, px〉}.
5. Accepted Types of Tokens (Υ): Υ(ws) = 〈R′, u〉,
Υ(wf ) = Υ(βi) = 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k and
Υ(wend) = 〈u, px〉.
6. Firing rules (G and λ):
InitialSetup: Given token 〈R′, u〉 placed at ws:
G(InitialSetup,〈R′, u〉) = true
λ(InitialSetup, 〈R′, u〉) = 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉,
where PR′,I = Pau(R′) ∩ PI
BelongToTuplei (1 ≤ i ≤ k): Given token 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉 placed at wf , and tuple 〈PSi, pxi〉i:
G(BelongToTuplei, 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉) = [(PSi ∩ PR′,I) 6= ∅ ∧ pxi /∈ Pau(authorized(u))]
λ(BelongToTuplei, 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉) = 〈PR′′,I , R′′, u〉 where PR′′,I = Pau(R′)∩PSi and R′′ = {r|r ∈
R′ ∧ Pau(r) ∩ PSi 6= ∅}
CompletedTuplei (1 ≤ i ≤ k): Given a set of tokens V ′ = tokensAt(u, βi) of type 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉:
G(CompletedTuplei, V
′) = [
⋃
〈PR′,I ,R′,u〉∈V ′
PR′,I ] = PSi
λ(CompletedTuplei, V
′) = 〈u, pxi〉, where pxi is the inferred permission of tuple i.
7. Initial State (m0): Initially, no tokens have been placed.
The CP-net works as follows. When a user u initially tries to activate a set of roles R′ ⊆ R
for which he is authorized, a token 〈R′, u〉 is placed in ws. Then, transition InitialSetup fires,
consuming the token in ws and placing a token of a different color at wf . Changing colors
enables us to keep track of relevant attributes. In this case, it is important to know which
of the permissions acquired through R′ would allow an inference. We denote this set of
permissions as PR′,I = Pau(R′) ∩ PI . Hence, when InitialSetup fires, token 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉 is
placed at wf . Tokens placed at wf are evaluated in parallel by the BelongToTuple transitions.
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A transition BelongToTuple i fires when at least one of the permissions in PR′,I belongs to
the corresponding set of inference PSi, and when the user cannot legitimately acquire pxi.
If the transition fires, the token at wf is consumed and a token is placed at βi. Note that it
is possible that a token placed at wf fires several transitions of the type BelongToTuple i. If
at some point of time, a place βi contains all the tokens that for the same user complete the
entire set of permissions PSi required to infer object xi, transition CompletedTuple i fires. In
other words, CompletedTuple i is triggered when a user has acquired all the permissions in
PSi of inference tuple 〈PSi, pxi〉i. Transition CompletedTuple i consumes all the tokens that
show user u has acquired enough information to infer pxi, and places token 〈u, pxi〉 at wend.
Hence, the history of accesses is provided by the places where the tokens are stored in
the Inference CP-net; as roles are activated by users, the tokens move around the CP-net.
Tokens placed in wend represent information that the user may be able to infer given his
previous accesses.
In Algorithm 2, we show the procedure to find the possible new permissions P ′ a user u
may infer after activating a set of roles R′ as per Definition 3. First, in line 2, the current
inferred permissions of the user are saved in M . Thus, M contains the set of tokens inferred
by user u before activating R′. Then, we place one token 〈R′, u〉 at ws. After the transitions
fire, and all tokens are in a place different than ws, we check the state of the CP-net. We
denote this new state as H′. Then, in line 5, we store in N all the tokens placed at wend.
Since we only need to identify the permissions that u will be able to infer if he activated R′,
in line 6, Q is initialized to contain only newly inferred information. Finally, in line 7, we
extract from Q the set P ′ of newly inferred permissions.
We first prove that P ′ contains the newly inferred permissions as per Definition 3, and
then we show an example of how the Inference CP-net works.
Theorem 2. Given a user u, an Inference CP-net H that contains the history of access of
user u, and a set of roles R′ that user u can activate, Algorithm 2 finds the set of inferred
permissions P ′, such that P ′ = Inferred(Hu, u, R′) as per Definition 3.
Proof. To prove that the set of permission P ′ returned by Algorithm 2 follows Definition 3,
we need to ensure that the four conditions of that definition are fulfilled. The conditions (1)
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Algorithm 2 Given an Inference CP-net H, a user u ∈ U and a set of roles R′ that he can
activate, return the set of inferred permission P ′, as per Definition 3.
1: findInferredPermissions(H, u,R′)
2: M ← H.tokensAt(u,wend) {Save old inferences}
3: H.place(〈R′, u〉, ws)
4: Wait for H to distribute the tokens. We referred to this new state as H′.
5: N ← H′.tokensAt(u,wend)
6: Q← Tokens in N that are not contained in M .
7: P ′ = {px |< u, px >∈ Q}
8: return P ′
and (2) are trivially fulfilled as they are explicitly checked by the guards of the firing rules
of type BelongToTuple i for (1 ≤ i ≤ k). Because transitions of type CompleteTuple i, for
(1 ≤ i ≤ k), are only fired when the entire set of permissions PS is acquired, tokens placed
at wend correspond to inferences that the users would be able to perform, hence condition (3)
is fulfilled. Finally, condition (4) is also fulfilled because of the processing performed in line
6, where only newly inferred permissions are assigned to Q. Therefore, the set of inferred
permissions P ′ returned by Algorithm 2 are equal to P ′ = Inferred(Hu, u, R′) in Definition
3.
Example 3. Suppose I = {〈{p1, p2, p3}, p10〉, 〈{p1, p5, p6}, p11〉}. The corresponding CP-net
is shown in Figure 5b; initially there are no tokens. User u1 activates roles R1 = {r1, r2}
for which Pau(R1) = {p1, p2, p8, p9, p15}. A token v1 = 〈u1, {r1, r2}〉 is placed at ws. After
transition InitialSetup fires, v1 is consumed and a token 〈u1, {p1, p2}, {r1, r2}〉 is placed at
wf . Since R1 acquires p1 which is part of both inference tuples and u1 is not authorized for
p10 or p11, the token at wf is removed, and two tokens are placed at β1, and β2. The tokens
placed contain this information: 〈u1, {p1, p2}, {r1, r2}〉. Since none of the inference tuples is
completed by R1, there are no new tokens at wend, and findInferredPermissions(H, u1, R1)
returns ∅. Thus, in context c, rs(R1, c, u1) = rs(p1, c) + rs(p2, c) + rs(p8, c) + rs(p9, c) +
rs(p15, c), which does not contain any inferred risk. We denote the new state of the CP-net by
H′. After a while, assume u1 activates role r3, where Pau(r3) = {p3, p4}. Token 〈u1, {r3}〉 is
placed at ws. Transition BelongTo〈{p1, p2, p3}, p10〉 fires and token 〈u1, {p3}, {r3}〉 is placed at
β1. At that point, transition CompletedTuple1 fires because two tokens that belong to u1, and
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complete the inference tuple are at β1. This time findInferredPermissions(H′, u1, {r3})
returns {p10}. Hence, the risk in context c of rs(r3, c, u1) = rs(p3, c) + rs(p4, c) + rs(p10, c),
which includes the risk of the inferred permission p10.
4.5.2 Finding Active Inference Threats
In this section, we propose a methodology to improve the performance of the Inference CP-
net presented in Definition 9. We assume that I contains all the existing inference threats.
Note that the set of inference tuples I does not depend on the user-to-role or the permission-
to-role assignments. Inference tuples are uniquely dependent on the types of objects that
exist on the organization (this is the case for existing methodologies to find automatically
inference tuples [33, 118]). Although it would be possible to include in I uniquely the active
inference threats for a particular user-to-role and permission-to-role assignments, we argue
that this would be undesirable. The reason is that if I contains all the existing inference
tuples, even if the user-to-role and the permission-to-role assignments change, the framework
can still capture the risk exposure due to inference threats. In contrast, if I only contains
the tuples for a particular policy configuration, for each possible policy modification, the
administrator would need to verify and possibly include or remove new tuples in the set I.
Since the tuples in I are independent of the user-to-role and the permission-to-role
assignments, there is some room for refinement during the deployment of the Inference CP-
net. This refinement consists in finding the active inference threats for a given policy and
uniquely including the relevant inferences tuples in the deployed Inference CP-net.
4.5.2.1 Simulating users’ behavior to identify active inference threats To find
the active inference threats, we take advantage of the existing properties of CP-nets. In
particular, using a CP-net we can simulate the behavior of the system to determine its
properties and to understand how the system will behave in the long term (stable state); e.g.,
whether a place in the CP-net is unreachable for a particular set of tokens. The simulations
consist of placing a set of tokens in the starting place of the CP-net and allowing the CP-net
to distribute those tokens according to its transition rules. Depending on the input that is
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used, the results may differ and different conclusions may be drawn.
To determine if in the long term there are any users that will be able to infer unautho-
rized information, we modify the Inference CP-net to verify specific properties of the policy
in the system. We want to identify whether a policy configuration will provide any user
enough information to perform an inference attack. Our objective is also to identify the
user-to-role assignments that create an inference threat so that an administrator can decide
if it is necessary to modify the policy to mitigate this risk. The Inference CP-net in Defi-
nition 9 was not designed to maintain this information. For this reason, for the simulation
purposes, we create a similar CP-net that additionally stores the set of roles that led to the
inference. The simulation CP-net is defined as follows.
Definition 10. Given a policy PL = 〈R,U, P, I, C,DSoD, SSoD〉, we define a Simulation
CP-net as tuple Hs = 〈PL,W, T, F, V,Υ, λ,mo〉 where:
1. Places W , transitions T and arcs F are defined as in the Inference CP-net in Definition 9.
2. Token Types (V ): Let u ∈ U , R′ ⊆ R, PR′,I ⊆ PI , and px ∈ PI , we have: V =
{〈R′, u〉, 〈PR′,I , R′, u〉, 〈R′, u, px〉}.
3. Accepted Types of Tokens (Υ): Υ(wend) = 〈R′, u, px〉, while Υ(ws), Υ(wf ) and Υ(βi) are
defined as in Definition 9.
4. Firing rules (G and λ):
InitialSetup and BelongToTuplei for 1 ≤ i ≤ k are defined as per Definition 9.
CompletedTuplei (1 ≤ i ≤ k): Given a set of tokens V ′ = tokensAt(u, βi) of type 〈PR′′,I , R′′, u〉:
G(CompletedTuplei, V
′) = [
⋃
〈PR′′,I ,R′′,u〉∈V ′
PR′′,I ] = PSi
λ(CompletedTuplei, V
′) = 〈R, u, pxi〉,
where R = {r | 〈PR′′,I , R′′, u〉 ∈ V ∧ r ∈ R′′} and pxi is the inferred permission of tuple i.
The main difference between the Simulation CP-net (Definition 10) and the Inference
CP-net (Definition 9) is the amount of information they store. In Definition 10, the last
place wend stores the roles responsible for the inference of a permission. For this purpose,
transition rules of type CompletedTuple i for 1 ≤ i ≤ k are also redefined to create a token
of type 〈R, u, pxi〉. This token contains the set of roles R that is responsible for the possible
inference of permission pxi by user u.
The complete process to identify active inference threats is shown in Algorithm 3. Its
input is the policy that is going to be tested, PL, and its output is the list of users that
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are able to infer unauthorized information and the user-to-role assignments that allow the
inference. This list is stored in a variable lstActive which contains tuples that show the
inference 〈R, u, px〉, where u is the user that infers permission px through role set R. This
list is initialized in line 2. The set of active inference tuples that we denote as Iy is initialized
as an empty set in line 3. Then, a simulation CP-net Hs is generated according to Definition
10. Because several users may have exactly the same roles assigned to them, which we call
having the same profile, we can perform the analysis only once for each profile. In line 5, we
create a representative user for each profile. We assume that each representative user will
activate at some point of time all the roles that he is authorized for. For this reason, in line
10 for each user u ∈ Up, we generate a set of tokens that aim at simulating the behavior of
the user throughout the life of the system. For each of the authorized roles a token is created
in line 10 and added to the list of tokens of that user. Then, the simulation is run for several
combinations of roles. In line 12 all the possible permutations of the way in which roles
can be activated are found. Later, Hs is inspected to see whether the system allowed any
inferences. For this purpose, in line 15, we verify if each user was able to infer information,
and if so, we store the inference in the variable lstActive. Finally, to know which is the
inference tuple that was activated, in line 18 we use the method identifyInferencePath()
that identifies the path through which a token arrived to wend. Then, the tuple identified is
added to Iy. Several CP-net simulations tools exist; we used CNP tools [42] to perform the
simulations.
4.5.2.2 Refinement of the inference CP-net We use the results of the simulation
(Algorithm 3) to improve the performance of the system. Knowing which of the users
may have in fact the power to infer information before the system is deployed, allows us
to maintain uniquely the information of the Inference CP-net for the relevant users. This
may reduce the amount of data that is actually stored by the system. Additionally, the
simulation may reveal that not all of the tuples in I are in fact a feasible threat given a
policy configuration. These may also be removed from the system to reduce the time required
to calculate the risk exposure of activating a set of roles, and hence, minimize the time it
takes to answer an access control request.
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Algorithm 3 Find active inference threats given a policy configuration PL =
〈R,U, P, I, C,DSoD, SSoD〉
1: findActiveInferenceThreats(PL)
2: lstActive←⊥ {List with active inferences, initially empty. Each element in this list is a tuple
that represents an active inference 〈R, u, px〉 where u is the user that infers permission px
through role set R}
3: Iy ← ∅ {Initialize active inference tuples as an empty set.}
4: Hs = createCPNet(PL) {According to Definition 10}
5: UP = sameProfile(U)
6: for all u ∈ Up do
7: Ru = authorized(u)
8: lstTokensu ←⊥
9: for all r ∈ Ru do
10: t=createToken(〈r, u〉)
11: lstTokensu.add(t)
12: for all Γ ∈ nextPermutation(lstTokens) do
13: Hs.placeAt(ws,Γ) {Place each token t ∈ Γ at ws in Hs}
14: runSimulation()
15: if Hs.tokensAt(u,wend) 6= ∅ then
16: for all t = 〈R, u, px〉 ∈ Hs.tokensAt(u,wend) do
17: lstActive.add(t)
18: I = identifyInferencePath()
19: add I to the set of active inference tuples Iy
20: return 〈lstActive, Iy〉
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Let PL denote a policy that has k = |I| inference tuples. After Algorithm 3 is run
for PL, no user was able to infer the permission associated with the inference tuples in
In = I \ Iy. As a consequence, it is not necessary to consider the inference tuples in In, and
the system uniquely has q = |Iy| active inference tuples for the current policy configuration
PL. The CP-net constructed for the production system (Definition 9) needs only to contain
the inference tuples Iy. Additionally, we can reduce the storage required by not maintaining
information of the users, Un that cannot infer information under the policy PL. The set of
users Un is defined as follows.
Definition 11. Given a policy PL and the list of tokens lstActive created by Algorithm 3 for
that policy, the set of users that cannot infer information under PL is computed as follows:
Un = U \ {u | 〈R, u, px〉 ∈ lstActive}
With this information, we can now define a Refined Inference CP-net as follows.
Definition 12. Given a policy PL and its Inference CP-net H = 〈PL,W, T, F, V,Υ, λ,mo〉,
its correspondent Refined Inference CP-net is created according to Definition 9 for a modified
policy PL′ such that PL′ = 〈R,U \ Un, P, Iy, C,DSoD, SSoD〉, where Un is the set of users
who are not able to infer unauthorized information as per Definition 11 and Iy contains the
active inference threats found through Algorithm 3 for the original PL. A Refined Inference
CP-net, does not stored information for any of the users in Un.
Theorem 3. Given a policy with k = |I| inference tuples, q = |Iy| active inference tuples,
and a set of users, Un, that are not able to infer unauthorized information, a Refined Inference
CP-net improves the performance with respect to the corresponding non-refined Inference CP-
net as follows:
• It decreases the number of created places in q and created transitions 2q.
• For each user Un and s of his requests, there is a reduction of s verifications of the CP-net
state.
• For each user in Un, there is a reduction of the number of tokens placed in the interval
[s, s ∗ k] where s is the number of access requests he issues to the system.
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Proof. We begin by proving the reduction on the components needed by the Refined Inference
CP-net. Then, we prove the reduction on the storage required. (i) Reduction of components
of the Refined CP-net: Let us first compute the number of components for Inference CP-
net constructed based on I. The total number of transitions is |T | = 2k while the total
number of places is |W | = k, as k = |I|. In contrast, a Refined CP-net created using Iy
has |T | = 2(k − q) transitions and |W | = k − q places. This is because for each of the
non-active inference tuples, the CP-net does not contain its correspondent BelongToTuple
and CompletedTuple transitions. Similarly, there is a total reduction of q created places, as
a place of type β is no longer required for each of the inference tuples in In. Hence, there
is a decrease of q places and 2q transitions needed when the refined version is used. (ii)
Reduction of the information stored: In addition, the results of the simulation can be used
to avoid maintaining the state of the CP-net for users that are not able to infer information
given the current policy PL. This means that the system does not have to store the tokens
for these users and does not need to verify whether there is an inference risk associated with
any request for those users. This saves space and computations. Suppose that user un ∈ Un
makes s authorization requests to the system. If the system is not fine tuned to avoid
maintaining the state of un in the CP-net, the system will be storing unnecessary tokens.
For each of the s requests the system does not place 1 tokens in ws. Hence, for s requests,
the lower bound of the tokens placed is s. The upper bound of the stored tokens that would
be maintained by the system for a user is s∗k. This occurs when all of the s tokens placed at
ws manage to trigger all the transitions of type BelongToTuple, creating s ∗ k tokens where
k is the number of inference tuples with which the CP-net was created. Therefore, for s
queries, the system will be storing a number of tokens in the interval [s, s ∗ k].
These reductions are especially important when the number of users that are not posing
an inference threat and when the non-active inference tuples are large.
4.5.3 Managing Active Inference Threats
Having identified the active inference threats of a particular policy through Algorithm 3,
we can provide additional information to administrators so they can manage the inference
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Figure 6: Managing active inference threats.
risk. Figure 6 shows the process. Once the active inference threats are identified, the system
generates a report indicating the factors in the policy that are creating the existing active
inference threats. With this information, the administrator can decide whether the current
policy provides adequate protection against inference threats or whether it is necessary to
modify it to reduce the risk exposure due to inference of information. This procedure can
be run offline iteratively until the administrator finds an acceptable level of risk exposure.
Once the desired level of risk exposure is achieved the administrator can release the particular
policy configuration to the production system.
In an effort to help the administrator understand the risk exposure of the organization
due to active inference threats, we present the results in categories. Each inference threat is
categorized as high, medium or low according to the severity of the risk exposure depending
on the risk associated with the inferred permissions. Recall that in the policy, each permission
is assigned a quantitative risk (rs(p, c)), so providing a qualitative measure of the impact
requires some internal processing. We transform the risk of the inferred permissions from
the qualitative measure provided in the policy definition to a quantitative one. We perform
this transformation to provide an easier way for the administrator to interpret the results
and prioritize the possible actions. A simple threshold based categorization does not grantee
a good transformation. Since different organizations may have different distributions of the
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risks, a different set of thresholds would need to be selected for each of them. Furthermore,
establishing where to make the division between observations may be challenging and may
require human input. For these reasons, we cluster the permissions based on their risk using
k-means clustering technique with k equal to three which will group all the permissions in
one of the three categories according to how risky they are. Before feeding the data to the
clustering algorithm, some preprocessing of the data is required. First, we need to decide
which of the risk associated with a permission p we are going to show to the administrator,
e.g., the risk associated with p may be different in different contexts, we need to decide which
risk should be considered. We use the maximum of all the risks associated with a permission,
which is given by max
∀c∈C
rs(p, c). It is also possible to use the average, the minimum or other
statistical measure of all the risks associated with a permission. However, we decided to use
the maximum because it does not underestimate the risk exposure, whereas an average may
provide a false sense of security.
Definition 13. The standardized risk value of an inference threat associated with permission
p is defined as follows:
rsp,s =
rs(p)− max
∀pi∈P
(rs(pi))
max
∀pi∈P
rs(pi)− min∀pi∈P(rs(pi))
where rs(p) = max
∀c∈C
rs(p, c) denotes the maximum risk associated with permission p.
In the previous formula, each of the permissions in the system is considered when the stan-
dardized version of the permissions associated with active inference threats are computed.
With this standardized information, the clustering algorithm is run and the permissions are
classified. The following example shows an output presented to the administrator.
Example 4. Figure 7 presents an example of an output shown to the administrator after the
simulation process. The first and second columns show the users that may infer information
and the permission (〈object, read〉) that the user may be able to infer. The third column
shows the severity of the inference threat. Then, the inference tuple that allows the inference
and the roles that are activated for this purpose are presented. Finally, the average trust
value of the user is presented if it is available (this value is the average trust in all context).
The administrator can use this information to make an informed decision as follows.
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Users 
Active 
Inference 
Threat 
Risk 
Associated 
Responsible 
Inference Tuple 
Roles 
responsible for 
inference 
Average 
trust of 
user 
u1 p1 Low <{p2,p4,p8},p1> r1,r5 0.9 
u1 p3 High <{p4,p5,p9},p3> r4,r5,r15 0.9 
u1 p69 Low <{p5,p6},p69> r5,r20 0.9 
u3 p3 High <{p4,p5,p9},p3> r5,r20 0.5 
u55 p22 Low <{p3,p4,p5},p22> r2,r5 0.3 
u122 p50 Medium <{p1,p8},p50> r25 0.5 
Figure 7: Inference simulation results.
The report shows that u1 is able to infer permissions p1, p3 and p69. According to the
risk associated with each threat, the inference of p1 and p69 is not too critical. However, the
possible inference of permission p3 is important. This may lead the administrator to modify
the policy. The simulation results show that the inference arises because u1 is assigned to
roles r4, r5, r15.
The output also allows the administrator to focus on the inference threats that are more
severe to prioritize his actions. In this case u1 and u3 may infer p3 which has a high risk.
The administrator may also notice that in average u3 seems to maintain a lower trust value
than u1. Based on this information, he may prioritise to modify the policy for u3. The report
shows the set of roles responsible for the inference threat; the administrator may remove the
authorization one or more of them to u3 to eliminate the inference threat.
In this way, an administrator can have an overview of the existing inference threats and
prioritize his actions. If the administrator judges appropriate, he may modify the user-to-role
assignment to mitigate the risk of inference. In some cases, the reduced number of employees
may lead to the acceptance of inference risks, whereas in others, the organization may take
steps to avoid those inferences.
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Table 2: Experiment parameters for the policy generation for the risk-and-trust RBAC
framework.
Ratio of number of roles to number of users 1:1
Ratio of number of roles to number of users assigned to roles 6:1
Ratio of number of roles to directly assigned permissions 1:5
Ratio of number of roles to constraints 5:1
Ratio of number of roles to active inference tuples 10:1
Ratio of number of requested permissions to maximum user assignment multiply by
directly assigned permissions per role
1:2
Maximum number of junior roles 3
Number of contexts 1
4.6 IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS
In order to evaluate the proposed algorithm, we generated synthetic well-formed policies,
as per Definition 6. The policies were generated randomly according to the ratios shown
in Table 2, which were chosen to match the ones used in [116]1. The risk assigned to
each permission in the policy was randomly assigned a value in the interval [0,100] using
a uniform distribution. The users’ trust thresholds were also randomly assigned using a
uniform distribution. Each point in our figures represents the average time of running the
algorithm for 30 different policies. Requests were randomly generated. The time required to
process requests that could not be granted was very low. For this reason, we only present
the results for granted requests.
Comparing Selection Heuristics: Our first experiment contrasts the performance
of the algorithm under two different heuristics to select the next role in line 36. Heuristic
1 selects a role that provides the minimum risk (min risk), and heuristic 2 selects a role
that provides the maximum number of permissions in the request set that have not been
covered by previously selected roles (max perm). In order to compare these heuristics, the
1Since their experiments did not include hybrid hierarchy and risk, we had to adapt slightly the parame-
ters. For instance, the ratio of permissions directly assigned for a roles in [116] is the same ratio of authorized
permissions for a role in our experiment to account for the effect of hierarchical relations.
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Figure 8: Comparison of selection heuristics for different types of hierarchy proportions.
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same policy and requests were used for both algorithms. The performance of the heuristics
depends on the proportion of I, IA and A-hierarchy relations. As shown in Figure 8a, when
all the hierarchical relations were of type IA, the max perm heuristic is faster. Figure 8b
presents the results of having all the relations of type I. There, 61% of the times the max
perm heuristic behaved better than the other heuristic. In contrast, when all the relations
in the hierarchy are of type A, as shown in Figure 8c, the results of the two heuristics are
equivalent. We also compared the results for policies that contain the same number of I, A
and IA relations. Figure 8d shows that min risk heuristic is slower for all the policy sizes.
Our results suggest that when the amount of A-hierarchy relations is greater than the other
two types of hierarchical relations, the two heuristics behave similarly. However, when the
proportions are different, the max perm heuristic is consistently faster than the min risk
heuristic. In all the experiments, the min risk heuristic never outperformed the max perm
heuristic. For that reason, in the following experiments, we only present the results for the
max perm heuristic.
The time required to find a solution for policies of the same size, but with different
proportions of I, A, and IA hierarchical is very similar for policies with less than 75 roles (it
took less than 0.2 milliseconds in all cases). For bigger policies the results change. The time
required for finding a solution for policies where all relations are of type I, is smaller than
for policies with all hierarchy relations of type A. This difference occurs because the number
of roles users can activate increases when the hierarchy relations are of type A (e.g., the
search space includes the roles the user is assigned to and all their junior roles). In contrast,
when all the relations are of I -type, the number of roles users can activate are uniquely those
directly assigned to them. When all the relations are of type IA, the algorithm takes more
time than when they are all of type I, but it takes less time than when the relations are all
of type A. The time required to find a solution when all the relations are of type IA is very
similar to the cases where the proportion of the three hierarchy types is the same.
Comparing Percentage of Granting Requests for Different Proportions of Mis-
behaving Users: This experiment shows how the system behaves as the percentage of users
that misbehave increases, and their trust thresholds are reduced. Initially, we randomly gen-
erated policies, and requests that were all granted. This is represented by the line of 0% users
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Figure 9: Comparison of granted requests for different percentage of misbehaving users.
misbehaving in Figure 9. For the same policies and requests, we randomly selected some
users, and reduced - randomly again - their trust thresholds; then we ran the experiments
again to see how many requests were denied because of decreases in trust of some users. The
results for 20%, 40% and 60% of users misbehaving are shown in Figure 9. As the number
of misbehaving users increases, the number of requests granted decreases. The lines are not
flat, as the number of requests denied depends on the trust threshold of the selected roles, as
well as the random reduction of the user’s trust value. The results of this experiment show
that our framework is able to deny access to misbehaving users, thus adapting to prevent
possible insider attacks.
Comparing Objective Functions: We compared the risk exposure when two different
objective functions are used to select the roles to be activated. The objective functions
compared are as follows. (1) Our proposed objective function: minimize the risk which is
presented in lines 20 to 23; we refer to it as objective min risk, and (2) The traditional
objective function used in RBAC systems which consists on minimizing the number of roles
to be activated; we refer to it as objective min num roles. When all the hierarchical relations
are of type IA, the objective min num roles always found riskier solutions, as shown in Figure
10. Similarly, when the ratios of I, A and IA hierarchies were proportional, 95% of the time
the objective min num roles provided riskier solutions. The objective min num roles was also
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Figure 10: Risk exposure using our algorithm (min. risk) compared to the risk of traditional
role activation algorithm (min. num. of roles) when all relations are of type IA.
riskier in 51% of the cases when all the relations were of type I. Interestingly, for policies in
which all the hierarchical relations were of type A, the risk of the solutions found by both
objective functions were the same. This is because there are no permissions directly acquired
by any role that can reduce the number of roles to be selected. The time required to find
a solution for both objective functions were very similar, and the number of roles selected
by both approaches were always the same for all hierarchy ratios. Hence, we believe our
objective function and the proposed algorithm is appropriate, as it reduces the risk and does
not augment the number of selected roles. Finally, our results suggest that the time required
to answer an authorization query is acceptable.
4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented our most general framework for insider threat prevention.
As part of this framework, we provided a methodology to determine the risk exposure of
activating a set of roles. This methodology considers the risk of inference of unauthorized
permissions. To manage this risk, we provided a CP-net based-approach. Additionally, we
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formulated an optimization problem to minimize the risk exposure of each access request.
To solve this problem, we proposed an algorithm and evaluated two different heuristics. We
showed that the risk exposure is reduced with respect to standard RBAC-based enforcement
algorithms. Finally, we provided a simulation methodology to identify active inference risks
that arise given a particular access control policy. The resulting simulation results can be
used by administrators to mitigate inference risks.
In the next chapter, we present our second framework, which aims at mitigating the risk
of a posteriori obligations.
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5.0 OBLIGATION-BASED FRAMEWORK TO REDUCE RISK
EXPOSURE AND DETER INSIDER ATTACKS
In this chapter, we present our research on risk management for obligation-based access
control systems. We begin by explaining the reasons that support the use of obligations as
a valid indicator to identify if a user is about to launch an attack in Section 5.1. Then, we
present our framework in Section 5.2. The detailed methodology to compute users’ trust
values is presented in Section 5.3. The methodology to identify policy misconfigurations and
outliers is presented in Section 5.4. Finally, we evaluate our approach in Section 5.5.
5.1 WHY USING A POSTERIORI OBLIGATIONS AS AN INDICATOR?
Although psychological precursors may allow early detection of insider threats, monitoring
users can be challenging because of privacy and legal concerns. To tackle this problem, we
propose to monitor and evaluate the users’ behavior towards a posteriori obligations as a way
to determine two highly relevant psychological indicators: these are disregard of authority
and lack of dependability [61]. As part of the disregard of authority, the employee ignores
rules, authority or policies, and feels above the rules or that they only apply to others.
Greitzer et. al [60] classified this indicator as the second most important psychological
precursor. As part of lack of dependability an employee is unable to keep commitments
and is unworthy of trust. When users stop fulfilling their a posteriori obligations, they are
disregarding authority and they may be less dependable. This may be due to lack of interest
and the fact that they may be occupying their time with other activities such as preparing
an attack.
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Monitoring and evaluating users’ patterns of fulfilling and violating obligations has sev-
eral advantages with respect to existing approaches to collect psychological precursors, which
were outlined as part of the challenges in Chapter 1. The rate of fulfillment of obligations can
be used as one of the metrics to assess the employees’ performance that does not introduce
any subjective information in the system. Since employees are being paid to perform their
jobs, using performance metrics is a well-accepted practice [58]. An additional advantage of
this methodology is its ability to include up-to-date information of a user’s behavior. Recall
that traditional ways to measure the employee’s psychosocial state usually are incorporated
slowly into the system. Therefore, we argue that the obligation-based trust values are an
objective measure of the actual, up-to-date performance of the users and hence capture their
real behavior.
5.2 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we present our proposed framework. First, we present the policy definition
model that we call Trust-and-oBligation based Core RBAC model (Core TB-RBAC Model).
This model extends the standard RBAC model [51]. We note that the methodology we
propose to evaluate the trust can be used for any access control system that includes a
posteriori obligations. Then, we present the architecture of the system.
5.2.1 The Core TB-RBAC Model
We extend the standard core RBAC model with obligations, risk and trust; it includes the
following components.
• U is the set of users, R is the set of roles, P is the set of permissions defined as P =
OPS × OBJ , where OPS is the set of operations and OBJ is the set of objects in the
system.
• B is the set of a posteriori obligations as defined in Definition 14 below and S is the set
of sessions.
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• UA ⊆ U ×R is the user to role assignment, as in standard RBAC.
• BP ⊆ P ×2B is obligation-aware permission set, where, bp ∈ BP is a tuple 〈p ∈ P,BS ⊆
B〉 that indicates that once p has been exercised all the obligations in BS need to be
fulfilled.
• PBA ⊆ R×BP is the assignment of obligation-aware permissions to roles. Permissions
associated with different roles can have different obligations associated with them. This
function replaces permission to role assignment (PA) of traditional RBAC.
• Function session user : S → U maps a session onto the corresponding user and function
session roles : S → 2R maps a session onto a set of roles.
• Each user u ∈ U is assigned an obligation-based trust value, trust(u, t) ∈ [0,1] at time
t. If trust(u, t) = 0, the user is not trusted. When trust(u, t) = 1 the user is completely
trusted to perform a posteriori obligations. This value is automatically updated by the
framework every time the user fulfills or violates an obligation.
• Pau : (r ∈ R)→ PS ⊆ P is a function that returns the permissions PS assigned to role
r. Formally, Pau(r ∈ R) = {p | (r, 〈p,BS〉) ∈ PBA ∧ 〈p,BS〉 ∈ BP}.
• Bau : (r ∈ R) → B ⊆ B is a function that returns the set of obligations that would be
assigned to the user that activates role r. Formally, Bau(r ∈ R) = {b | (r, 〈p,BS〉) ∈
PBA ∧ 〈p,BS〉 ∈ BP ∧ b ∈ BS}.
We define an a posteriori obligation as follows:
Definition 14. An a posteriori obligation b is defined as a tuple b = 〈A ⊆ OPS ×
OBJ, D, ϕ〉 where
1. A is a set of actions that need to be performed to fulfill the obligation. The user assigned
to b needs to perform all a ∈ A in order to fulfill the obligation.
2. D specifies how much time a user has to fulfill the obligation after the obligation is
assigned to him.
3. 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 indicates how critical it is for the organization that the obligation is performed
in time; where ϕ = 1 means that it is very critical and ϕ = 0 means that the obligation
is not critical at all.
In order to refer to a particular component of obligation b ∈ B, we use the dot notation.
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For instance, b.ϕ returns the criticality value of the obligation.
Obligation Instantiation: Obligations are assigned to users when they activate asso-
ciated roles, as follows.
Definition 15. When user u activates role r in a session, for each a posteriori obligation
b associated with r, the system instantiates the obligation creating the tuple: 〈u, b, τ, S〉
where:
1. u is the user that needs to fulfill the obligation.
2. b is the obligation that needs to be fulfilled by u.
3. τ is the time when the obligation is acquired by user u.
4. S is the state of the obligation which is initially set to pending.
Once an a posteri obligation has been triggered, it can be in one of the following states:
pending, fulfilled or violated. The interval within which the obligation needs to be fulfilled
is [τ, τ + b.D]. The obligation is pending when the user has not performed the actions
required by the obligation and the deadline to perform it has not passed. The obligation is
fulfilled when the user performed the required actions within the stipulated time interval.
Conversely, the obligation is violated when the user does not perform the required actions
during the valid interval of time.
Access control decision process: To obtain the permissions authorized for a role,
users need to activate the role in a session. Hence, a user u requesting a permission set
PS ⊆ P is granted access to PS if the following conditions hold:
1. ∃ RS ⊆ R ∧ PS ⊆
⋃
r∈RS
Pau(r) ∧ (∀r ∈ RS : (u, r) ∈ UA), which means that there is a
set of roles RS that can provide all the permissions in PS and all of the roles in RS are
assigned to user u.
2. The system trusts the user enough to perform all the a posteriori obligations that would
be acquired by activating the set of roles RS:
∀ r ∈ RS,BS ⊆ Bau(r), b ∈ BS : trust(u, t) ≥ b.ϕ
In this dissertation, we do not specify how to select RS so that they respect the least
privileged principle; however, this can be easily done using one of the algorithms presented
in [119].
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In the following example, we illustrate how different obligations have different criticality
values associated with them.
Example 5. Consider a manufacturing organization. When a new supply container arrives,
the employee in charge needs to access the system and register it; this in turn triggers obliga-
tion b1. This obligation corresponds to updating the inventory state after reviewing an order
of a component to produce their most sold product. If the user fails to fulfill this obligation
on time and the ordered supplies have defects, the entire operation of the organization would
be negatively impacted. In case the defect is difficult to notice and nobody recognizes the
lack of quality of the supplies, the organization would manufacture defective products. This
may lead to a decrease on the goodwill of the organization and may also result in fines and
additional product repairing costs for the enterprise. In a second scenario, the defect of the
supply is noticed by a different employee during production and the operation is stopped due
to the lack of available materials. In this case, the production line is stopped and orders may
not be fulfilled on time causing delays, fines and loss of goodwill. Since the entire operation
of the organization may be severely affected due to the lack of fulfillment of b1, its criticality
for the organization is high, so we assign a value of b1.ϕ = 0.9.
Obligation b2 requires the obliged user to review a report of expenditures by the end of the
week. This obligation aims at identifying discrepancies every week. However, an accountant
reviews the report at the end of each month, so the discrepancy would be found eventually.
The impact of violating this obligation is medium because not performing the obligation does
not have long-term repercussions for the organization. Only in the short term the discrepancy
would exist. Hence, we assign b2.ϕ = 0.5. Finally, when a user registers a new sale, obligation
b3 is triggered requiring the user to update the internal review file with comments regarding
the interaction with the client. This obligation has low impact because not updating the file
does not affect the operations of the organization. Thus, we can assign b3.ϕ = 0.3.
The above example shows that the criticality of an obligation depends on the impact
of its violation. The risk exposure an organization faces when an a posteriori obligation is
assigned to a user is a function of the criticality of that obligation and the likelihood that
the user will default on it. The larger the trust value of the user, the less likely he would
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default on an obligation. We use the criticality value of an obligation as a threshold that
indicates how trusted a user needs to be in order to be assigned to a particular a posteriori
obligation. Note that the criticality of the obligations can be expressed qualitatively and
later mapped to a quantitative measure. Hence, the policy specifier can use any of the
existing risk assessment methodologies (e.g., [108, 7]) to assign these values.
5.2.2 Risk-and-Trust Obligation Framework
Figure 11 presents the architecture of our framework. First, we describe the functionality of
each of the modules in the system and then we show the steps followed when a user’s access
request arrives at the system. The Obligation-based Trust Module monitors the users of the
system and is in charge of determining the trust values associated with all of them. The
trust values are stored in the Trust Repository.
The Administration Module generates alerts of possible policy misconfigurations related
to a posteriori obligations and suspicious users. The Clustering Module finds the patterns
of misbehavior and the Report Module generates the corresponding alert reports for the
administrator. This process is explained in Section 5.4.
In addition, the framework contains the Enforcement Module which consists of the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), the Policy Decision Point (PDP) and the Obligation Handler. The
Obligation Handler is responsible for maintaining the state (pending, fulfilled or violated)
of the instantiated obligations in the system up-to-date. This information is stored in the
Obligation State Repository. Every time an obligation changes its state to fulfilled or violated,
the system informs the Obligation-based Trust Module of the new information, which in turn
updates the trust value of the corresponding user. The PEP is in charge of intercepting all
the access requests of the users in the system and it passes them to the PDP, which evaluates
the request according to the policy stored at the Policy Information Point (PIP). The PDP
returns the grant or deny decision to the PEP, which enforces the decision.
Figure 12 presents the process that is followed by the system to determine whether an
access request is granted or denied. When a request is received by the PEP, it forwards
the request to the PDP, which retrieves the set of roles that need to be activated to grant
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Figure 11: Architecture of the risk-and-trust obligation framework.
the access. If the system cannot find such a set, the request is denied as the user is not
authorized for roles that provide the requested permissions. If the roles that provide the
privileges are found, the system evaluates whether activating them would create any a pos-
teriori obligations for the user. If so, the PDP retrieves the trust value of the user and
determines whether the value offsets the criticality of the obligations that would be assigned
to the user. When the user is trusted enough to complete successfully such obligations, the
access is granted and the Obligation Handler instantiates them according to Definition 15.
In case the user is not trustworthy enough to fulfill one or more of the obligations that would
be assigned to him, the system denies the access request.
5.3 TRUST COMPUTATION
In this section, we present the methodology to compute the trust of a user. As noted by
Greitzer et. al [59], one of the limitations of threshold-based approaches is the fact that
smart attackers would try to stay within the threshold to avoid being detected. Hence, the
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Figure 12: Processing flow of an access request.
trust computation mechanism needs to account for strategically controlled variations on the
user’s behavior. Strategic changes in behavior occur when a user first constructs a good
level of trust and then starts misbehaving. In addition, the trust value should provide a way
to discern when the user accidentally does not perform an obligation. We want to reduce
the trust value to account to the bad behavior, but give the opportunity to users to redeem
themselves if they have defaulted obligations by mistake. In addition, the trust value should
include a group factor to determine whether the evaluated user is the only one among the
users assigned to a particular obligation, who is repetitively violating the obligation.
Our trust model considers the following aspects to find the obligation-based trust value
(trust(u, t)):
1. His recent behavior.
2. His historical behavior, which shows how many times he has fulfilled or defaulted on
assigned obligations.
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3. His sudden changes in the behavior, which allows the system to penalize the user for
negative changes in behavior.
4. His performance with respect to other users.
Our trust model is inspired by that of Srivatsa et. al presented in [106], where the
first three components are included; however, we compute the trust values differently. In
addition, to capture the overall group behavior and its relation to that of an individual
user, we include the drift from the group. In Section 2.5.1, we discuss in further detail the
differences between our approach and the one presented in [106].
5.3.1 Trust Methodology
An observation o of a user’s behavior consists of a fulfilled or violated obligation (o =
〈u ∈ U, b ∈ B, final status〉). We assume a user’s observations are ordered based on their
generation timestamps and that they are grouped in what we call observation groups. Each
observation group contains a fixed maximum number of observations x. If at a particular
time instant there are m logged observations, there would be n = dm/xe groups. We denote
observation groups as T1, ..., Ti, ...Tn, where, group Tn contains the most recently logged
observations and T1 contains the oldest observations. Each group Ti for 2 ≤ i ≤ n is
guaranteed to contain x observations while T1 may contain less than x observations. The
groups are recalculated every time a new observation is logged to the system. For instance,
suppose that the fixed maximum number of observations per group is set to three (x = 3),
and that, at time t19, the system has logged six observations o1, ..., o6, where o1 is the first
and o6 the last observation logged, respectively. At t19 there are two groups T1 and T2, where
T1 contains [o1, o2, o3] and T2 contains observations [o4, o5, o6]. Suppose that at t22 another
observation o7 is generated; it causes a re-grouping of observations as follows: a new group
T3 is created containing the most recent observations [o5, o6, o7], T2 contains [o2, o3, o4]
and T1 contains the oldest observation o1. Hence, T3 contains the most recent behavior of
the user. In this way, at time instant t the observation groups are created according to the
observations available and each group represents the behavior of a user in a period of time.
Table 3 contains the notation that we use in the rest of the dissertation. We use multisets
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Table 3: Notation for Chapter 5 (obligations).
m(M, b) Function that returns the multiplicity (number of elements of type b) contained in
multiset M .
B Set of obligations in the system
GBTu Multiset that contains the obligations fulfilled by user u in observation group T
BBTu Multiset that contains the obligations violated by user u in observation group T
TGBT Multiset that contains the obligations fulfilled by all users in observation group T
TBBT Multiset that contains the obligations violated by all users in observation group T
totalRisk(u, T ) Function that returns the total risk of the obligations fulfilled and violated in obser-
vation group T by user u
to refer to the observations in each group. A multiset is a collection in which each element
may appear more than once. For instance, a multiset of obligations M = {b1, b2, b3, b1}
contains obligation b1 twice. The multiplicity is a function that returns the number of times
an element appears in a multiset and is defined as m : Multiset × element → int. In the
previous example m(M, b1) = 2 as obligation b1 appears two times.
Definition 16. The raw trust RTu[T ] of user u in observation group T is calculated using
the following expression:
RTu[T ] =
∑
b∈B
b.ϕ ∗m(GBTu , b)∑
b∈B
b.ϕ ∗m(GBTu , b) +
∑
b∈B
b.ϕ ∗m(BBTu , b)
The raw trust captures the behavior of user u in period defined by the observation
group T and it is a weighted average of the number of obligations fulfilled over the total
number of obligations assumed by the user. The weights are determined by the importance
of the obligations themselves (ϕ). In this fashion, an obligation that is very critical to the
organization has a heavier impact on the raw trust, than one that is not so critical. A user
that has violated all his acquired obligations has a raw trust equal to zero. In contrast, when
the user has promptly fulfilled all his assigned obligations, his raw trust is equal to one.
Definition 17. The historical trust of user u for observation group Tn, Hu[Tn], is computed
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Figure 13: Effect of ρ on the historic trust (Definition 17) considering that all the obligations
have the same criticality.
as follows:
Hu[Tn] =
n−1∑
k=1
RTu[Tn−k] ∗ wk
where wk is the weight of observation group Tn−k which is calculated as follows:
wk =
ρk−1 + totalRisk(u, Tn−k)∑n−1
i=1 (ρ
i−1 + totalRisk(u, Tn−i))
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1.
When the weight of recent events is much higher than those of previous observations, the
system allows the users to improve their trust values rather quickly because it prioritizes the
most recent behavior. The weight wk has two components, decay of historical information
and the criticality of the observation groups. The first one is provided by ρk−1 and allows
the system administrator to change the importance of each historical observation group.
Figure 13 depicts the effect of ρ on wk. When ρ = 1, all the observation groups have the
same weight; hence all the periods that contribute to the historical trust have the same
importance. In this case, the historical trust is equivalent to the average of the raw trust.
When ρ = 0.5, some of the older observations do not have much weight and we would be
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losing some information. In contrast, when ρ = 0.9 there is a desirable effect in which all the
historical observations are considered, but the more recent ones have more weight than the
older ones. We prefer to have ρ nearby 0.9 to maintain freshness of the observations while
considering all the historical information available.
The second component of the weight wk corresponds to the total criticality of the obli-
gations that are included in observation group Tn−k. This component allows us to provide a
higher weights to observation groups that contain obligations with higher criticality values
and inhibits strategic users from improving their trust values by fulfilling only low criticality
obligations.
Definition 18. The trust fluctuation Du[T ] of user u in observation group T is defined as
follows:
Du[T ] = RTu[T ]−Hu[T ]
which represents the variation of the current trust with respect to the historical trust.
When Du[T ] ≥ 0, the user has improved or maintained his behavior with respect to his
historical trust. In contrast, when Du[T ] < 0, the user behavior has worsened.
It is also desirable to discover when a user does not fulfill a particular obligation more
frequently than his peers, which may represent attempts to sabotage the operation. We
capture it using the notion of group drift.
Definition 19. The group drift, Gbu[T ], of obligation b ∈ B for user u in observation group
T is defined as follows:
If m(BBTu , b) = 0, then G
b
u[T ] = 0. Otherwise:
Gbu[T ] =
m(BBTu , b)
m(TBBT , b)
− m(BB
T
u , b) +m(GB
T
u , b)
m(TBBT , b) +m(TGBT , b)
Here, 0 ≤ Gbu[T ] ≤ 1. If the user has not violated any obligation of type b, his group drift
is zero. In addition, the group drift is zero if user u is the only one that has been assigned
to obligation b, as there is no evidence that shows his behavior is drifting from the group
(in fact, there is no group). When the number of users assigned to b increases, there is more
evidence as to how far apart from the group the user is. When Gbu[T ] = 0.5, it means that
half of the total assigned obligations (fulfilled and violated in observation group T ) were
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violated by u. A Gbu[T ] close to one implies that user u is the only person in a large group
that has violated the obligation.
A big drift from the average may actually predict attempts to sabotage the opera-
tion. This is especially relevant when an obligation that has a large criticality value (ϕ) is
consistently violated. This behavior is suspicious and is penalized as follows.
Definition 20. The benchmark penalization of user u in observation group T , PGu[T ], is
calculated as follows:
PGu[T ] =
∑
∀b:Gbu[T ]>χb
δb
where 0 ≤ χb ≤ 1 is a threshold for obligation b ∈ B that specifies how far apart from
the group a user needs to be in order to be penalized and δb is the penalization received for
drifting from the group substantially.
In the previous definition, when Gbu[T ] > χb, user u is an outlier that does not fulfill
obligation b, and should be penalized by an amount of δb. Note that the penalization and
the threshold of each violated obligation b ∈ B (δb and χb) may have different values in the
system depending on the importance of the obligation (b.ϕ). Finally, we compute the total
obligation-based trust values for user u at time t, which is equivalent to finding the trust
value for observation group Tn (remember that the most recent observation group is denoted
by Tn).
Definition 21. The individual obligation-based trust
trust(u, Tn) of user u in observation group Tn is calculated as follows:
trust(u, Tn) =

trust(u, Tn−1) if γ(Du[Tn]) = 0
0 if T ≤ 0
T otherwise
where
T = α×RTu[Tn] + β ×Hu[Tn] + γ × (Du[Tn])− PGu[Tn] and α + β + γ = 1.
Here, α represents the weight of the current behavior, β represents the weight of the
historical information and γ the weight of sudden changes of behavior. We use two possible
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values for this latter weight, γ1 and γ2, to be able to penalize heavily negative changes in
behavior while allowing users to regain trust slowly for positive changes. Letting γ1 < γ2,
when Du[Tn] ≥ 0, we use γ1 and when Du[Tn] < 0 (the user behavior has worsened), we use
γ2. In this way, the user takes longer to regain trust than to lose it. We show the effect of
these weights in Section 5.5.
In Definition 21, if the user does not change his behavior his trust value remains un-
changed with respect to the previous interval of time. When the γ ∗ Du[Tn] − PGu[Tn] is
too small making T negative (recall that γ ∗ Du[Tn] is negative when a negative change of
behavior occurs), the new trust value is zero, which is the minimum possible. Finally, when
none of these two cases happen, the trust is updated according to the current and historical
behavior, the behavior fluctuations and the benchmark penalization.
Contrasting our trust computation approach: Our proposed trust computation
methodology is an extension of the trust computation methodology presented by Srivatsa et.
al in [106]. We decided to base our methodology on their approach because of its strengths
[34]. Srivatsa et. al approach was designed for decentralized overlay networks. In their
work, the final trust value of a node is based on its current and historical behavior and
sudden changes of behavior. This methodology is not adequate for measuring how trusted
a user is to fulfill a particular obligation because adversaries that know how their trust
values are computed may try to manipulate the system in the following ways. (i) In [106],
all the failures or good behaviors have the same weights. In the case of obligations, this
assumption is not valid as each obligation has its own criticality value. An adversary that
wants to avoid detection would maintain an adequate trust value by fulfilling only non-critical
obligations while violating critical obligations. (ii) Similarly, their historical value does not
include the criticality of the obligations to prevent strategic users from manipulating the
trust computation by fulfilling only low-criticality obligations. (iii) Their approach does
not include group behaviors as part of the metrics to determine how trusted a user is.
However, including group drift would allow us to identify users trying to sabotage particular
operations by avoiding the fulfillment of one or more obligations. For these reasons, current
methodologies are not adequate to measure how trusted a user is to fulfill a particular
obligation.
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We evaluate our trust methodology in Section 5.5. In the following section, we present
the Administration Module which is in charge of detecting policy misconfigurations.
5.4 ADMINISTRATION MODULE
An important consideration for monitoring systems is the fact that some of the suspicious
behaviors may, in fact, be due to factors other than insider attacks and incompetence. For
instance, if it is informally agreed that an obligation is no longer required, but the policy is not
up to date, users may be ignoring that particular obligation in accordance with the informal
agreement. To find the patterns of misbehavior, we incorporate clustering techniques within
the administrative module. These patterns can be used by the policy administrator to review
whether a particular obligation should cease to exist or to see why those employees are not
performing them (e.g., the reasons could include: the obligations may no longer be necessary
for the business process, users are too busy, the obligation should be assigned to other roles,
etc.). In addition, during this process, users that are not fulfilling a particular obligation
more often than their peers are also identified. In what follows we explain the process
followed by this module, but first we provide some background on clustering algorithms.
5.4.1 Clustering Algorithms
Clustering is an unsupervised machine learning technique that aims to discover similar groups
and outliers in datasets with unknown characteristics. We refer to [68] for a comprehensive
review. Each observation being compared is represented by a vector that contains informa-
tion about different characteristics. Clustering algorithms use a distance measure to identify
how far apart the observations being clustered are. Different distance metrics exist in the lit-
erature, e.g., Euclidian, Manhattan distances. There are two types of clustering algorithms:
hierarchical and partitional. Partitional methods require the specification of the number of
clusters to be found; given this number, they output a solution with that number of clusters.
In contrast, hierarchical algorithms do not need as input the number of clusters to be found
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Figure 14: Procedure to find the patterns of misbehavior.
and output several possible clusters. The hierarchical clustering algorithms begin by placing
each observation into a separate cluster. Then, they verify the distances between all the
observations and put together the two most similar ones in a new cluster. Existing methods
to perform hierarchical clustering mainly vary on the way they compute the similarity be-
tween clusters; among them are Ward, single-link and mean/average methods. A detailed
discussion on the differences among them can be found in [68].
The output of hierarchical clustering algorithms is a set of possible clusters, however,
they do not assess the strength of the relation between the grouped observations. Multiscale
bootstrapping resampling [105] is a methodology that allows us to overcome this downside by
computing p-values for each of the clusters found by the hierarchical clustering algorithm.
The methodology indicates the clusters that have high cohesion, which allows the data
analyst to focus his attention in those relevant patterns.
5.4.2 Process to Find Patterns of Misbehavior
The process to find patterns of misbehavior is illustrated in Figure 14 and should be per-
formed periodically. We use a clustering technique to detect patterns of misbehavior and
outliers. We utilize hierarchical clustering, as it does not require the specification of the num-
ber of clusters to be found. This is appropriate since administrators do not know whether
the users in the system have similar misbehaviors, whether they can be grouped or how many
groups would result. The only parameter that needs to be specified is the distance metric
to compare individuals and clusters. We use Ward hierarchical algorithm with Manhattan
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distance, as it finds better clusters for our purpose. We evaluate different algorithms in
Section 5.5.
In order to use the algorithm, the logged information is set up in a similarity matrix
M|U |×|B|, which has one row for each of the users and one column for each obligation of
the system. Each cell xi,j in the matrix contains the total number of obligations of type bj
that user ui has violated. The information included can have as much historical information
as the administrator desires. Then, the matrix is cleaned by removing users that have not
misbehaved, as there is no point in trying to find patterns of misbehavior for them.
The cleaned similarity matrix is used as input for the clustering algorithm, which outputs
a set of possible clusters. Then, the system performs a multiscale bootstrapping resampling
that establishes which of the clusters are cohesive. Cohesive clusters may represent policy
misconfiguration or users colluding not to perform an obligation. This information can be
used by the administrator to take corrective measures. For instance, he may decide to in-
vestigate why a cluster of users is not fulfilling an obligation and if appropriate, he may
remove the obligation from the policy. On the other hand, outliers with a high number of
obligation(s) violated may represent lazy, absent users or employees that may have higher
risk of becoming insider attackers. This information can be used to further monitor their
performance. Figure 18a presents an example. The dendogram was generated by the cluster-
ing algorithm and it shows all the possible clusters. The multiscale bootstraping resampling
method created the rectangles that show the cohesive clusters that represent different pat-
terns of misbehavior. Note that u10 is an outlier; if the number of obligations violated is
high, he is flagged as suspicious.
5.5 EVALUATION
In this section, we begin by evaluating our proposed trust methodology presented in Section
5.3. Then, we present the assessment of the procedure to find patterns of misbehavior
presented in Section 5.4.
Evaluation of the trust methodology: We evaluated our system under different
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Figure 15: Evolution of trust values when the percentage of violated obligations increases,
with α = 0.4, γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 0.03 and ρ = 0.9.
users’ behaviors. We generated synthetic data to test our approach. In each iteration, a
user could fulfill or violate one of 15 a posteriori obligations. The criticality values of the
obligations were assigned using the following distribution: 10% of obligations were set to
high (0.9), 60% were set to medium (0.6) and the remaining were set to low (0.3) criticality.
The number of observations in each period was set to 10. Each of the points in the following
experiments was found every time a new observation was generated. In our experiments,
we used ρ = 0.9 to compute the historical trust (Definition 17), for the reasons explained in
Section 5.3. Our implementation was done in java.
Misbehaving users: To verify that our methodology is able to identify when a user is
misbehaving, we examined three different cases. Figure 15 presents the results for a user that
initially was completely trusted trust(u, t0) = 1, but later starts misbehaving, as it is shown
by the percentage of violated obligations per period. As the number of violated obligations
increases, the obligation trust value, trust(u, t), of the user is reduced. In addition, the
historical and raw trust values also decrease as the misbehavior continuous. Consider an
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Figure 16: Trust values comparison for: scenario 1 : α = 0.4, γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.03 and
scenario 2 : α = 0.4, γ1 = 0.01 and γ2 = 0.3.
obligation with a high criticality of 0.9. If the user attempts to access a permission that
would require the fulfillment of that particular obligation, he would not be able to obtain
the privilege after t5. Around t17, he would lose accesses that require a trust value higher
than 0.6.
If the administrator desires the system to adapt faster to unfavorable changes in behavior,
the weight γ2 can be set up higher to increase the punishment for negative drifts on user’s
behavior. For the same user we presented in the previous experiment, Figure 16 shows how
the system increases its sensitivity to negative behaviors. Scenario 1 presents a conservative
γ2 weight while scenario 2 shows the results for a bigger γ2 value. The obligation trust value
of the user decreases faster for scenario 2 than for scenario 1 resulting in a faster revocation
of highly critical privileges. This is due to the amplified effect of a negative drift, which is
also shown in the figure. For scenario 1, the drift is almost zero, while for scenario 2, the
negative effect is substantially smaller, which according to Definition 18 results in a smaller
obligation-based trust value. Hence, the larger γ2, the faster the system adapts to negative
behaviors.
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Figure 17: User redemption after having a trust value of 0.5. Parameters used: α = 0.4,
γ1 = 0.01, γ2 = 0.03 and ρ = 0.9.
Redemption: We also evaluated the results of the system when a user improves his
behavior. This is relevant, as it is possible that the user was not able to fulfill his obligations
due to legitimate reasons (e.g., absence caused by sickness), hence, the system should allow
the user to improve his trust value based on his new behavior. At the same time, it is
important that the trust increases slowly, otherwise attackers would be able to increase their
trust value too fast. Figure 17 shows the results of a scenario in which the user’s initial trust
values are set to 0.5, but after t7 he starts fulfilling all the assigned obligations. Since the
user fulfills all the obligations (from t7 onwards), RT [T ] is always equal to one and the drift
is always zero. The user requires twenty periods of spotless behavior before he improves his
trust to 0.8 (with the parameters of scenario 1). Because the good behavior continues, the
user’s trust value also continues the improvement trend.
Evaluation of the methodology to find patterns of misbehavior: We created
several logs with different patterns of misbehavior, outliers and noise. A misbehaving pattern
consists of several users not fulfilling a particular obligation, as if there was a legitimate
informal agreement not to perform that obligation. Outliers are users who did not fulfill
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(a) Ward with Manhattan (b) Single-link with Euclidean
Figure 18: Example. The boxes in the dendongram represent cohesive clusters.
continuously a particular obligation and hence had a larger number of violations for that
obligation than the average of the users. In addition, we included random accidents which
represented obligations not fulfilled, unintentionally e.g., once someone missed a deadline.
These observations can be considered as noise. The maximum number of obligations in the
system was set to 15, the maximum number of users to 30 and we generated a total of 10
logs. We used R [93] to run cluster algorithms and the bootstrapping sampling method (with
a significance level of 0.95) on the data and verified how many of the expected observations
were classified correctly. We compared three hierarchical clustering algorithms: Ward, single-
link and mean with two distances Euclidean and Manhattan. Since we know the existing
patterns in the data tested, we can compare the solutions of the algorithms. The expected
patterns in the data, are referred to as classes ; they represent the ground truth. For example,
class1 = {u0, u1} represents the users that violated obligation b4, class2 = {u2, u3} represents
the users who violated obligation b6, class3 = {u4, u5} represents the users violating b8 and
class4 = {u6, u7, u8, u9} represents those violating obligation b12. Figure 18 presents two
solutions; one found by Ward with Manhattan and the other by Single-link with Euclidean.
The rectangles around the users represent cohesive clusters. For the Ward output, the three
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Table 4: Comparison between clustering algorithms
Method Average Entropy Average Purity
Ward Euclidean 0.28 0.68
Ward Manhattan 0.19 0.70
Average Euclidean 0.32 0.64
Average Manhattan 0.28 0.67
Single Euclidean 0.33 0.62
Single Manhattan 0.26 0.67
expected classes were found. In contrast, the Single-link algorithm created one cluster for
all the elements in classes 3 and 4, failing to identify the existing misbehaving pattern. In
this case, Ward with Manhattan outperformed Single-link with Euclidean.
To compare clustering algorithms purity and entropy are typically used [121]. Entropy
is a function of the distribution of classes in the resulting clusters and purity is a function of
the relative size of the largest class in the resulting clusters. The details of how to calculate
these metrics are provided in Appendix . Both entropy and purity are in the interval [0,1].
Solutions with higher purity are preferred, while solutions with small entropies are preferred.
Table 4 presents the comparisons among the algorithms. Ward in combination with
Manhattan distance provides the most reliable results according to both of the metrics
used, as clusters found most of the time represented the existing classes. The worst results
were found for single-link in combination with Euclidean distance. In addition, when the
algorithms used Euclidean distance to measure difference among users, the results were
consistently worse than when they used Manhattan distance. The empirical validation shows
that the best option is to use Ward with Manhattan.
5.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented an access control framework to mitigate the risk exposure
caused by a posteriori obligations. We incorporated the criticality value of violating an obli-
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gation into its definition to monitor users’ violation patterns, prevent sabotage threats and
unintentional damage. Additionally, we presented an obligation-based trust methodology
that is resilient to na¨ıve and strategic users. This methodology can be integrated into any
access control model with a posteriori obligations. Through experimental evaluations, we
showed that our methodology can effectively identify suspicious behavior as well as allow
users to recover their trust values slowly. We also showed that based on previous work on
psychological precursors a posteriori obligations can be used to identify suspicious users.
Finally, we provided an approach to identify patterns of misbehavior, suspicious users and
policy misconfigurations.
In the next chapter, we present our third framework, G-SIR, which incorporates geo-
social information into the access control decision making process to deter insider threats.
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6.0 AN INSIDER ATTACK RESILIENT GEO-SOCIAL ACCESS
CONTROL SYSTEM
In this chapter we present our proposed Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control
Framework (G-SIR). First, we present the notions of spatial scopes and social predicates
in Section 6.1. Then, in Section 6.2, we present an overview of the proposed framework.
The detailed specification of our proposed G-SIR model is presented in Section 6.3. The risk
management procedure is presented in 6.4. The proposed enforcement algorithm is presented
in Section 6.5. Finally, we conclude the chapter in Section 6.6 where we present the system
evaluation.
6.1 SOCIAL PREDICATES AND SPATIAL SCOPES
G-SIR makes use of the notions of social predicates and spatial scopes introduced in Geo-
Social RBAC model [14]. They are defined as follows.
Social Predicates: A social graph can be represented as G = 〈V,E〉 where V is a set
of vertices that represent users and E is a set of edges that represent the existence of a
social relation between users1. These edges may be also labeled to refine further the types
of relationships between users. Let W be a set of social relation labels (e.g., nanny, spouse,
etc.) that may be organized in a hierarchy. W(i,j) represents the set of labels of edge (i, j),
for example, W(i,j)={nanny, schoolmate} shows that user i is the nanny and schoolmate of
user j.
1Our model may also be used with graphs built from available information such as tweets, retweets,
among other data.
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Additionally, there is a set of social functions to evaluate the social relations between
users. Examples of these functions include areFriends(vi, vj), haveSocialRelation(label, vi, vj),
socialDistanceLessEqualTo(vi, vj , k), isSuperior (vi, vj), haveCommonNeighbor (vi, vj), areIn-
Clique(vi, vj), formAClique(vi, V
′ ⊆ V ), among others. Functions belongsToCommunity(u,
comm), and assignedToRole(u, r) are useful for our framework and are defined in Table
5. Let F be the set of social functions such as those mentioned above. We define a Social
Predicate S as2 S ::= S ∧ S|S ∨ S|f |¬f , where f ∈ F .
To specify social predicates we use ur to denote the requesting user and u? to denote a
user in the vicinity that is instantiated at the time of evaluation of the policy.
Spatial Scopes: A Spatial Scope, SC, defines a place of interest. It is defined as SC = 〈h, `〉,
where h is a feature and ` is a location function. A feature is a place of interest in the space,
e.g., room 410, x-y coordinate or hallway. The geometry of these features are defined ac-
cording to the Open GeoSpatial consortium geometric model [1]. Function ` evaluates where
with respect to feature the user needs to be located. For example, SC = 〈room420, in〉,
defines as spatial scope being inside room420 and SC = 〈radiusAround(u, 5feet), in〉, de-
fines a circle with a radius 5 feet around the current position of user u. Function ` can also
be overlap, touch, cross, in, contains, equal, and disjoint [1], and may also be defined using
more refined proximity functions as the ones defined by Gupta et. al in [63].
6.2 OVERVIEW OF THE PROPOSED G-SIR
At the core of the proposed G-SIR framework there is an access control policy specification
and enforcement mechanism designed to leverage users’ geo-social behavior. The access
control component captures current and historic geo-social interactions to determine whether
an access should be granted or denied. Our framework extends RBAC; hence, users need
to fulfill constraints that are assigned to roles they play in an organization. A role may be
subject to the following constraints.
• Spatial scope: A role may have a spatial scope that defines a set of locations where it
2For simplicity, parenthesis are omitted to avoid distracting readers from the main issues
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can be activated by users assigned to it.
• Geo-Social Contracts: These constraints indicate places that users assigned to the con-
strained role cannot visit and people they cannot frequently meet.
• Vicinity constraints: These constraints impose restrictions on people that may or may
not be at a certain distance from the requester at the time of an access. There are two
types of vicinity constraints: inhibiting and enabling constraints.
Inhibiting constraints specify that a requested permission needs to be denied when certain
inhibiting users are in the vicinity. They are designed to avoid potential proximity
attacks, such as shoulder surfing attacks. For this, a spatial scope where inhibitors
cannot be located is defined.
Enabling constraints are designed to verify the validity of an access request by leveraging
the trust on other users in the vicinity. These constraints specify who and how many
people should be in a spatial scope of interest. To enforce them, it is important to ensure
that the enablers and the requester are not colluding to prevent insider attacks. We refer
to this as collusion-free enforcement.
• Geo-social trace based constraints: These constraints require a user to follow a particular
geo-social path before he can be authorized to access a particular resource. They are often
useful to ensure that users do not access a resource without proper previous interactions.
• Geo-social obligations: These are geo-social actions that users need to fulfill after they
have been granted an access.
The proposed constraints are useful in two ways. First, they help capture inappropriate
geo-social context and subsequently deny accesses that violate the access control policy.
Secondly, monitoring the fulfillment of these constraints provides a way to identify users’
whose geo-social behavior is frequently questionable and outside of the expected patterns.
When users violate their geo-social contracts, do not fulfill their obligations or traces,
G-SIR flags them as suspicious. Because some of the constraints may be more important
than others, their violation has a criticality value. The observations of suspicious geo-social
behavior are used to obtain the likelihood of insider attacks and, ultimately, to determine
the risk exposure of granting an access.
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Figure 19 presents the architecture of G-SIR. All monitoring and likelihood computations
described take place in the Monitoring, Context and Inference Module. The Context Module
determines the context of a user, which includes information such as the current device used
by the user, type of connection used, etc.
The Access Control Module is in charge of making the access control decisions. To
determine if an access request should be granted, all applicable geo-social constraints are
verified. Additionally, this module verifies if the risk exposure of granting access to a set
of requested permissions is tolerable to allow the access. To manage the risk exposure, at
the time of policy specification, the system administrator should perform a utility elicitation
process. During this process, described in detail in Section 6.4, the possible costs of misuse of
granting a malicious access, the cost of denying a non-malicious access and gain of allowing
a non-malicious access are analyzed. Through this analysis, a threshold that determines the
maximum tolerable probability of attack is found. If the probability of attack is too high
according to the risk management procedure, the access is denied. Otherwise it is granted.
The steps performed by the Access Control Module are as follows. Each access request,
Qu = 〈u, P ′〉, where u denotes the user requesting permission set P ′, is received by the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP). Then, it forwards them to the Policy Decision Point (PDP) which
evaluates the policy stored in Policy Enforcement Point (PIP). An access request is granted
by the PDP if all of the following conditions are satisfied; otherwise it is denied:
• User u is assigned to a role set, R′, required to obtain the requested permissions P ′.
Additionally, the current location of u allows the activation of R′ and does not violate
any of u’s geo-social contracts.
• All trace-based constraints associated with R′ are fulfilled by u.
• No inhibitors are located in the vicinity.
• There are enough enablers, not suspected of colluding, to fulfill all enabling constraints
associated with R′ and the current locations of the possible enablers do not violate any
of their geo-social contracts.
• Finally, the risk management procedure that considers the historic geo-social behavior
of the user permits the access.
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In the next section, we present the proposed access control model.
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Figure 19: Overview of the proposed G-SIR framework
6.3 G-SIR ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
The G-SIR access control model consists of sets of roles R, users U , actions A, objects O
and sessions S. Permissions are defined as P = A×O. Users are assigned to roles, and roles
are assigned permissions.
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Table 5: Function specifications for G-SIR.
Function Meaning
assigned(u ∈ U) Returns the set of roles that u is assigned to.
Pau(r ∈ R) Returns the set of permissions assigned to r.
Pau(R
′ ⊆ R) Returns the set of permissions assigned to all roles in
R′.
validLocation(u, r) Returns true if the current location of u satisfies the
spatial scope of r.SC.
vicinity(SC) Returns a set of users located in the place specified by
spatial scope SC.
PrCollusion(Uc ⊆ U) Function that determines the probability that users in
Uc are colluding.
belongsToCommunity(u ∈ U , comm) Given a user u and a community name comm, returns
true if the user is part of comm.
assignedToRole(u ∈ U , r ∈ R) Given a user u and a role r, returns true if u is assigned
to r.
fulfillSocialPredicate(ur, uc,S) Returns true if users uc and ur fulfill social predicate
S.
fulfillContracts(u ∈ U) Returns true if user u ⊆ U currently satisfies all his
contracts. It evaluates the union of all contracts as-
signed to roles in assigned(u).
inhibitors(ur ∈ U, r ∈ R) Given a requester ur and a role r, returns a set of
users that are classified as inhibitors according to the
inhibiting constraints r.I.
enablers(ur ∈ U, r ∈ R) Given a requester ur and a role r, returns a set Ue ⊆ U ,
if it exists, that satisfies all enabling constraints r.E
according to Definition 26. Otherwise it returns ∅. If
r.E = ∅, it returns ∅.
completeTraces(r ∈ R, u ∈ U) Returns true if user u has completed traces r.W.
traceContains(w ∈ W, node) Returns true if trace w contains node as part of its
spatial scope w.SC.
disjoint(SCi, SCj) Given two spatial scopes SCi and SCj , returns true if
the SCi is disjoint in SCj .
fulfillO(u ∈ U, r ∈ R) Returns true if user u satisfies obligations r.B and all
his geo-social contracts.
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Let X be a set of contexts dynamically associated with users. The context of user u is
denoted as Xu. Let E be a set of enabling constraints and I be a set of inhibiting constraints.
Additionally, let GC and B be the sets of geo-social contracts and geo-social obligations,
respectively. Finally, let W be a set of geo-social traces. All these constraints are formally
defined later.
Definition 22. A role r ∈ R in G-SIR access control model is associated with a constraint
vector CVR = 〈SC, E ,W ,GC,B〉 where:
• SC is the spatial scope of a role (places where the role can be activated).
• E ⊆ E and I ⊆ I represent the constraints enforced over the users in the vicinity, where
E defines the required enablers, and I defines inhibitors.
• W ⊆W is a set of geo-social trace constraints.
• GC ⊆ GC is a set of geo-social contracts.
• B ⊆ B is a set of geo-social obligations.
To refer to a constraint of a role, we use the dot notation, e.g., r.SC returns the spatial
scope of role r and r.I returns its inhibiting constraint. In section 6.3.6, we specify how a
role can be activated in a session to exercise the permissions associated with it. We make use
of the functions presented in Table 5. We also use the dot notation to refer to components
of tuples. We now define the constraints that can be assigned to roles.
6.3.1 Geo-social Contracts
Geo-social contracts are used to establish acceptable and unacceptable geo-social behavior
for different roles. Geo-social contracts are assigned to a user when he is assigned to a role.
These contracts need to be constantly fulfilled.
Definition 23. A Geo-Social Contract gc ∈ GC is defined as gc = 〈ω, ϕ〉 where
• ω = 〈SC,S〉, here SC represents a spatial scope (place that users subject to gc are not
allowed to visit), and S is a social predicate that defines undesirable acquaintances. When
a component in ω is set to ⊥, (e.g., ω.SC = ⊥), it indicates that it is not considered
during the enforcement.
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• 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 represents how critical it is for the organization if a user violates the contract.
Here, ϕ = 1 means that it is very critical while ϕ = 0 means not critical at all.
If user u is assigned to a role set Ru ⊆ R, to be allowed to activate any role in Ru, he
needs to fulfill all geo-social contracts associated with each role in Ru.
Example 6. (a) Consider a user Bob who is assigned to role secretary; by being assigned to
this role, he cannot access a laboratory where highly reactive chemicals are located because he
is not trained to deal with dangerous chemicals. If Bob accesses the lab, there is an inherent
risk of mishandling substances that may lead to accidents and loss of lives and intellectual
property. For this reason, a violation of this contract will result in a high risk for the organi-
zation. This constraint can be expressed as follows: gc1 = 〈〈〈chemicalLab, in〉,⊥〉, 0.9〉. (b)
Consider a consulting firm that may have projects from multiple competing companies, say
X and Y . The consulting firm needs to ensure that the projects are completely compartmen-
talized to be able to offer a quality consulting service. Besides enforcing separation of duty
–where no user can be assigned both roles, namely consultant for X, rx, and consultant for Y ,
ry – it is desirable that people belonging to conflicting projects are not together to avoid leak-
age of information. Contractors that have multiple clients often require this type of control.
These constraints can be expressed as follows: gc2 = 〈〈⊥, assignedToRole(u?, rx)〉, 0.5〉 and
gc3 = 〈〈⊥, assignedToRole(u?, ry)〉, 0.5〉. gc2 is associated with role ry and gc3 is associated
with role rx.
As the previous scenarios show, not all contracts are the same in terms of risk exposure.
An untrained person entering a lab that has a lot of volatile chemicals poses higher risk
compared to the same person entering into a meeting room reserved for a team working in a
classified advertisement (e.g., an untrained individual may cause a serious accident). Hence,
gc1.ϕ > gc2.ϕ.
6.3.2 Vicinity Constraints
Inhibiting and enabling constraints are designed to classify users in the vicinity as enablers,
inhibitors or neutral.
Definition 24. An Inhibiting Constraint ci ∈ I is defined as tuple 〈X,SC,S, α〉 where
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• X ⊆ X is a subset of contexts where the inhibiting constraint is applicable,
• SC defines the spatial scope where the inhibiting constraint is evaluated,
• S defines the predicate used to classify users in the vicinity as inhibitors and
• α is a threshold to determine the minimum level of confidence needed to decide if a user
should be made part of the inhibiting group.
We say that if there is a set of one or more users Uci in location ci.SC, who fulfill social
predicate ci.S with a minimum confidence level of α, the constraint is not satisfied and the
access should be denied to prevent information leakage.
At the policy evaluation time, G-SIR verifies if the requester’s context is one of the
context specified in X. If it is, the inhibiting constraint is evaluated otherwise it is ignored.
This helps specify policies where the device the user is utilizing may influence the size of the
spatial scope evaluated as illustrated in the following example.
Example 7. Assume smartphone, laptop and presenter are context of interest. Consider re-
questing user ur who is assigned to role r1 with inhibiting constraints r1.I = {ci1, ci2}, where
ci1= 〈{laptop, smartphone}, 〈radiusAround(ur, 5feet), in)〉, belongToCommunity(u?,BadGuys), 0.95〉 and
ci2= 〈{presenter}, 〈conferenceRoom, in〉, belongToCommunity(u?,BadGuys), 0.95〉.
When ur is using a laptop or smartphone, ci1 is evaluated to verify the presence of
inhibitors within a 5feet radius. If ur is using a presenter (e.g., ur is making a presentation),
ci2 is evaluated to verify that no inhibitors are present in the conference room. In both ci1
and ci2, users in the vicinity are classified as inhibitors if they belong to the community
BadGuys with a confidence level of 0.95 or more.
Definition 25. An Enabling Constraint ce ∈ E is defined as a tuple 〈SC, k,S, τc〉 such that
SC is a spatial scope where k users who fulfill social predicate S with respect to the requester
need to be located, and 0 ≤ τc ≤ 1, is a threshold that defines the maximum tolerance for
colluding users.
Here, ce.τc is the maximum acceptable probability of collusion and should be specified
based on the risk of an access. A larger ce.τc reflects more tolerance to collusion behavior.
In fact, if ce.τc = 1, the collusion indicators are not considered at all. In contrast, when
ce.τc = 0 any suspicion of collusion results in invalidating a set of enablers.
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Threshold ce.τc provides a way to determine when a set of potential enablers cannot
be trusted. It is compared with the value obtained by function PrCollusion. Consider a
candidate set of enablers Ue, if PrCollusion(Ue) > ce.τc, the candidate enablers are rendered
untrustworthy.
ce.S may be evaluated based on uncertain information. For example, a social graph may
be evaluated to identify if users belong to dangerous communities through algorithms such as
those presented in [78, 5, 40]. These algorithms output a set of communities and a confidence
level of the result. ce.α determines the minimum confidence level required to classify a user
as part of a community. In contrast, when ce.S is evaluated based on information that is
well-established, ce.α can be set to one.
Example 8. Consider role r2 with a set of enabling constraints r2.E = {ce1}. Enabling
constraint ce1 is defined as: 〈〈conferenceRoom,in〉, 4, areFriends(u?, ur), 0.8〉. ce1 requires
four users who are friends of the requester to be in the conference room and for them to be
non-colluding with a probability of 0.8 or more.
Definition 26. Given a requester ur, an enabling constraint ce = 〈SC, k,S, τc〉 is said to be
satisfied if and only if there exists a set of enablers Ue such that ∀ ue ∈ Ue :
1. ue ∈ vicinity(ce.SC) .
2. fulfillSocialPredicate(ur, ue, ce.S)
3. PrCollusion(Ue ∪ ur) ≤ ce.τc
4. fulfillContracts(ue)
5. |Ue| ≥ ce.k
In the previous definition, the risk of including invalid enablers is controlled in two ways.
i) by verifying that the probability of collusion between the set of enablers is less than the
specified confidence threshold and ii) by verifying that none of the enablers is violating any of
his contracts. This mitigates potential social engineering attacks where an enabler is tricked
into going to the required spatial scope ce.SC to satisfy enabling constraint ce. It similarly
thwarts attacks where the requester and enablers probe the system to see what accesses they
can obtain.
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Conflict Resolution: Because inhibiting and enabling constraints are evaluated dynam-
ically –based on who is located in the vicinity at the time of the access request, it is possible
that one or more users in the vicinity may be classified as both inhibitor and enabler. We call
this a vicinity conflict. It arises when for a given role, inhibitors(ur, r)∩enablers(ur, r) 6= ∅.
For ce ∈ r.E and ci ∈ r.I, recall that ce.S specifies social relations of the users, whereas
ci.S specifies users in the vicinity suspected of belonging to dangerous communities for an
access. Hence, a user may be related to another and at the same time be suspected of par-
ticipating in a non-desirable community according to ci. This may occur for instance, when
a user is suspected of being a spy. By design, this conflict is resolved in G-SIR through deny
overrides : if a user is classified as inhibitor, the access request is denied.
6.3.3 Geo-Social Obligations
Geo-social obligations establish that after activating a role, the requester needs to visit or
cannot visit a particular place or interact with people within a predefined period of time.
Definition 27. A Geo-Social Obligation b ∈ B is defined as 〈dir,D, ϕ〉 where
• dir is the directive that users subject to b need to fulfill. dir ∈ {〈+meet,S〉, 〈+visit, SC〉,
〈−meet,S〉, 〈−visit, SC〉}. +meet, means that the user should meet a targeted person or
group as defined by social predicate S, while -meet means that the user should not meet
the person or population. Similarly, +visit means a user needs to visit spatial scope SC
and -visit that he cannot visit it.
• D is a time duration that specifies how much time a user has to fulfill the obligation after
the obligation is triggered and assigned to him.
• 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 is a value that represents how critical it is for the organization if a user
violates the obligation. Here, ϕ = 1 means that it is very critical and ϕ = 0 means it is
not critical at all.
At the time of activation, our framework instantiates each triggered obligation and creates
a record to monitor its state. Suppose user u activates role r, which has associated with it
obligation b ∈ r.B. The framework creates a record that contains the user who triggered the
obligation, the obligation triggered, b, the time t when the activation took place, and the
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state of the obligation, which can be pending, fulfilled or violated. The obligation should be
fulfilled within the interval [t, t+b.D]. The obligation’s state is pending when user u has not
fulfilled it and the deadline has not passed. The state changes to fulfilled if u successfully
fulfills b and to violated if the user does not complete the required condition before b.D
elapses.
Example 9. After activating a role, r, users may not enter the server room where the
tenant’s machines are stored and cannot meet people associated with community Y. b1 =
〈〈−visit, 〈serverRoom, in〉〉, 1month, 0.7〉 and b2 = 〈〈−meet, belongsToCommunity(u?, Y )〉,
1year, 0.5〉. And r.B = {b1, b2}.
6.3.4 Geo-Social Trace Constraints
Geo-social traces specify the locations and social interactions that are required before acti-
vating a role. When a user wants to activate a geo-social role, his traces are evaluated to see
if they match the expected ones. If they do not match, the access request is denied.
Definition 28. A Geo-Social Trace Constraint w ∈W is a tuple w = 〈lst,D, ϕ〉 where
• lst = 〈〈SC1,S1〉1, ...〈SCn,Sn〉n〉 is a list of places and/or people that the requester needs
to visit and/or meet. SCi represents a spatial scope and Si a social predicate that defines
people that the requester needs to meet. When SCi or Si is set to ⊥, it indicates that
that component needs no consideration.
• D is the duration that defines how long ago with respect to the current time in the recent
past the trace should have been satisfied.
• 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 is the criticality associated with not completing the trace as expected.
In the previous definition w.D specifies that only recent traces are relevant. If a user
is requesting access to a role that requires the fulfillment of w.D at time t, the user should
have completed the trace within [t− w.D, t].
Recall that a single role may have one or more geo-social trace constraints; for a role
r the set of geo-social traces is denoted as r.W . We use function completeTraces(r, u) to
verify if u’s traces satisfy all the geo-social trace constraints w ∈ r.W associated with r.
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Example 10. Consider a medical doctor who is required to go to the Sanitizing Facility
before entering into the Neo-natal Unit where new babies are born. This constraint can be
expressed as w1=(〈〈Sanitizing Facility, in〉,⊥〉, 15minutes, 0.8), which is a trace constraint
that requires the doctor to go to the Sanitizing Facility before being able to activate the role
that allows him to enter into the Neo-natal Unit. If the user tries to gain access to a new-born
unit without passing through the Sanitizing Facility, the impact of his actions may be severe
because of the germs that he may be bringing to the newly born babies who are especially
susceptible to infectious diseases. Hence, the criticality of the obligation is large, w1.ϕ = 0.8.
At the verification time, say t, the system verifies that the requester completed the trace
within the past 15 minutes. If they do not, completeTraces(r, u) returns false and the role
cannot be activated.
6.3.5 Well-Formed Policy
For G-SIR to work properly, it is necessary to ensure that the policy specification is consis-
tent. Contracts are rules that forbid some interactions and movements; if they are violated
access is denied. Hence, they should not conflict with any of the other constraints. Addition-
ally, users should not be subjected to contradictory constraints. Therefore, it is necessary to
ensure the policy is well-formed.
Definition 29. A policy is said to be well-formed iff ∀u ∈ U, ri, rj ∈ assigned(u):
1. @ gc ∈ ri.GC : disjoint(gc.SC, rj.SC)
2. @ b = 〈〈+visit, SC〉, D, ϕ〉 ∈ ri.B, gc ∈ rj.GC :
disjoint(b.dir.SC, gc.SC)
3. @ b ∈ ri.B, gc ∈ rj.GC : b.S = gc.S
4. @ w ∈ ri.W , gc ∈ rj.GC : traceContains(w, rj.SC) ∧ @〈SCi,Si〉 ∈ w.lst : Si = gc.S
In the previous definition, condition 1 states that no user should be assigned to a role that
requires him to go to a place to obtain certain privileges while at the same time prohibiting
him from going to that place according to his social contracts. Conditions 2 and 3 state that
a user should not be asked to avoid places or people, while at the same time, he is required to
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visit and/or meet them to fulfill their obligations. Condition 4 states that contracts should
not conflict with traces that the user needs to fulfill to gain access.
Whenever a new role is created or a user is assigned to a role, these properties should
be verified. If one or more conditions in Definition 29 is not satisfied, it is necessary to
re-evaluate the assignment and/or policy.
6.3.6 Role Activation
With all the geo-social constraints specified, we now define how to make access control
decisions in G-SIR.
Definition 30. A role r with constraint vector CVr = 〈SC, E , I,W ,GC〉 is said to be fulfilled
for user ur, fulfilled(ur, r), iff the following conditions are satisfied:
1. r ∈ assigned(ur)
2. validLocation(ur, r)
3. completeTraces(r, ur)
4. fulfillContracts(ur)
5. inhibitors(ur, r.I) = ∅
6. If r.E 6= ∅, then enablers(ur, r) 6= ∅
Otherwise r is not-fulfilled for ur.
We now define how the system decides to grant or deny an access request Qu.
Definition 31. An access request Qu = 〈ur, P ′〉 is granted under context Xu, if and only if
there exists a set of roles R′ ⊆ R such that all of the following conditions are fulfilled:
1.
⋃
r∈R′
Pau(r) ⊇ P ′ (Roles in R′ provide the requested permissions),
2. ∀ r ∈ R′ : fulfilled(ur, r) (Definition 30)
3. RiskMan(Qu,Xur) = true
The last condition specifies that for Qu to be granted, its associated risk should be
acceptable according to RiskMan. In the next section, we present the methodology used to
obtain RiskMan.
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6.4 G-SIR RISK MANAGEMENT
In this section, we present how to compute RiskMan. Because utility theory has been
recognized as a useful methodology to make decisions under uncertainty [39], we utilize it
to formulate our decision-making process. A utility value represents the preferences of a
decision maker. It is often useful to think of utility as a measure of satisfaction. Hence, a
higher utility indicates a higher preference for an outcome and in combination, utility values
reflect the preferred order of different outcomes. As it is customary, we define the utility
value as a number between 0 to 100.
Consider an access request Qu = 〈ur, P ′〉 and let R′ ⊆ R be a set of roles that could
satisfy the access request for ur. We denote by A the uncertain event of Qu being issued to
compromise the system (an attack) and A¯ the complementary event (Qu is a non-malicious
request). We denote the probability of event A (attack) as q, hence the probability of event A¯
(no-attack) is (1− q). Similarly, let G represent allowing access and G¯ represents the decision
to deny access.
The utility depends on the context of the user Xu and the permissions that ur would
obtain through R′3. Because we are interested in preventing insider attacks, the following
analysis assumes that the utilities are defined to reflect the interests of the organization
implementing G-SIR. There are four possible outcomes of granting or denying Qu. Hence,
there are four utilities of interest; these are:
1. UR
′,Xu
G¯/A represents the utility of denying access to roles R
′ under context Xu given that the
access request is an attack,
2. UR
′,Xu
G¯/A¯ represents the utility of denying access to R
′ under context Xu given that the
access request is not an attack,
3. UR
′,Xu
G/A represents the utility of granting access to R
′ under context Xu given that the
access request is an attack, and
3It is necessary to consider the permissions granted by R′ rather than the permissions requested P ′ to
analyze the risk exposure for the following reason. In RBAC, permissions cannot be acquired individually;
they need to be acquired through the activation of roles. That is why in Definition 31 we allow for extra
permissions to be granted: Pau(R
′) may have additional permissions that are not in P ′. Hence, the risk
exposure depends on all permissions granted rather than the permissions in P ′.
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4. UR
′,Xu
G/A¯ the utility of granting the access when it is not an attack.
Henceforth, we do not explicitly indicate the request being evaluated Qu, the set of roles
R′ and current context Xu to simplify the notation (unless it is not clear what request or
context we are referring to); however, note that the utility depends on the context of the
user and permissions being requested. The expected utility (EU) of denying and granting
access is computed as follows:
EU(G¯) = q ∗ UG¯/A + (1− q) ∗ UG¯/A¯ (1)
EU(G) = q ∗ UG/A + (1− q) ∗ UG/A¯ (2)
An access request should be granted when EU(G¯) ≤ EU(G), otherwise it should be
denied. Therefore, the threshold to decide when an access should be granted or denied can
be computed by equalizing equations (1) and (2), obtaining:
q ∗ UG¯/A + (1− q) ∗ UG¯/A¯ = q ∗ UG/A + (1− q) ∗ UG/A¯ (3)
The only unknown value in equations (3) is q. By solving equation (3) for q, we can find
the threshold value for an access. The solution of this equation is provided in the following
definition.
Definition 32. Given the utility values UG¯/A, UG¯/A¯, UG/A and UG/A¯ for context Xu, request Qu
for which a set of roles R′ are enabled for ur provided the risk management procedure allows
it, the decision-making threshold is defined as follows:
τ(R′,Xu) = UG/A¯ − UG¯/A¯
UG¯/A + UG/A¯ − UG/A − UG¯/A¯
If τ > 1 then τ = 1 and if τ < 0 then τ = 0.
The utility values depend on the context and request; hence, a different threshold is used
for each context and request. The risk management procedure is defined as follows.
Definition 33. Let R′ be a set of roles enabled for ur that satisfies request Qu under context
Xu. The risk management decision-making process is as follows:
RiskMan(R′,Xu) =
true if τ(R
′,Xu) > Pr[A | Xu, R′]
false if τ(R′,Xu) ≤ Pr[A | Xu, R′]
where Pr[A | Xu, R′] is the probability of Qu being an attack given Xu and R′.
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Table 6: Example utility values for two different contexts.
Utility for Qu, R’
Context UG/A UG/A¯ UG¯/A¯ UG¯/A τ
Xu1 (emergency room) 0 90 5 15 0.85
Xu2 (remote access) 0 70 10 25 0.71
Example 11. Consider a doctor trying to access a patient’s record in two different con-
texts. Suppose that a set of roles R′ could satisfy the doctor’s request, Qu, provided the risk
management procedure allows it. In context Xu1, he is trying to access from an emergency
room and in context Xu2 he is requesting the same record from his home. The utility val-
ues for both contexts and the threshold values are presented in Table 6. Because the utility
is a measure of satisfaction, the utility of granting access in an emergency room is larger
than denying the access when the doctor is at home when there is no attack. This is true
considering that granting access to a patient’s data from the emergency room may save the
patient’s life. Similarly, UR
′,Xu1
G¯/A¯ < U
R′,Xu2
G¯/A¯ , because we would be less satisfied to have an access
denied in the emergency room than in the other context. Given these utilities, the thresholds
are computed according to Definition 32. Suppose Pr[A | Xu1, R′] = Pr[A | Xu2, R′] = 0.8.
In this case, we have τ(R′,Xu1) = 0.85 > 0.8, so the access is granted. Note that this is
equivalent to finding the expected utilities in equations (1) and (2), for which the analysis
shows that EU(G,Xu1) = 18 and EU(G¯,Xu1) = 13. Since the expected utility of granting is
greater than the utility of denying the access, in this case, the best decision is to grant the
access. In context Xu2, τ(R′,Xu2) = 0.71 < 0.8, so the access is denied. Again, using the
threshold values is equivalent to computing the expected utilities, which are EU(G,Xu2) = 14
and EU(G¯,Xu2) = 22; it also results in denying the access. Hence, when the access is from
home, Xu2, the system requires a larger assurance that the request is not an attack, whereas
in a more critical type of access such as Xu1, the system is more tolerable to the risk of attack
because the associated utility values allow a riskier behavior.
Obtaining Utility Values: Utility values are subjective in nature and, therefore, each
organization should elicit them. An in-depth review of the widely studied utility elicitation
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process can be found in [39]. In what follows, we provide some guidelines to help the policy
administrator find these values.
• Utility values should be in the interval between zero and one hundred, where a higher
value reflects a higher preference for a particular outcome.
• Additionally, utility values should satisfy the following relations to be correct. First,
UG/A < UG/A¯, because an organization would be clearly more satisfied if an access request
is granted and it turns out to be a legitimate access request, than if granting the access
results in an attack. Similarly, UG¯/A < UG¯/A¯, because an organization is more satisfied if
an access request that aims to attack the organization is denied than if a non-malicious
access is denied.
• To find the utilities associated with a request Qu that requires the activation of R′, one
needs to consider the permissions that would be obtained by the requesting user, Pau(R
′),
and the inferred purpose of the request. To define a value for UR
′,Xu
G/A , all possible misuses
of the permissions authorized by R′ should be considered. Similarly, to define UR
′,Xu
G/A¯
the perceived benefit of granting access to R′ should be considered. This may change
according to the context of the user, which is often intertwined with the purpose of the
access, as example 11 illustrates. Another example of the perceived benefit associated
with granting a legitimate access is the benefit associated with the completion of a critical
transaction.
Estimating the Probability of Attack and Probability of collusion: G-SIR esti-
mates the probability of events A and A¯. We use the following methodology to find those
probabilities. The probability of attack depends on the behavior exhibited by the requester.
To compute it, all available information such as browsing history, email transfer, geo-social
behavior, among others can be aggregated. Geo-social information can also be included
as part of the information aggregated. Our previously proposed methodology presented in
Chapter 5 can be used to analyze the deviations from users’ observed behavior with respect
to geo-social contracts, geo-social obligations and geo-social trace constraints. Whenever a
user violates a contract, attempts an access without completing required traces or violates
an obligation, G-SIR creates a record that is later analyzed to determine how trustworthy
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the user is. To aggregate all such available information, several existing information fusion
approaches can be used (e.g., Bayesian networks [60, 61]). These information fusion ap-
proaches are dependent on the data available and the organization that is implementing it,
and they are out of the scope of this dissertation.
The probability of collusion is also an input for G-SIR (function PrCollusion). Depending
on the domain, collusion characteristics may vary. As a result indicators and methodologies
to find colluding users may change. Methodologies such as the ones presented in [89, 96]
may be used to determine the value of PrCollusion.
6.5 ENFORCEMENT ALGORITHM
To enforce the G-SIR policy, we propose Algorithm 4. The inputs to the algorithm are the
requester ur, a set of requested permissions P
′, the location of the requester Lu and his
context Xu. The algorithm looks for a set of roles R′ to satisfy the access request. If at
the end of the execution R′ is empty, the access is denied. Otherwise, it is granted. First,
the algorithm verifies if the requester ur is violating any contract in line 2, and if he is, the
access is denied.
Candidate role selection: Next, in line 4 the set of candidate roles Ravail is found using
function getCandidateRoles (presented in line 11). First, in line 12, the function verifies if
all permissions in P ′ can be obtained through the roles assigned to ur. If not, the request
cannot be granted because there are no roles assigned to ur that provide P
′. In which case,
an empty set of available roles is returned and the access is denied. Otherwise, the function
continues its execution initializing variables Ravail and Ri. Ravail is a set used to store roles
assigned to ur that have all its constraint vectors fulfilled according to Definition 30. Ri is
a set variable used to store roles that provide one or more permissions in P ′. Both Ravail
and Ri are initially empty. In line 15, all roles assigned to ur are evaluated and only those
that provide requested permissions are added to Ri. Then, in line 18 all roles in Ri are
verified to see if their constraint vectors are satisfied. This verification consists in evaluating
the following conditions (line 19): that ur’s current location allows the activation of r, that
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Algorithm 4 Geo-Social Decision Making Process
Input: ur:= requesting user, P
′:= Permissions requested, Lu:= location of ur, Xu:= context of ur.
Output: R′:= set of roles that fulfill Definition 31. If R′ 6= ∅, the access is denied. Otherwise,
roles R′ can be activated to grant the access request.
1: findGeoSocialRoleActivationSet(ur, P
′,Lu,Xu)
2: if ¬fulfillContracts(ur) then
3: return ∅ {Request denied}
4: Ravail ← getCandidateRoles(ur, P ′,Lu) {Candidate roles}
5: if Ravail = ∅ then
6: return ∅ {Request denied}
7: Rsel ← ∅ {Selected roles so far}
8: Prem ← P ′ {Set of permissions that haven’t been found}
9: R′ ← selectRolesMinimumRisk(Prem, Ravail, Rsel, ur,Xu) {See Chapter 4, Algorithm 1}
10: ———————————————————————————————————————–
11: getCandidateRoles(ur, P
′,Lu)
12: if (P ′ \ Pau(assigned(ur))) 6= ∅ then
13: return ∅ {Authorized roles cannot provides P ′}
14: Ravail, Ri ← ∅
15: for all r ∈ assigned(ur) do
16: if (Pau(r) ∩ P ′ 6= ∅) then
17: Ri ← Ri ∪ {r}
18: for all r ∈ Ri do
19: if validLocation(ur, r) ∧ completeTraces(r, ur)
∧ (inhibitors(ur, r) = ∅) then
20: if enoughNonColludingEnablers(r, ur) then
21: Ravail ← Ravail ∪ {r}
22: if (P ′ \ Pau(Ravail)) 6= ∅ then
23: return ∅ {Roles in Ravail cannot provides P ′}
24: return Ravail
25: ———————————————————————————————————————–
26: enoughNonColludingEnablers(r, ur)
27: for all ce ∈ r.E do
28: Uavail ← ∅
29: Uv ← vicinity(ce.SC) \ur
30: if |Uv| < ce.k then
31: return false
32: for all uv ∈ Uv do
33: if fulfillContracts(uv)
∧ fulfillSocialPredicate(ur, uv, ce.S) then
34: Uavail ← Uavail ∪ {uv}
35: if ce.k ≤ |Uavail| then
36: found← false
37: while Ua ⊆ combinations(Uavail, ce.k) ∧ ¬found do
38: if PrCollusion(Ua ∪ {ur}) < ce.τ then
39: found← true
40: if ¬found then
41: return false {Couldn’t find enablers for ce}
42: else
43: return false {Not enough users in Uavail}
44: return true {All enabling constraints are satisfied.}
115
ur has completed the traces required for the activation of r and that there are no users in
the vicinity who conflict with r’s inhibiting constraint. If these conditions are satisfied, the
function proceeds to evaluate if the enabling constraints associated with r are also fulfilled.
For this purpose, in line 20 a function that verifies r’s enabling constraints is invoked (we
discuss this function later). If r’s constraint vector is satisfied, r is added to Ravail in line
21. Hence, Ravail only contains roles with fulfilled constraint vector. Because Ravail may be
a subset of Ri, one last verification is performed. In line 22, roles in Ravail are verified to see
if they can provide all the permissions in P ′. If they cannot, the function returns an empty
set and the access is denied. Otherwise, Ravail is returned in line 24.
Finding non-colluding enablers: To find the set of non-colluding enablers function enough-
NonColludingEnablers is invoked in line 20. This function is presented in line 26. Variable
Uavail is initially empty and is used to store users who are potential enablers. For each
enabling constraint ce associated with role r (line 27), the set of users in the vicinity are
retrieved and stored in Uv (line 29). Users in Uv are examined to determine if they are vio-
lating their contracts or do not fulfill the required social predicate (line 33). Only users who
are not violating their contracts and fulfill ce’s social predicate are added to Uavail. After
that, if Uavail does not have the required ce.k the function returns false to show that there
are no valid enablers for r (line 43). Otherwise, groups of size k are evaluated in line 37. If
none of the groups evaluated are collusion free, the function returns false to show that there
are no valid enablers for ce. If a group Ua is found to be non-colluding with the required
probability, ce is satisfied and variable found is set to true to show that there is no need to
continue examining other groups. It is necessary to ensure that all enabling constraints in
r.E are satisfied; hence, the function continues evaluating all constraints (for loop line 27).
If after all constraints ce ∈ r.E have been evaluated and a set of collusion free enablers has
been found for each ce, the function returns true in line 44.
Selection of roles to activate with minimum risk: After Ravail is found, it is guaranteed to
have uniquely roles assigned to ur for which constraint vectors are fulfilled. If Ravail is empty,
there are no roles and the access is denied (line 6). Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds to
find the roles to be activated. There may be multiple subsets of roles in Ravail that could
satisfy the request. To select the set of roles to be activated, we leverage on Algorithm
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1 presented in Chapter 4, which selects the set of roles that minimizes the risk exposure.
This function, selectRolesMinimumRisk, is called in line 9. The only caveat is that the
threshold used in the algorithm is computed differently. Letting τ be the threshold found
through Definition 32 and τx be the threshold used in the algorithm presented in Chapter
4, when implementing function selectRolesMinimumRisk the following replacement should
be performed: τx = 1− τ . This follows because utility-based risk methodology proposed in
this chapter is built so that a request with higher risk has a smaller τ while τx follows the
opposite relation. After function selectRolesMinimumRisk is invoked, it returns the set of
roles with minimum risk exposure that can be activated by ur to satisfy the request. If the
function returns an empty set, no role can be activated to satisfy the access request and the
access is denied. Otherwise, the access is granted by activating R′.
6.6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed system using a discrete indoor simulator implemented in Java.
We describe the experimental setup and then the experimental results.
6.6.1 Experiment Setup
6.6.1.1 Generation of social graph and user mobility For simulating user mobility,
we randomly generated a map where the assumed organization is located, as follows. First,
we specified a size of a Cartesian rectangle. Then, we randomly selected the points where
places are located on the map. These places were also randomly connected according to the
parameters specified in Table 7. In our implementation, we used a graph abstraction where
vertices represent the places on the map and edges represent connections between places (for
e.g., corridors).
At the beginning of the simulation, all users were randomly placed on the map. Each
policy was evaluated at multiple time instants, and at every time instance users could move
around the map to adjacent places or stay in their current positions. The speed of the users
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was set to be 5 feet per second.
Social graphs were generated using the Jung API provided in [3]. We evaluated the
effect of representative types of network topologies on the system. The topologies evaluated
include preferential attachment [10] small world [77], power law [48] and a fully connected
network. These topologies are commonly observed in different social networks. All graphs
evaluated were undirected.
6.6.1.2 Generation of policy, access requests and threats Policies were randomly
generated using the parameters presented in Table 7. We ensured that all policies used
in the experiments were well-formed according to Definition 29. We selected the values of
the parameters inspired by previous works such as [11, 117], which evaluate RBAC policy
enforcement. Geo-social policies have not been evaluated in previous work. Hence, we
adjusted some parameters and included new ones to incorporate unique geo-social features.
In the following experiments, we test different values for those parameters to show their effect.
Role’ activation thresholds (which represent the maximum tolerable probability of attack,
Definition 32) were randomly assigned between 0 and 0.5 because it is only justifiable to use
roles with spatial scope and other geo-social constraints when the information protected is
valuable. The probabilities of attack used for the risk management procedure were randomly
generated for each user and assumed to be accurate. Initially, the probabilities of attack
were set to 0.01. Throughout the simulation, the probabilities of attack for each user were
randomly updated.
To generate inhibiting constraints, we created three classes of confidential data and
assigned to each class a color that represents the type of individuals who should not be
allowed to access it. When a role was generated with an inhibiting constraint, one color
was randomly selected. At the beginning of the simulation, we randomly selected inhibiting
users and tainted them with a random color.
Enabling constraints were randomly generated to required k users related by friendship
to the requester in the spatial scope of the role to be activated. Colluding communities were
randomly generated. We considered two parameters, the number of colluding communities
and the number of members per colluding community. For each community, we randomly
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selected a user and marked him as colluding and then, continued choosing some of his friends
as colluding until the number of colluding users per community was reached.
Trace constraints were generated randomly verifying that the path required to arrive at
the place of access did indeed exist. The number of previous places users needed to visit was
set as 2. The time required to fulfill the constraint (Definition 28) was generated considering
the distance between places and the speed of users to allow enough time.
Request generation, events counted as threats and measure of improvement: To
generate access requests, every time a user stepped into a place where there was a role with
spatial scope, a request was issued on his behalf. We consider the following as potential
insider threats:
(a) Not authorized for role: A user issues a request to obtain access to information he is not
authorized for.
(b) Inhibiting users: A user issues an access request, but there are inhibiting users in the
vicinity that may launch a proximity attack, e.g., if an access request is evaluated for a
role with color red, if any user tainted red is in the vicinity, he is classified as inhibitor.
(c) Lack of enablers: A request is issued, but there are not enough enablers at the required
place to authorize the request.
(d) Colluding users: A user issues an access request that requires enablers and the only
people who could serve as enablers are colluding according to the collusion threshold.
(e) Enablers violating contracts: A user issues a request for which all potential enablers are
violating their contracts (they are in places where they should not be).
(f) Suspicious requester: A user issues a request for which the probability of attack is too
high compared to the role’s activation threshold.
(g) Incomplete traces: A user issues a request without completing the required traces.
Each access request was only classified in a single category according to the order of constraint
evaluation in Algorithm 4.
To evaluate our proposed approach, we use as a baseline the Geo-Social RBAC model
introduced in Chapter 2, section 2.6. Some of our experiments aim to measure the percentage
of threats detected by our framework in comparison to the baseline. Our objective is to
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Table 7: Default experiment parameters. The number of users is used to scale the size of
the evaluated policies.
Parameter Value
Ratio of total number of places to total number of
users
1:3
User speed 5 feet per second
Map coordinates (size of Cartesian map) (300 feet x 300 feet)
Ratio of number of users to roles 4:1
Ratio of roles assigned per user to number of roles 1:2
Inhibiting constraints per role 1
Percentage of roles with inhibiting constraints 50%
Number of inhibitors 3 types of inhibiting users (colors),
40% of users were assigned a random
color.
Enabling constraints per role 1
Range of k [1, 3]
Required social relation Friendship
Collusion threshold 0.9
Number of colluding communities 5% of number of users
Number of colluding users per community 5
Roles with trace-based constraints 5%
Roles with geo-social contracts 40%
Simulation time 8 hours
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Figure 20: Comparisons between the proposed G-SIR and the baseline (Geo-Social RBAC).
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present an overall picture of the effect of including a relevant policy constraint in G-SIR
with respect to the baseline. We refer to this number as improvement and it is computed
as follows4: improvement =
[
nproposed
nbaseline
]
− 1, where nproposed is the number of potentially
malicious access requests (threats) detected by G-SIR which is equal to the sum of all
previously described threats (a) to (g) and nbaseline is the number of threats detected by the
baseline, which is the addition of threats of type (a), (c) and (g). In the following figures,
we show the improvement as a percentage.
6.6.2 Analysis of Results
In this subsection, we discuss and analyze the results of our various experiments. Each
reported experimental measurement is the average of running the simulation 30 times (each
time a different randomly generated policy was used). The results presented were found using
30 randomly generated OSNs, 10 of each topology. The number of users in the simulation
were fixed at 250. Some experiments change the policy size; this value is determined by the
number of users according to the parameters in Table 7.
Baseline Comparisons: First, we present an overview of the types of attacks prevented
by the proposed G-SIR with respect to the baseline, Geo-Social RBAC. Figure 20a shows the
number of threats detected by G-SIR that could not be captured by the baseline. The first
column in the figure presents the number of access requests denied because the requester was
not authorized for a role; hence, this number is the same for both approaches. The second
and third columns show the number of requests denied due to lack of enablers and incom-
plete traces, this is slightly larger for the baseline, because our approach finds other policy
violations first, according to the order presented in Algorithm 4. Geo-Social RBAC does not
capture any of the remaining violations: suspicious requester, enablers violating contracts,
inhibiting users and colluding users. We note that there may be some misclassifications in
the counts of suspicious requester and colluding users. This is caused by the uncertainty in
the estimation of the probability of attack and the probability of collusion, respectively. We
present the number of false positives and false negatives in a later experiment. In this exper-
4This formula is typically used to determine the percentage of new features captured by a proposed
approach with respect to a baseline.
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iment, we assume that these two values are accurate. Given this assumption, the proposed
G-SIR mitigates more threats.
Figure 20b presents the number of requests granted by the baseline and our proposed
approach. In the x-axis, we show the results for multiple policy sizes. The dotted line
represents the number of requests granted that are legitimate. All requests that are above
that line are malicious ones and should not have been granted. The table below the figure
contains the exact percentage of malicious requests granted by the baseline that G-SIR was
successfully able to deny. Overall, the results show that the baseline granted around 33%
of malicious requests irrespective of the policy size. The policy size uniquely influenced the
total number of requests granted. Overall, G-SIR was able to identify 33% more policy
violations than the baseline.
The percentage of additional threats captured by G-SIR depends on the type of policy
enforced, in particular, the number of roles assigned to each user. Figure 20c presents the
improvement measured as the percentage of threats detected by our framework in comparison
to the baseline Geo-Social RBAC. In the x-axis of Figure 20c, we show the percentage of roles
assigned to users. The bars represent the percentage of threats detected by the proposed
system that are not detected by the baseline5. We present the percentage of threats for
two simulation techniques. The first one, when access requests are completely randomly
generated, and the second one, when requests are randomly generated but users only issue
requests for their authorized roles. Figure 20c shows that the improvement increases as the
percentage of roles assigned to users also increases. This is the case because, for smaller
percentage of role assignments, the majority of access requests denied are denied because
users are not authorized for roles. Since both the baseline Geo-Social RBAC and the proposed
G-SIR detect this type of threat, the improvement in comparison to the baseline is smaller.
For this reason, the percentage of new threats captured by our framework is larger when we
run the simulation such that users only request an access if they are authorized for a role. As
it can be seen, the improvement increases with respect to the results shown for completely
random requests.
5We found this number using the improvement formula previously presented in this sub-section; hence,
the line 0% represents Geo-Social RBAC.
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We note that the difference between the percentage of threats captured in Figure 20b and
the malicious request granted by Geo-Social RBAC in 20b is due to the difference between
the number of requests generated by the simulator that were granted and the number of
requests that were denied. The number of requests denied due to the lack of assigned role,
and lack of enablers is substantially larger than all other types of requests (Figure 20a)
including the number of granted requests. Hence, the improvement reported is greater than
when only the number of granted requests is considered.
In the following, we present the effect of increasing both the percentage of attacks that
are addressed by G-SIR and the different types of constraints in the system. Unless explicitly
mentioned, parameters are maintained to their default values (Table 7).
Proximity Attacks: In Figure 21a we present the percentage of threats prevented by
G-SIR that were not captured by the baseline as the number of inhibiting users increases. In
this figure, the baseline is represented by the line in 0%. When only 10% of the users were
inhibitors, G-SIR was able to capture 3.5% more threats than the baseline. While a system
where 90% of the users cannot learn some information (recall that there are three colors),
resulted in an improvement of 5.9% of threats captured. Figure 21a, was built for a policy
where 80% of roles had an inhibiting constraint.
Figure 21b presents the effect of environments with a different number of inhibiting users
under policies with various number of roles with inhibiting constraints. As the number of
roles with inhibiting constraints increases, there are more confidentiality leaks prevented.
Similarly, as the number of inhibitors in the vicinity increases, the number of leaks of con-
fidential information due to proximity attacks is also higher. Since the baseline does not
prevent this type of attacks, the overall number of threats prevented by G-SIR increases.
When 100% of users are assigned an inhibiting color and all roles have an inhibiting con-
straint associated with them, the number of threats mitigated goes up to 6.8%.
In our next experiment, we counted as a confidentiality threat an attempt to do any
of the following: i) when a user tries to access a role that he is not assigned to and the
role has an inhibiting constraint that conflicts with the color of the user, ii) when there are
inhibitors in the vicinity, iii) when there is a collusion to access confidential information and
iv) when there is a contract violation and the violating user is trying to serve as an enabler.
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Figure 21: G-SIR proximity threat results.
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Using this classification, in Figure 21c, we present a comparison between the percentage of
confidentiality threats detected by G-SIR in contrast to Geo-Social RBAC. In this experi-
ment, the proposed G-SIR captures more confidentiality threats than those captured by the
baseline (Geo-Social RBAC). Geo-Social RBAC only captures confidentiality threats of type
i). As the percentage of inhibiting users increases, the number of all types of confidentiality
violation attempts enumerated before also increases; including those of type i). That is why
we see that the percentage of confidentiality threats captured by Geo-Social RBAC does
increase with the number of inhibiting users. However, there is always a large percentage
of threats that are not detected by Geo-Social RBAC. Figure 21c was generated for policies
where 60% of roles have inhibiting constraints. For these policies, the percentage of threats
not captured by Geo-Social RBAC vary between 92% to 72%. For policies with a higher
number of roles with inhibiting constraints, the number of threats not captured by Geo-
Social RBAC that are captured by our G-SIR is larger. For instance, when all roles have
inhibiting constraints and there are 90% of inhibiting users, the percentage of threats not
captured by the baseline captured by G-SIR increases to 76%. This corresponds to 4% more
than the same data point in Figure 21c. These experiments show that G-SIR is effective
capturing proximity and confidentiality threats.
Collusion Attacks: Figure 22 presents the effect of increasing the number of colluding
users per community (x-axis) and the number of colluding communities. Colluding attacks
are not prevented by the baseline, hence all the lines in the figure represent attacks thwarted
by G-SIR. The results reported were generated for policies with enabling constraints that re-
quired one enabler (k = 1). In this experiment, we assumed that the colluding communities
and users were known. Hence, all attacks presented in Figure 22 can be prevented by G-SIR.
In a real system, the accuracy depends on the accuracy of the community detection algo-
rithms used, e.g., [89, 96]. Figure 22 shows that the number of colluding attacks prevented
by G-SIR increases with the number of communities. This follows because the probability
of detecting an attack when more communities exist is larger. Similarly, as the number of
colluding members per community increases, the probability of a collusion attack increases
and the number of collusion threats increases.
Geo-Social Contract Violations: Figure 23 presents the number of contract violations
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Figure 22: Collusion threats captured by G-SIR.
stopped by G-SIR as the percentage of roles with contract constraints increases. Note that
the baseline does not prevent any of these attacks. In Figure 23a, we present the overall
increase on the number of threats uniquely prevented by G-SIR and Figure 23b the absolute
number of contract violations. In both figures, as the number of geo-social contracts in the
policy increases, the threats captured by the G-SIR also increases. This implies that for
organizations that require more protection against users wandering through unauthorized
places, G-SIR performs better. Recall that policies randomly generated by our simulator
are well-formed and all roles have a spatial scope assigned to them. Hence, the number
of contract violations uniquely contains threats where a potential enabler is violating a
contract. Had we used policies that contain conflicts, the number of violations reported
would be larger, as the verification in line 2 of Algorithm 4 never evaluated to true during
our simulations. Therefore, these figures uniquely show attacks that aim at using enablers
that are not qualified to be in the required spatial scope. These figures show a clear trend
where the number of attacks stopped increases as the roles with contracts is incremented.
The fluctuations shown, reflect users’ random movements.
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Figure 23: Effect of geo-social contracts on the number of threats captured.
Sensitivity and specificity analysis: G-SIR takes as input the estimated probability
of attack. In this experiment, we measure the effect of using estimation methodologies with
different values of average error, ε, on the number of threats detected by G-SIR. For this
purpose, we generated synthetic data as follows. We randomly selected a probability of
attack, q, for each user; this value was considered as the ground truth. Then, the estimated
probability, qˆ, was randomly selected in the interval [q− ε/2, q+ ε/2]. We changed the value
of ε between 0.1 and 0.8. The observations generated by the simulation runs were classified
according to Figure 24a as true positives (TP), false negatives (FN), false positives (FP) and
true negatives (TN).
Figure 24 presents the results of this experiment, which include the average number of TP,
FN, FP and TN as well as the average sensitivity and specificity. Figure 24b shows that the
number of TP decreases very little as the estimation error increases. In the worst case, when
ε=0.8, the number of TP is reduced on average by four observations which is relatively small
compared to the total number of observations. As expected, the number of FN increases with
the increase in the average estimation error as shown in Figure 24c. The average number of
FN for the largest estimation error (ε=0.8) is 5.4 which is relatively small in comparison to
the total number of observations. These results indicate that G-SIR is capable of stopping
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most threats generated by the simulator even when the performance of the information
module is not good. This is the case because not all access request decisions are based on
inferred information. Hence, access decisions that do not require inferred information are
correctly made even if the inference module predictions are inadequate. Additionally, in our
simulation, the thresholds related to roles reflect the fact that only valuable information
is protected with geo-social policies. In Figure 24d as the estimation error increases, the
number of TN decreases. The effect of the estimation error can be seen on the average FP
shown in Figure 24e. This indicates that under poor estimation methodologies, the number
of requests denied to legitimate users increases; however, in real systems, the estimation
error in most cases should be small.
Sensitivity and specificity are measures that provide an overview of all the previous results
and are shown in Figure 24f. Sensitivity represents the percentage of attackers who are
correctly identified as attackers while specificity shows the percentage of legitimate insiders
who are correctly identified as not being a threat. The sensitivity measure shows that
G-SIR is good in capturing attacks even when the estimation error increases. This is a
consequence of the following two facts. First, some of the policy constraints that are part of
G-SIR do not depend on the inferred input data, so they can be enforced correctly without
any influence of the estimation error. Secondly, the thresholds used in the simulation were
selected to ensure that, as in real policies, only relevant information would be protected by
G-SIR policies. Thus, when the inferred probability of attack is too high, even under certain
error, the enforcement mechanism will deny access to the most important information. The
specificity shows that as the estimation error increases, the number of honest insiders that
are denied access to very critical resources increases as well. This shows that G-SIR does
capture imminent insider threats even under suboptimal input.
Runtime overhead: In Figure 25, the difference between the time required by Geo-
Social RBAC and G-SIR is shown for policies of multiple sizes. Our proposed G-SIR intro-
duces some additional runtime overhead due to the extra verifications performed. However,
the overhead is acceptable in comparison to Geo-Social RBAC.
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6.6.3 Limitations of the Experiments
Evaluating insider threat mitigation systems is a challenging task given the lack of ground
truth data, standard metrics or methods to assess new approaches [62]. Furthermore, the
abnormalities in the patterns of mobility of users during working hours have not been studied
previously. Hence, there is not a well-known way to introduce insider attacks of this type into
our simulation. In the previous experiments, we worked around this problem by randomly
generating threats. The same randomly generated threats were used to compare G-SIR
and Geo-Social RBAC. By randomly generating the threats, we tried to reduce as much as
possible biasing the results. To better understand how the model would work under different
circumstances, we run experiments under multiple parameter configurations.
In some experiments, we assumed that the inference module was accurate. This module
is in charge of finding the colluding communities that lead to the computation of function
PrCollusion as well as finding the probability of attack Pr[A | Xu, R′] used by the risk man-
agement procedure. These probabilities are an estimation and hence they have an associated
uncertainty. The false positives and false negatives that result due to the enforcement of our
model do depend on the error associated with the methodologies to estimate these proba-
bilities. Despite the difficulty of using estimation methodologies as part of this simulation,
we run the experiment presented in Figure 24 to understand how robust G-SIR is under dif-
ferent estimation errors. This experiment shows that the G-SIR is robust preventing insider
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threats.
Other types of attacks that were not included in our simulation, but that certainly may
impact a real production system include the following. We assumed that the locations of all
users were known with high accuracy during the simulation. In real systems, the location
may not be known with 100% accuracy for reasons that include technological limitations,
malicious insiders tampering equipment or using other ways to spoof their location. Other
attacks that may influence the security of the system are tampering or manipulation of
the social graph. In our simulation, social graphs were generated at the beginning and
did not change throughout the simulation. Hence, this threat was not measured by our
simulation. Despite these limitations, we believe the experimental results show that the
proposed framework can mitigate threats that existing approaches fail to prevent.
6.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, we presented G-SIR. As part of this framework, we developed several pol-
icy constraints that can serve to specify appropriate and inappropriate geo-social behavior.
These constraints include geo-social contracts, geo-social obligations, inhibiting, enabling and
trace-based constraints. Their enforcement can help understand the context of a requester
and subsequently deny accesses that impose too high of a risk. Additionally, by monitoring
G-SIR policy compliance logs, it is possible to identify users whose geo-social behavior is
questionable, dangerous or suspicious. We also presented a utility-based decision making
approach to make access control decisions. Finally, we evaluated our approach through sim-
ulations and showed that enforcing the proposed G-SIR policy can help capture some threats
that cannot be prevented using existing techniques.
In the next chapter, we present the conclusions, limitation and future work related to
this dissertation.
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7.0 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
As part of this dissertation, we have presented three complementary frameworks that aim at
mitigating insider threats and unintentional damages in systems that use RBAC, obligations
and Geo-Social information to perform access control.
We have presented an approach to perform access control considering the behavior of the
users, and the risk exposure that an organization is ready to accept when granting access to
certain roles in the system. Our approach adapts to negative behaviors of users by denying
access to permissions whose misuse would negatively impact an organization. In this way,
our approach is able to mitigate possible attacks when there are technical precursors that
indicate a user is behaving maliciously. In order to reduce the risk exposure further, we have
also defined an optimization problem, and an algorithm that reduces the risk exposure. We
have presented experimental results for different types of policies. We believe the features
offered by our framework make it difficult for insider attackers to misuse their privileges.
Additionally, we have proposed a framework to control the risk exposure caused by a
posteriori obligations. As part of this framework, we proposed and evaluated a methodology
to identify how trustworthy a user is to fulfill a posteriori obligations. Our methodology con-
siders the latest, historical and sudden changes on users’ behavior as well as users’ behavior
compared to his peers. The obligation-based trust value associated with each user is used
to decide whether to grant or deny accesses that create a posteriori obligations. When a
user is not considered trusted enough to fulfill a posteriori obligations, accesses that require
the assignment of highly critical obligations are denied. In this way, our framework reduces
the risk exposure caused by a posteriori obligations and identifies and deters insider threats
without compromising the privacy of the users. In addition, we proposed a clustering-based
methodology to find patterns of misbehavior and outliers in the system. Our methodology
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can serve to identify policy misconfigurations and suspicious users. This information allows
the system administrator to take appropriate measures.
Our trust methodology can be integrated into any access control model that includes a
posteriori obligations (e.g., UCON) and risk aware role activation mechanisms (e.g., [11]).
We believe that considering the inherent risk of a posteriori obligations can help the systems
better understand a user’s intentions and mood as well as reduce the risk exposure of an
organization.
Our third proposed framework is designed to take advantage of the increasing availabil-
ity of geo-social information to prevent insider attacks. Few approaches have incorporated
geo-social information into the access control decision-making process and none of them
have considered the intricacies of incorporating geo-social information as part of the ac-
cess control system for insider threat mitigation. First, we performed an analysis of insider
threats that arise when geo-social information is used to perform access control decisions. To
capture these new threats, we proposed Geo-Social Insider Threat Resilient Access Control
Framework (G-SIR). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first effort to use geo-social in-
formation to deter insider threats by incorporating it into the access control mechanism. We
proposed an access control methodology that includes several novel policy constraints that
include geo-social contracts, geo-social risk aware trace constraints, inhibiting constraints,
enabling constraints, and geo-social obligations. Enforcing these constraints helps in reducing
the risk of proximity and social engineering attacks. Additionally, monitoring the fulfillment
of these constraints may help identify suspicious users. We proposed an enforcement algo-
rithm and presented simulation results to evaluate the proposed framework. We believe that
as a result of our proposed research, organizations with geo-social security requirements will
be more likely to embrace the advantages that geo-social access control systems offer.
7.0.1 Limitations and future work
There are two limitations related to the proposed work. First, we assume that all insiders
access the system through a reference monitor (the PEP in Figure 2). Any attack vectors
that subvert or circumvent the PEP cannot be detected by our approach. Examples of
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these vectors include exploiting vulnerabilities in the operating systems, physical attacks to
unencrypted disks, among others. Hence, complementary measures are necessary to protect
against these threats.
Secondly, our framework uses a threshold-based approach to adapt to negative changes in
behavior. The threshold may be computed based on multiple anomaly detection indicators
and anomaly detection techniques. For this reason, there are certain types of attacks that
cannot be prevented using our approach. In particular, we distinguish between two types
of attacks. i) Threshold manipulation: Carefully crafted insider attacks may not be noticed
if the insider manages to maintain a profile that is not recognized as suspicious by the
predictive system. Although we have proposed a methodology to find obligation-based trust
values that is difficult to manipulate by powerful adversaries (Chapter 5), there may be
multiple sources of information used to calculate the thresholds used by our first and third
framework. Attack vectors to achieve this effect may include patiently training the anomaly
detection systems to trick them to believe the actions of insider attackers are legitimate [55].
Another way to achieve this effect is by colluding with other users to modify the profile.
ii) Rage attacks: Similarly, users whose previous behavior is exemplary and in a moment of
rage decide to perform an attack that requires a single or few accesses that cause a great
deal of damage may not be prevented by our proposed solution. We have proposed the
use of enabler constraints and geo-social contracts as part of our work; these may help to
deter some of these attacks. Albeit, they may not be enough. Therefore, complementary
mitigation techniques are necessary to ensure that these types of attacks are prevented.
As it is the case with any interesting problem, there is a great deal of future work that
remains to be done in this area. With respect to the prevention of inference of unauthorized
information, there are some interesting research directions. As part of this dissertation, we
proposed a model that assumes the existence of inference tuples. Inference tuples capture
what we believe is a significant portion of inferences. However, there might be more complex
inference patterns of interest or there may be multiple insiders colluding to infer unauthorized
information. Future research work includes developing approaches to capture more complex
inference threats.
With respect to data collection, our frameworks require monitoring users’ behavior. This
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information is fed to a probabilistic system to determine the probability of an access request
resulting in an attack. In this dissertation, we assumed that it is possible to obtain and
analyze this information without constraints. However, to apply this system in real en-
vironments, it is necessary to consider several issues along the legal, privacy and ethical
dimensions. Future work may include the design of technical solutions that provide privacy
guaranties for users. Additionally, techniques to ensure that geo-social data is not spoofed
are needed.
With respect to policy specification, future work includes designing graphical interfaces
to specify risk-and-trust policies as well as performing usability studies to help select inter-
faces that reduce policy specification errors.
Finally, we believe that the methodologies, approaches and analysis presented in this
dissertation are important to understand and prevent insider threats. Our proposed research
is useful for multiple types of organizations.
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APPENDIX
ENTROPY AND PURITY OF CLUSTERING SOLUTIONS
Entropy and Purity are two measures typically used to evaluate the quality of clustering
solutions when the ground truth (classes) are known [121]. Entropy is a function of the
distribution of classes in the resulting clusters. The entropy for each cluster Sr of size nr is
defined as:
E(Sr) = − 1
log(q)
q∑
i=1
nir
nr
log
nir
nr
where q is the number of classes in the data set, and nir is the number of users of the class
ith that were assigned to the rth cluster. The entropy of the entire solution is computed as
follows:
Entropy =
k∑
r=1
nr
n
E(Sr)
where n is the total number of users in each cluster and k is the number of found clusters.
An algorithm that provides a perfect solution, according to the entropy metric, will result
in clusters that contain users from a single class, in which case Entropy = 0. The smaller
the entropy the better.
Purity is a function of the relative size of the largest class in the resulting clusters. The
purity of cluster Sr is defined as
P (Sr) =
1
nr
maxi(n
i
r)
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which is the number of users of the largest class in a cluster divided by the cluster size. The
total purity of a clustering solution is the weighted average of the clusters’ purities:
Purity =
k∑
r=1
nr
n
P (Sr)
A higher purity represents a better solution.
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